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Via the Institute of Internal Auditors, founded in 1941, the internal auditing profession actively promote the quality of internal auditors and internal audit activities. Since 1999, internal auditing standards have been revised. From 1 January 2002, all internal audit activities/any consultant rendering internal auditing services must undergo quality control, according to the provisions of Attribute Standard 1300. The revised internal auditing standards on quality control in internal audit activities reflect fundamental changes for the internal auditing profession. This article analyses the formal prescriptions and guidelines on quality in internal audit activities contained in the internal auditing standards and related practice advisories.

Internal audit executives instruct the internal audit department to supervise corporate business management activities, evaluate internal controls and risks and provide recommendations for operating. Therefore, this paper aims to confirm whether and how the supervisory ability of the chief internal audit executive enhances the internal audit department’s function to prevent corporate fraud. Based on the results, this paper further researches the role of the supervisory board position in this relationship.

This paper examines 922 small and medium-sized listed enterprises in China from 2010 to 2017 and empirically investigates the influence of the internal audit executive’s supervisory ability (IAESA) on the occurrence of corporate fraud.

The results reveal that the IAESA is significantly negatively correlated with the occurrence of corporate fraud. This suppression effect is more pronounced when the internal audit executive is also the company’s supervisor. However, if the internal audit executive is the chairman of the board of supervisors, the suppression effect no longer exists. This paper therefore confirms that the IAESA curbs corporate fraud via the improvement of the internal corporate control level.

Because the sample data was limited by the information disclosure level of the included companies, the sample size was relatively small as compared with those of other studies.

This study not only expands the research perspective in the field of internal audit functions but also provides a decision-making reference for the prevention of corporate fraud.

This paper extends an approach that might be able to curb corporate fraud.

A comprehensive index was developed using data envelope analysis to quantify the supervisory ability of internal audit executives. Based on this, this research confirms that the internal audit department performs a “firewall function” to prevent corporate fraud.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether there is a significant deficit in the assurance needs of boards and, if so, what might be done to fill this gap and whether internal auditors have a role to play in this.

Contemporary examples of boards being taken by surprise are analysed, making extensive use of high quality reports and other information. The role played by internal audit, both in these cases and with reference to what is currently regarded as “best practice” is explored to assess internal audit's potential to evolve to meet the challenge.

Boards are exposed to a partial assurance vacuum which urgently needs to be filled. If internal audit can make a further quantum leap, as internal audit has done in other respects in the past, then internal audit may fulfil this need.

This research is based on the plentiful information in the public domain which has been sufficient to reliably support the conclusions drawn.

Nothing less than a root and branch revamp of internal auditing is called for. If responded to, the rewards for internal audit and the added value for boards and their stakeholders will be massive.

While internal auditors are tentatively moving into the audit of governance processes, this paper argues that internal audit must be much bolder to become a respected corporate governance partner to the board.

The purpose of this study is to explore the internal audit actors and stakeholders' perceptions of the IA status in Iranian companies, and those actors and stakeholders' roles in shaping the current situation of IA in Iran.

This paper uses the interpretive qualitative method. Data comprises of semi-structured interviews with board of directors, audit committees, chief executive officers and chief audit executives. The paper analyzes internal audit policy documents, reports and legislations.

The results illustrate that the internal audit in Iran is perceived as a “perfunctory” practice among its stakeholders due to being recognized as an inefficient process. The key actors and stakeholders in internal audit process–including executive and board managers, audit committee members and chief audit executives–play important roles in shaping the current status of internal audit via their perceptions and actions.

The fact that internal audit in Iran is perceived as an inefficient process and is used as a perfunctory practice highlights the importance of addressing this issue at the standardization and regulation level. The deficits in the roles of key actors and stakeholders need to be considered as the legislative guide in different levels.

Prior studies mostly focus on the role of internal audit in organizations. In contrast, this study focuses on the role of key actors and stakeholders of internal auditing process in shaping the current perceived role of internal audit in organizations. Also, the study examines an emerging economy, which differs from advanced economies in important ways, including regulations, organizational culture, internal control structure and internal audit.

This paper aims to offer empirical evidence about the effect of the interaction between the audit committee and the internal audit function (IAF) on the moral courage of the chief audit executive (CAE).

A mixed approach was followed. In the first stage, questionnaires were sent to CAEs of 60 listed, financial and non-financial Tunisian companies. To enhance the depth of the analysis, in the second stage, semi-directed interviews with 22 CAEs from listed financial and non-financial Tunisian companies were performed.

This paper found that the existence of private access to the audit committee has a positive effect on the moral courage of the CAE. The number of meetings between the audit committee and the CAE, the examination of internal audit programmes and results together with the contribution of the audit committee to the appointment and dismissal of the CAE do not show a significant link with the moral courage of the CAE. It also found an insignificant relationship between the audit committee’s examination of interaction between management and the IAF and the moral courage of the CAE.

To the best of the authors' knowledge, this paper fills one of the major research gaps in the auditing literature by demonstrating the critical role of audit committee–internal audit interaction in promoting the CAE’s moral courage to behave ethically.

Examines the role of professional associations, governmental agencies, and international accounting and auditing bodies in promulgating standards to foster auditor independence domestically and abroad. Focuses specifically on the role played by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA), the Securities and Exchange Commission and the US Government Accounting Office. Also looks at other professional associations in banking, industry, and manufacturing sectors dealing with sensitive issues of auditors′ involvement in such matters as management advisory services, operating responsibilities, outsourcing, opinion shopping, auditor rotation, and other conflicts of interest which may impair auditor independence.

Audit committees have been established with varying success in recent years. Although they should have a broad mandate to deal with a range of corporate issues, the committees often concentrate primarily on external audit reviews. This tendency can be addressed through the development of a close relationship between the audit committee and internal audit. The factors which will affect the internal auditor′s ability to foster this relationship include competence, corporate culture and positive thinking. Internal auditors have the opportunity to influence the role of the audit committee and ensure maximum effect in respect of good corporate management and control.

Audit committees have increasingly been recognised as an integral part of modern control structures and governance practices in both the private sector and public service. The audit committee is an integral element of public accountability and governance processes. It plays a key role in underwriting the integrity of corporate governance of a government department. The broad aim of this study is to investigate the status and function of audit committees in South African national government departments. The research question investigated in this paper is to determine whether audit committees in the public service are perceived to be effective in assisting accounting officers of government departments to discharge their responsibilities. The study concludes that the majority of audit committees in the South African public service are not perceived as ineffective in the performance of the required functions of committees. Audit committees can still improve their effectiveness in their performance of certain key functions in the areas of oversight over risk management, governance, financial reporting, internal control and support for the external audit function.

The purpose of this study is to establish the relationship between chief executive officer (CEO) power, audit committee effectiveness and earnings quality in regulated firms in Uganda.

The authors employed cross-sectional and correlational research designs, based on a sample of 136 regulated firms in Uganda. Data were collected using a questionnaire survey from Chief Finance Officers and Chief Audit Executives. Data were analyzed using a Statistical Package for Social Sciences and Partial Least Squares Structural Equation Modeling.

Results indicate that CEO power causes negative variances in earnings quality. The results also reveal that audit committee effectiveness positively relates relatively similarly with earnings quality. In addition, CEO power and audit committee effectiveness are negative and significantly related. The results further indicate that CEO power and earnings quality are mediated by audit committee effectiveness.

CEO power creates an opaque accounting environment which may leave the stakeholders unable to evaluate the true economic reality of the firm. Audit committee effectiveness is an important enabler for reporting high-quality earnings even in the presence of a powerful CEO.

This study contributes toward a methodological stance of using perceptions to understand earnings quality in regulated firms in Uganda. This is probably the first study that has specifically explored earnings quality using only the fundamental qualitative characteristics of accounting information (as proxies) as enshrined in the Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting 2018 particularly in Uganda since Her adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards in 1998. Second, the indirect effect of audit committee effectiveness and CEO power is tested.

This study aims to critically analyse the independence of the internal audit function through its relationship with management and the audit committee.

Results are based on a critical comparison of responses from questionnaires sent out to Australian chief audit executives (CAEs) versus existing literature and best practice guidelines.

With respect to the internal audit function's relationship with management, threats identified include: using the internal audit function as a stepping stone to other positions; having the chief executive officer (CEO) or chief finance officer (CFO) approve the internal audit function's budget and provide input for the internal audit plan; and considering the internal auditor to be a “partner”, especially when combined with other indirect threats. With respect to the relationship with the audit committee, significant threats identified include CAEs not reporting functionally to the audit committee; the audit committee not having sole responsibility for appointing, dismissing and evaluating the CAE; and not having all audit committee members or at least one member qualified in accounting.

This study introduces independence threat scores, thereby generating analysis of the internal audit function's independence taking into account a combination of threats.