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This paper aims to examine the effect of contractual factors and noncontractual factors on tax avoidance (TA).

The sample comprises 400 firm-year observations of 67 companies listed on the HDAX during the period 2008–2017. The generalized least square panel regression is applied.

The study results confirm a significant effect of long-term chief executive officer (CEO) compensation incentives and CEO attributes on TA. Findings exhibit a significant impact of foreign CEO on TA, whereas an insider CEO mitigates TA. The results hold for several robustness tests, with lag effective tax rate as dependent variable and with splitting foreign CEO into European and non-European origin.

First, the sample is limited to 400 firm-year observations and to the German context. For shareholders, the study provides first evidence on relationships between the geographical and internal versus external labor market for CEOs and TA. For researchers, the findings underline the importance of integrating behavioral approaches like place attachment theory and the rooting theory in the theory of TA.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study to examine the impact of both contractual determinants and behavioral determinants on TA in the German context as an emerged economy with a dualistic corporate governance. This study contributes to the existing literature regarding the scientific debates about the impact of CEOs and CEO attributes on TA. It also analyses the balance between the place attachment theory and the rooting theory in the face of the compensation outcomes of agency theory.

Building upon multiple theories (i.e. agency, signalling and human capital), this paper aims to explore the effects of directors’ education on audit fees and to assess the mediating role of audit committee (AC).

The authors use an econometric analysis of Italian-listed non-financial firms during the period 2012–2015 using single-mediator models through ordinary least squares and logit regressions. Moreover, the authors apply the path analysis with the bootstrap method to test the mediating effect.

Findings show that the directors’ level of education improves audit fees. Additionally, the presence of an AC and the financial expertise of its members mediate this relationship.

By offering insights into the implications for audit pricing of the board and AC human capital, the paper helps regulators and policy-makers to understand which characteristic of such governance bodies improves auditing quality and the provision of better financial reporting.

The study uses a unique data set hand-collected from multiple sources and advances the auditing literature by shedding light on the reasons behind the influence of directors’ characteristics on audit fees and on the role played by the AC.

With Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), the self-regulation of the auditing profession was replaced with standard setting and oversight by the government. The authors focus on the audit fees literature to examine how this change impacted research trends over time and shaped different aspects of audits.

The authors utilized bibliometric and content analysis to identify research themes pre- and post-SOX.

The change in regulation contributed to an increased focus on clients and continued interest in engagement characteristics as added requirements emphasized the client's governance structure, the auditor's tenure and the type of services provided.

The prominent issue that emerged is how deficiencies in the audit processes and in the client's internal controls are translated into audit fees. The authors discuss regulatory initiatives pursued in other jurisdictions, including mandatory rotation of firms, joint audits and further limitations on non-audit services, as intended and unintended consequences of these requirements warrant further examination.

This study aims to examine how new regulation changes for the auditor’s report, so-called key audit matters (KAMs), influence tax avoidance.

This study uses data from firms listed on the Omani capital market over the period 2012–2019 and analyzes these data using pooled panel data regression with a robust standard error. It uses two common proxies for tax avoidance and two measures for the KAMs disclosure requirement.

This study finds a sharp decrease in the effective tax rate following the introduction of KAMs disclosure and the issuance of more KAMs in audit reports. This result is supported by several robustness checks. In an additional analysis, the authors observe interesting results, indicating that real earnings management mediates this association, while the audit committee plays a moderating role. The authors do not find a moderating effect of Big4 on this association, but find discrepancies within the Big4 firms in relation to this moderating effect.

The results of this study indicate that although the introduction of the KAMs disclosure requirement may have positive consequences, it may also lead to unintended negative consequences. This conclusion has not been comprehensively reported in literature.

Firm performance has become a thriving research field. However, a review of previous studies shows that the answers to several fundamental questions remain vague and require further investigation. Thus, the purpose of this study is twofold. The first is to determine the extent of the involvement of political connections (PCs) in Pakistani-listed companies, and the second is to examine the association between PCs and firm financial performance with director efficacy’s moderating role.

A data set of 221 non-financial companies listed on the Pakistan Stock Exchange for 10 years (2008–2017) was analysed using panel-corrected standard error regression. Additionally, the authors address endogeneity issue by using Hackman two-stage estimation and lagged variables regression.

The study found that PCs negatively affected the firm’s financial performance, and director efficacy as a moderator strengthened this relationship. The result is consistent with the political economy theory that argues that an unstable political system and a weak judicial system will strongly affect investors and their rights.

The impact of political influence on the corporate sector remains a concern for policymakers, regulators, investors, financial experts, auditors and academic researchers. This study’s findings are that an effective board of directors can strengthen the company’s best practices by controlling political connectedness to protect all the interested parties, particularly investors, and restore their confidence. Therefore, the results of this study can assist all stakeholders when a PCs exists to make the right decisions.

The study extends the literature in terms of theoretical contribution that uses an integrative approach to combine political economy theory, agency theory and resource dependence theory to address the moderating role of director efficacy with an association between PCs and firm financial performance. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, no extant research has investigated the association between PCs and firm financial performance using five aspects of PCs, along with moderator director efficacy.

This study aims to analyze whether chief executive officer (CEO) duality and financial expertise are associated with earnings management to exceed thresholds. It also investigates to what extent and in what direction this association evolves when family ownership is introduced as a moderator variable.

Based on balanced panel data related to companies listed on the Tunis Stock Exchange, this study uses the logistic random-effect model to test research hypotheses during the period spanning from 2016 to 2021.

The results show that CEOs with financial expertise are less inclined to engage in earnings management to avoid reporting losses and earnings decline. The authors also provide evidence that CEO duality allows top management to be more powerful and, therefore, manage earnings to report positive profits and sustain recent performance. Furthermore, the authors find that family ownership moderates the association between CEO financial expertise, CEO duality and earnings management to exceed thresholds.

The findings suggest to regulators involved in corporate governance and earnings management issues a reflection on CEO duality power, board effectiveness and family control. The study results are also of interest to auditors and board members as they provide a more in-depth understanding of the impact of CEOs' attributes and family control on financial reporting decisions.

This study extends past literature by providing new insights into the effect of CEO attributes and family control on earnings management practices in weak investor protection countries such as Tunisia.

The authors analyze the association between the functional background of the compensation committee chair and CEO compensation. The analysis is motivated by the continuing debate about the reasonableness of executive pay patterns and the growing emphasis on the role of compensation committees.

The authors define three expert categories—accounting, finance, and generalist—and collect data on the compensation committee (CC) chairs of the S&P 500 firms from 2008 to 2018. The authors run an ordinary least square model and regress CEO total and cash compensation on the three expert categories.

The authors find that firms in which the CC chair has expertise in accounting, finance, and general business favor performance measures that are more aligned with accounting, finance, and general business, respectively. There is little evidence that CC chairs who are CEOs of other firms endorse more generous pay for the host CEO; the authors find some evidence that CC chairs tenure relative to the host CEO's is negatively associated with the level of the CEO's pay.

This study suggests that firms and regulators should consider the background of the compensation committee chair to understand the variations in top executive.

Companies desiring to link executive compensation to particular areas of strategy must also consider matching the functional background of the compensation committee chair with the target strategy areas. From regulatory standpoint, requiring compensation committees to operate independent of inside directors can reduce attempts by inside directors to skim the process, but a failure to also consider the impact of compensation committees' discretion over the pay-setting process can distort the executives' pay-performance relation.

This is the first study to examine the effects of the functional background of the compensation committee chair on CEO compensation.

The purpose of this study is to establish the relationship between chief executive officer (CEO) power, audit committee effectiveness and earnings quality in regulated firms in Uganda.

The authors employed cross-sectional and correlational research designs, based on a sample of 136 regulated firms in Uganda. Data were collected using a questionnaire survey from Chief Finance Officers and Chief Audit Executives. Data were analyzed using a Statistical Package for Social Sciences and Partial Least Squares Structural Equation Modeling.

Results indicate that CEO power causes negative variances in earnings quality. The results also reveal that audit committee effectiveness positively relates relatively similarly with earnings quality. In addition, CEO power and audit committee effectiveness are negative and significantly related. The results further indicate that CEO power and earnings quality are mediated by audit committee effectiveness.

CEO power creates an opaque accounting environment which may leave the stakeholders unable to evaluate the true economic reality of the firm. Audit committee effectiveness is an important enabler for reporting high-quality earnings even in the presence of a powerful CEO.

This study contributes toward a methodological stance of using perceptions to understand earnings quality in regulated firms in Uganda. This is probably the first study that has specifically explored earnings quality using only the fundamental qualitative characteristics of accounting information (as proxies) as enshrined in the Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting 2018 particularly in Uganda since Her adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards in 1998. Second, the indirect effect of audit committee effectiveness and CEO power is tested.

This study aims to investigate the relationship between chief executive officer (CEO) power and the level of tax avoidance of Tunisian listed companies. It also examines the moderating role of institutional ownership in this association.

The sample comprises 306 firm-year observations of companies listed on the Tunis Stock Exchange during the 2013–2020 period.

The results indicate that CEO power reduces tax avoidance levels. Moreover, the relationship between CEO power and tax avoidance is more pronounced in the presence of institutional ownership, suggesting that CEOs act less opportunistically when monitored by institutional investors, which results in a reduction in tax avoidance.

This study suggests that CEO power and institutional shareholders’ influence are important factors in determining firms’ avoidance behavior. This study has significant implications for shareholders and regulatory bodies. Indeed, shareholders apprehend the impact of appointing a powerful CEO on tax avoidance practices. This study may also provide regulators with new insights into the influence of CEO power dimensions and institutional ownership on tax aggressiveness.

This study fills the gap in the accounting literature by investigating how CEO power may impact tax avoidance behavior and provides empirical evidence on the moderating impact of institutional ownership on this relationship in an emerging economy context characterized by a weakly protected investor setting.

This study aims to examine how the prestige of audit committee (AC) chairpersons influences earnings management.

The sample contains 1,973 firm-year observations of French listed firms for the period 2007–2018. The authors examine the status of AC chairs and CEOs by focusing on the French business elite system. This study tests the association between AC chairs’ (relative) status and the level of earnings management using measures of accrual earnings management and real earnings management (REM).

The results of this study do not show that high-status AC chairs constrain accruals manipulation. However, the results provide evidence that they play a key role in constraining REM. High-status AC chairs are more likely to enhance the monitoring of this type of manipulation, given their thorough knowledge and understanding of the firm’s business environment and practices. This study also finds evidence that AC chairs with a status higher than CEOs are associated with lower levels of REM. The results suggest that prestigious AC chairs influence lower status CEOs’ strategic decisions.

This study demonstrates that high-status AC chairs play an important role in detecting and constraining deviations from normal business practices. The results have substantial implications for boards, which will benefit from an understanding of how the appointment of high-status chairs affects financial reporting quality.