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The primary purpose of this chapter is to examine some old truths about leadership at the CEO level, and to summarize a new perspective based on charismatic leadership theory that could help cast light on this important area of strategic management. In so doing, we attempt to move charismatic leadership theory in some new directions by bridging micro-and macro-level conceptualizations. The upper echelons perspective from the strategic management literature is first summarized. We then identify problems in conceptualization and measurement that have served to limit the usefulness of this theoretical approach with regard to understanding the leadership role and effects of CEOs. We present two alternative new models that incorporate the constructs of strategic change, CEO charisma, and perceived environmental uncertainty. Data are also presented, suggesting mixed support for the models. Suggestions are made with regard to future quantitative and qualitative research.

Selznick (1957) differentiated between institutional leadership, concerned with organizational identity and character, and administrative management, concerned with organizational operations or efficiencies. We investigated the timing and extent of each of these by leaders of new ventures during market emergence. Examining the case of satellite radio, we analyzed 235 executive statements in 244 press releases, 1998–2005, for the start-ups, XM and Sirius. We found that leaders, across the organizational hierarchy and over time, interpreted entrepreneurial action in terms of the venture's identity, but institutional leadership was primarily associated with CEOs and administrative management with lower echelon executives. Institutional leadership was higher during market emergence and commercialization, while administrative management increased with the growth and establishment of satellite radio as a market category.

In this chapter, the authors explore the notion of loneliness in the CEO role. Traditionally, leaders are portrayed as possessing plentiful personal and social resources whereas lonely people are portrayed as socially and personally lacking, and so the notion of being lonely in a leadership position seems counterintuitive. The authors explore the elements of the CEO role and discuss the various ways the position can induce or perpetuate loneliness. The authors review the research on loneliness in relation to the CEO role and lay the foundation for future research in this underdeveloped area. The authors propose that loneliness is likely to develop when CEOs either are new to the leadership role or enact negative individual behaviors and might be felt more acutely during times of poor performance, criticism, and difficult decisions. The authors discuss implications and suggestions for future research.

Whereas most societal commentators continue to review the historical patterns of men’s leadership in search of models for 21st-century success, few have begun to recognize, let alone appreciate, the equivalent patterns of women’s leadership and the future contributions that women could potentially make as leaders. What could and are women bringing to society as global leaders? Why at this moment in history is there such a marked increase in the number of women leaders? Are we entering an era in which both male and female leaders will shape history, both symbolically and in reality? And if so, will we discover that women, on average, lead in different ways than men, or will we learn that role (global leader) explains more than gender? This chapter reveals the accelerating trends of women joining men in senior leadership positions, establishes the relationship of women leaders to our overall understanding of global leadership, and sets forth an agenda to accomplish much needed research and understanding.

There has been concern expressed in the financial press and focus established in the accounting literature over rising levels of executive compensation. Individuals on the compensation committee, a sub-committee of the board of directors, collectively determine executive compensation and are responsible for maintaining the pay-for-performance standard, a concept that warrants further attention. This study examines the process of exaggeration of a group decision over individual beliefs and the impact of leadership upon a committee's outcome when making compensation awards. In an experiment with 98 subjects role-playing as compensation committee members, results show that in a committee of individuals where a coterie and a majority belief is present, group polarization occurs and the compensation results are exaggerated as compared to individual beliefs. The findings also suggest, though, that the appointment of a leader as chair of the committee, either in the majority or minority view, has a moderating effect on the group outcome. These results highlight and add to the literature the potential for agency costs in the group decision process that may be found in the executive compensation-setting environment.

Teams with a deep understanding of how their roles serve the overall vision of the organisation can transition smoothly from an exclusively in-person office into a working from home (WFH) set-up, even when this needs to happen suddenly and in a disruptive external environment. At the same time, WFH, with all the flexibility that it does offer, does not appear to sufficiently allow for the informal levels of communication and ongoing iterative feedback required by team members to sustain shared leadership and actively co-shape strategy.

Shared leadership is achieved and maintained through the type of interaction between team members and the leader. In this case study, the team nurtures shared leadership and the leader demonstrates a readiness for it by effectively coordinating and leveraging networked synergies between various stakeholders as well as guiding and translating knowledge sharing and creation into informed actionable strategy with the team. The leader, on the one hand, is an integrated member of the team nurturing it and sharing leadership with it and, on the other hand, embraces a cockpit function which navigates this ‘sharedness’ with all relevant stakeholders.

Many argue that the design of compensation contracts for public company chief executive officers (CEOs) is often not guided by a goal of value maximization. Yet, there is limited direct empirical evidence on the negative consequences of the proposed inefficient contracting between shareholders and CEOs. Using data on CEO bonus contracts of the S&P 500 firms, we investigate potential firm performance implications of the use of qualitative criteria such as leadership and mentoring in those contracts. We maintain that unlike quantitative criteria, qualitative criteria are difficult to define and measure on an objective basis, possibly resulting in an inefficient and biased incentive structure. Twenty-five percent of the sample observations have CEO bonus contracts that include a qualitative criterion for bonus payment determination. Our results show that employee productivity, asset productivity, capital expenditures, and future abnormal stock returns are lower for firms that use a qualitative criterion in CEO bonus contracts than those that do not. Further, contrary to the argument in prior literature that earnings management decreases with the use of subjective performance indicators in incentive contracts, we find that income-increasing accruals are actually higher when the CEO bonus contract includes a qualitative criterion. We recommend that compensation committees set concrete, measurable performance goals for CEOs, providing CEOs with better guidance and helping improve their corporate decision making.

Serious questions have been raised regarding the necessity to continue focusing our research on what constitutes individual, or what the authors refer to as singular leadership. Although the authors consider these questions to be important to advancing the field of leadership theory, research, and practice, they also suggest that attempts to minimize the relevance of singular leadership may hinder progress in other domains of leadership research. In this chapter, the authors explore how and why singular leaders and their leadership matter, and how they may influence follower, peer, and organizational outcomes. The authors use a paradoxical framework to present a theoretical model and propositions that allow us to clarify the influence of different forms of singular leadership within organizations. In our examination of singular leadership, the authors consider both positive and harmful modes of attributes, cognitions, and behaviors.