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This study aims to investigate how major big bath accounting practices and CEO turnover in Egypt relate to one another, as well as the first to use the CEO’s origin as a moderating factor.

This study uses 10-year longitudinal data from 2012 to 2021 and 290 firm-year observations from Egypt’s listed nonfinancial firms that witnessed CEO turnover to identify the significant big bath accounting practices in Egyptian businesses after the Egyptian revolution and the COVID-19 pandemic. Using fixed and random effect models, the authors investigate the impact of CEO turnover on company earnings during the first year of a newly appointed CEO as an indicator of big bath practices after controlling CEO gender, experience, firm size, leverage, return on assets, return on equity and industry. The hypotheses were investigated using static panel data.

The results show the presence of big bath practices in the Egyptian market. Furthermore, big bath accounting practices are positively correlated with CEO turnover. Moreover, the results indicate that big bath accounting practices are only endured when external CEOs are employed, rather than internal ones.

The sample size and availability of data are the main research limitations. In addition, this study only examined CEO turnover and CEO origin as moderators in big bath accounting. Thus, future research may consider other CEO characteristics and political factors associated with big bath practices.

The findings from this study offer valuable insights to investors and regulators for effective decision-making and governance practices within the Egyptian capital market, while also contributing to a more informed approach to emerging markets on a global scale.

The findings contribute to the big-bath and CEO turnover and origin literature by showing a lower ceiling for earnings manipulation and using Egypt as a case study due to its unique institutional environment.

This study aims to examine the effects of firm performance on chief executive officer (CEO) turnover and the moderating role of CEO attributes on the firm performance–CEO turnover relationship.

Probit regressions were used to examine the relationship between various CEO attributes and CEO turnover and the moderation effect of firm performance on the CEO attributes–CEO turnover relationship. The sample comprises firms from the FTSE 350 Index covering the period 1999–2018.

The results indicate that firm performance negatively and significantly impacts CEO turnover. Further analysis reveals that selected CEO attributes, namely, CEO internal experience, CEO network size and CEO age, moderate the relationship between firm performance and CEO turnover. Specifically, CEO internal experience and performance combine to reduce the likelihood of CEO turnover. However, CEO network size and age when combined with firm performance increase the likelihood of CEO turnover.

The results imply that boards should pay more attention to CEO attributes in their decisions to hire and fire executive managers as these factors may affect a wide variety of firm outcomes.

This paper makes key contributions to the CEO turnover and corporate governance literature by providing evidence of key factors other than performance that can affect the CEO dismissal decision. Specifically, this study shows that CEO attributes such as CEO internal experience, CEO networks and CEO age far outweigh the importance of performance as a factor influencing CEO turnover decisions.

The purpose of this paper is to empirically analyze the impact of chief executive officer (CEO) turnover on strategic change and explore the mediating role of organizational slack between them, as well as the moderating role and joint moderating role of top management team (TMT) external social network, ownership nature and industry type.

Based on the upper echelons theory, resource allocation theory and structuration theory, this paper takes the unbalanced panel data of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges of China from 2001 to 2018 as the research sample, uses ordinary least squares (OLS) regression method and fixed effect model to study the relationship between CEO turnover and strategic change, and focuses on the mediating mechanism and moderating mechanism between them.

The authors find that CEO turnover is positively related to strategic change. When a CEO turns over, a new CEO will initiate strategic change. Precipitation organizational slack plays a mediating role between CEO turnover and strategic change. Non-precipitation organizational slack has no mediating effect between CEO turnover and strategic change, which is embodied as “suppressing effects.” When the non-precipitation organizational slack variable is controlled, the impact of CEO turnover on strategic change will be enhanced. TMT external social network, ownership nature and industry type all negatively moderate the relationship between CEO turnover and strategic change. TMT external social network and ownership nature have a joint moderating effect between CEO turnover and strategic change. When TMT external social network is small, CEO turnover has a positive effect on strategic change in both state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises, but the promotion effect is stronger in non-state-owned enterprises. When TMT external social network is large, the positive effect of CEO turnover on strategic change in state-owned enterprises is from strong to weak, but in the non-state-owned enterprises is from weak to strong. TMT external social network and industry type have a joint moderating effect between CEO turnover and strategic change. When TMT external social network is small, CEO turnover has a positive impact on strategic change in high-tech enterprises and non-high-tech enterprises, but the promotion effect is stronger in non-high-tech enterprises. When TMT external social network is large, the positive impact of CEO turnover on strategic change in high-tech enterprises is from strong to weak, but in the non-high-tech enterprises is from weak to strong.

On the basis of previous studies, this paper further expands the research scope of the mechanism of CEO turnover on strategic change, echoing the research arguments of relevant scholars. At the same time, the research results reveal the mechanism of organizational slack, TMT external social network, ownership nature and industry type in the relationship between CEO turnover and strategic change, and further deepen the application of upper echelons theory, resources allocation theory and structuration theory in China. In addition, the research conclusions of this paper also provide reference value for Chinese enterprises in carrying out strategic change, promoting enterprise transformation and improving the level of corporate governance, and help to enhance the understanding and attention of Chinese enterprises to CEO turnover, organizational slack, TMT external social network, strategic change and corporate governance under the background of high-quality economic development.

This paper aims to analyze the direct and indirect effects of investor protection on forced CEO turnover.

The authors investigate 5,175 firm-year observations from 16 European countries over 2012–2018, collect data on four national investor protection indicators, identify 196 forced CEO turnovers and use multiple logistic regression models.

The results show that a reduction in the degree of investor protection significantly increases the probability of a forced change of the company’s CEO. Furthermore, when the degree of investor protection increases, directors are attributed a lower degree of responsibility in the event of a decline in earnings performance. Therefore, the relation between a decrease in profitability and a forced change of CEO is reduced.

The research is focused on countries belonging to the European Economic Area and most of the investor protection indicators are derived from surveys. Concerning policy implications, the findings suggest that regulators should focus on the effective enforcement of investor protection mechanisms.

The results confirm that characteristics at the country level have an impact on corporate decisions, highlighting the importance of increasing the degree of investor protection as a means of mitigating agency conflicts and improving stewardship.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study explores a relatively underinvestigated topic as it uses investor protection indicators to jointly evaluate both direct and indirect effects on forced changes of CEO through cross-national research.

Many studies have examined the antecedents of firms' strategic change on a micro and meso level, but few studies have explored it from the macrolevel (e.g. economic policy uncertainty) perspective. This research draws attention to the impact of economic policy uncertainty on firms' strategic change.

This research empirically tests hypotheses based on a sample of listed firms in China during the period between 2010 and 2017.

Based on real options theory, the authors theorize and find that economic policy uncertainty will negatively affect firms' strategic change through the mediating effect of CEO turnover. Moreover, organizational inertia will strengthen the negative impact of economic policy uncertainty on CEO turnover and will weaken the positive impact of CEO turnover on firms' strategic change.

First, this research contributes to the strategic change literature by demonstrating the important impact of economic policy uncertainty on firms' strategic change. Second, this research expands the literature on the economic consequences of economic policy uncertainty. Third, this research clarifies the path and boundary conditions of economic policy uncertainty affecting strategic change by introducing the mediating effects of CEO turnover and the moderating effects of organizational inertia.

This paper aims to further contribute to the growing stream of literature on the CEO's impact on corporate social responsibility (CSR). The authors shed light on the implications of attunement theory on which relatively less research has been done. Furthermore, this paper strives to reconcile contradictory findings of the effect of CEO tenure on CSR and use the immediate changes of CSR enacted by the new CEO upon firm value.

The empirical strategy of the paper is centered around CEO transition. Applying first difference model, the authors identify a tenure-varying pattern of CEO influence on CSR. Moreover, the authors base the analyses of CSR value relevance on the sudden change of CSR during CEO transition, and use a within-industry matching approach as the inferential strategy. Manual data collection is conducted extensively for robustness checks.

The authors find that CSR activities change drastically at the beginning of the new CEO's ascendancy. One exception to this general pattern of CSR policy change is when the new CEO is brought from outside the organization, a result supporting the attunement theory. The authors find that firm value increases (decreases) when the new CEO increases (decreases) the CSR investment above (below) the industry norm.

This paper is among the first ones in the extant literature that directly examines the analytical implications of attunement theory concerning the CEO's impact on the firm's CSR policies. Furthermore, the positive association between CSR and firm value corroborates the arguments of instrumental stakeholder theory.

The purpose of this study is threefold: to examine the impact of a remuneration committee (RC) on the level of chief executive officer (CEO) remuneration; whether firms with a RC, pay a premium to CEOs with different skill sets (general or specific); and whether a pay premium mitigates the potential for CEO turnover.

This study uses a sample of 5,305 firm-year observations on a data set drawn from companies listed on the Australian Securities Exchange for the period 2007 to 2014. The authors use ordinary least squares as well as logit regression techniques to test the formulated hypotheses. Difference in difference and propensity score matching techniques were undertaken to address the endogeneity concerns.

The findings show that firms with a RC pay a higher total remuneration to CEOs compared to firms without a RC. Furthermore, firms with a RC, value and reward CEOs with general skills by paying a premium not offered to CEOs with industry-specific skills. Paying a premium, in turn, mitigates CEO turnover by strengthening the CEO’s commitment to the organisation.

The study helps us to understand the critical role played by the RC in the remuneration of CEOs. The findings show that RCs act as an effective governance mechanism to deal with issues of executive remuneration and to retain skilled CEOs. Additionally, CEOs who acquire and develop general managerial skills will be able to extract higher pay from improved bargaining power. The findings will be of relevance to shareholders, regulators and company management who have an interest in executive pay and performance.

The authors examine the spillover effects of CEO removal on the corporate financial policies of competing firms among S&P 1500 firms.

The authors used generalized estimating equations (GEE) on a sample of S&P 1,500 firms from 2000 to 2018 to test this study's research hypotheses. Return on assets (ROA), investment policy, and payout policy are used as proxies for corporate policies.

The authors found an increase in ROA and dividend payout in the immediate aftermath. Further, this study's hypothesis does not hold for R&D expenditure and net-working capital as the authors found an insignificant change in them in the immediate aftermath. However, the authors found a significant reduction in capital expenditure, supporting this study's hypothesis in the context of investment policy. Institutional investors and product similarity moderated the spillover effect on corporate policies (ROA, dividend payout, and capital expenditure).

The authors address a novel aspect of CEO performance-induced removal due to poor performance, i.e., the response of other CEOs to CEO performance-induced removal. This study's findings add to the literature supporting the bright side of CEOs' response to CEO performance-induced removal in peer firms due to poor performance.

This study aims to explore the relationship between chief executive officer (CEO) power and stock price crash risk in India. Furthermore, it seeks to analyse how insider trades may moderate the impact of CEO power on stock price crash risk.

A study of 236 companies from the S&P BSE 500 Index (2014–2023) have been analysed through pooled ordinary least square (OLS) regression in the baseline analysis. To enhance the results' reliability, robustness checks include alternative methodologies, such as panel data regression with fixed-effects, binary logistic regression and Bayesian regression. Additional control variables and alternative crash risk measure have also been utilised. To address potential endogeneity, instrumental variable techniques such as two-stage least squares (IV-2SLS) and difference-in-difference (DiD) methodologies are utilised.

Stakeholder theory is supported by results revealing that CEO power proxies like CEO duality, status and directorship reduce one-year ahead stock price crash risk and vice versa. Insider trades are found to moderate the link between select dimensions of CEO power and stock price crash risk. These findings persist after addressing potential endogeneity concerns, and the results remain consistent across alternative methodologies and variable inclusions.

This study significantly advances research on stock price crash risk, especially in emerging economies like India. The implications of these findings are crucial for investors aiming to mitigate crash risk, for corporations seeking enhanced governance measures and for policymakers considering the economic and welfare consequences associated with this phenomenon.

Given the serious question raised by the subprime of the 2008 global financial crisis over the rising practices of excessive rewarding of executives in the USA and European firms, the executive pay-performance nexus has emerged as a popular topic of debate in the contemporary corporate finance research. Conducted mostly on the Anglo-Saxon contexts, research outcomes have been inconclusive and dichotomous. Considering this backdrop, this study aims to investigate the endogenous relationship between executive compensation and risk taking in the context of the USA.

Using a large sample of non-financial firms from 2010 to 2020 based on panel data and two-stage least square regression. In this study, the riskier corporate decision is measured as book leverage and ratio of R&D expense to total assets. Chief executive officers’ (CEO) experience and age are used as instrumental variables, and these are expected to influence compensation incentives and, hence, affect firm riskiness indirectly. Firm size, return on assets and CEO turnover are reported to affect compensation and corporate decisions, therefore, included as control variables. Given that higher executive compensation is related to riskier corporate decision in firms, this study incorporates total wealth (i.e. accumulated equity related compensation) as an additional proxy of compensation, and this selection is justifiable by the perfect contracting notion of the agency theory.

The results of this study show a significant positive and increasing nexus among compensation and riskier corporate decisions. Besides, the compensation level proxied through the percentage of each form of compensation in total compensation is very important as greater equity and greater salary diminishes risk taking.

The outcomes of this study have useful implications for firm stakeholders and policymakers.

The level of pay measured by the percentage of each type of compensation in total compensation is of utmost importance as it can increase or decrease risk taking in corporate decisions.