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This study examines how cash and stock bonus compensations influence top executives to allocate a firm's resources to fixed intangible assets investment and the extent to which this relationship is conditional on executives' ownership, firm growth, internal cash flow and leverage.

Using data from 213 non-financial and non-utility UK FTSE 350 firms for the period 2007–2015, generating a total of 1,748 firm-year observations, panel econometric methods are employed to test the authors’ model.

The authors observe that executives' cash bonus compensation positively impacts fixed intangible assets investment. However, executives' stock bonus compensation has a negative and significant influence on fixed intangible assets. The authors further observe that executives either cash bonus or stock bonus crucially invest more in fixed intangible assets when the firm has a growth potential. Also, both cash bonus and stock bonus executives in firms with lower internal cash flow spend less on fixed intangible assets. Similar results are also observed for those stock bonus-motivated executives with an increase in fixed intangible assets for low leverage firms but a decrease for high leverage ones.

A key limitation of this study is its concentration on a single country (United Kingdom). Thus, future studies can expand the focus of this study by looking at it from the perspective of multiple countries.

The practical relevance of the study results is that firms with high growth opportunity in fixed intangible assets activity can use more cash bonus compensation (risk-avoiding incentive) to induce corporate executives to invest more in such activity. This finding is particularly important given the increasing appetite of firms in this knowledge-based economy to create expansion through fixed intangible assets investment. That is, for firms to increase fixed intangible assets investment, this study suggests that executive cash bonus compensation cannot be ignored.

While this paper builds on the classic Q theory of investment literature, it is the first – to the best of the authors’ knowledge – to explore how cash and stock bonus compensations influence top executives to allocate a firm's resources to fixed intangible assets investment and the extent to which this relationship is conditional on executives' ownership, firm growth, internal cash flow and leverage.

This study aims to examine the impact of executive bonus compensation on a firm’s financial leverage policy and the extent to which this compensation–leverage relation is moderated by firm growth and executive ownership.

Using data from 213 non-financial and non-utility UK FTSE 350 firms for the period 2007–2015, generating a total of 1,784 firm-year observations, panel econometric methods are used to test the model.

Drawing insights from agency theoretic view, this paper uncovers that managerial cash bonus compensation is negatively and significantly related to financial leverage. However, stock bonus compensation has a positive and significant impact on leverage. This study also observes that compensation–leverage is moderated by both firm growth and executive ownership. The results remain robust to alternative econometric models.

While this paper builds on the risk-motivated argument of executive bonus compensation literature, it is the first – to the best of the knowledge – to explore the bonus compensation-corporate financial leverage and, particularly, examine the extent to which firm growth and corporate executive ownership matter in this relationship.

The purpose of this study is to examine whether independent directors' financial expertise affects the use of private information in setting bank chief executive officer (CEO) bonuses.

The association between future firm performance and bank CEO bonuses is used to measure the incorporation of private information into bonuses. Both level and change specifications are employed to test the effect of independent directors' financial expertise on the use of private information in setting CEO bonuses.

It is found that future firm performance is more positively associated with bank CEO bonuses for banks with a higher proportion of financial experts among independent directors than for other banks. The findings suggest that independent directors with financial expertise can more effectively use private information in setting bank CEO bonuses.

Research on independent directors' role in the use of private information in setting compensation is valuable for understanding how corporate governance can enhance the efficiency of CEO compensation contracts. This study indicates that financial experts on the bank board play an important role in this regard.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the association between institutional investor ownership and the compensation of executives at US banks during the financial crisis period.

This paper uses a linear regression model to examine the association between institutional ownership and the level of executive compensation at US banks.

Institutional investors influence executive compensation at banks with the impact being most pronounced for the CEO. Ownership by the top five investors is associated with greater total compensation. Active investors have the strongest impact on executive compensation as evidenced by a positive association between active ownership and both equity compensation and total compensation. As well, active ownership is negatively associated with bonus compensation. The paper also finds that passive and grey investors influence compensation but to a less significant extent than active investors.

The results suggest that the monitoring role of active and passive institutional investors is different in the banking industry. As well, institutional investors were likely a driving factor in shaping the compensation packages of the top executive team during the financial crisis period.

Stakeholders at banks should be aware that not all types of institutional investors act as effective monitors over issues such as controlling the amount of executive compensation paid to the highest paid executive, the CEO. Prospective investors should consider the type of institutional investor that owns large blocks of equity when making an investment decision. Namely, the interests of existing institutional investors may differ from their own interests.

This paper provides a new perspective on the monitoring roles played by different types of institutional investors. Furthermore, it provides a more comprehensive analysis by investigating the role of institutional investors in shaping the compensation packages of CEOs and other top executives including chief financial officers (CFOs) who play a vital role in risk management at banks.

We investigate the relationship between chief executive officer (CEO) compensation and a firm's financial performance in the insurance industry to determine CEO pay policies that are more effective in promoting specific financial corporate goals.

Considering different components of executive pay, we investigate the latter’s relationship with the corporate performance of the insurance industry using the generalized method of moments (GMM) model developed for dynamic panel estimation. Our data encompasses the periods before and after the 2008 financial crisis.

We observe that after the crisis the insurance industry experienced a major change in executives’ compensation packages. While CEOs’ compensation was primarily based on bonuses pre-crisis, the average size of the bonus was reduced to one-third of the level, stock awards and nonequity incentives were doubled and option awards increased almost 70 percent in the post-crisis period. It is also evident that the work experience of CEOs and the firm's financial performance play a significant role in determining CEO compensation. As the CEO becomes more experienced, stock awards and option awards replace cash bonus.

The paper finds supporting evidence for the agency-related problem in the insurance industry and the convergence of interest hypothesis, suggesting that a firm's market valuation rises as its managers own an increasingly large portion of the firm. To align the interest of owners with that of management, managers should be converted into owners via stock ownership. The paper addresses a topical issue regarding pay and performance and the effect of the financial crisis in the insurance industry.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship of CEO compensation plans and the risk of managerial equity portfolios with the extent of strategic investments in advertising, capital expenditures and research and development (R&D). The elements of compensation are salary, bonuses, options and restricted stock grants. The authors proxy the design of CEO equity portfolios by the price performance sensitivity of the holdings and the portfolio deltas.

The authors use the components of executive compensation and portfolio risk as the dependent variables, regressing these against measures for the level of strategic investment. The authors test for non-linear relationships between the components of CEO compensation and strategic investments. The sample is a broad cross-section from 1992 to 2016.

The authors find strong support for non-linear relationships of capital expenditures and R&D with CEO bonuses, option grants and restricted stock grants. There are very complex relationships between the components of executive compensation and R&D expenditures, but little evidence of a relationship with advertising expenditures. The authors also find strong complex relationships in the design of CEO equity portfolios with advertising and R&D.

Little earlier research has considered advertising, capital expenditures and R&D in a unified framework. Also, testing for non-linear associations provides much greater insight into the relationship between the components of executive compensation and strategic investment. The findings represent a valuable incremental contribution to the executive compensation literature. The results also have normative policy implications for compensation committees’ design of optimal annual CEO compensation packages to incentivize or discourage particular strategic investment behavior.

The study examines whether corporate governance moderates the relationship between CEO compensation and earnings management.

The study uses 1,800 firm-year observations from 2005 to 2010 and employ multiple regression analyses and other sensitivity tests.

The study finds a positive relationship between CEO compensation and earnings management. The study’s results also suggest that CEO bonus compensation increases in relation to earnings management and therefore the study infers that managers may become involved in earnings management to increase their compensation. However, the study finds that the relationship is moderated by a strong corporate governance system which reduces the impact of earnings management on CEO compensation.

The study is conducted in a specific context, and therefore it may be subject to a set of limitations. The study emphasises exclusively on whether executives manage earnings to increase their compensation. The study does not consider the issue of several other and potentially contradictory motivations here.

The study’s findings highlight potential implications and offer useful propositions for stakeholders, particularly accounting and corporate governance regulators, to consider. The findings offer a basis for the accounting professions to further discuss and improve accounting standards to provide adequate regulations and monitoring to decrease managerial opportunistic behaviours in earnings manipulations. The findings also emphasise the need for appropriately designed CEO compensation packages in such a manner that improves the manager–shareholder alignment and reduces the information asymmetry problem. The results signify that corporate governance plays a vital role in mitigating the relationship between CEO compensation and earnings management.

This study adds to the existing literature by documenting empirical support on the link between earnings management and CEO compensation against a backdrop of high demand for strong corporate governance practices.

The human capital of a leader and the human capital of the employees who work for the leader can impact the bonus earned by the leader. Little to no research has examined data that includes the maximum potential bonus that could be earned by a leader and the actual bonus earned. This information provides a closer examination of leader performance and the impacts of leader and employee human capital on the bonus earned by the leader.

The authors use a sample of NCAA college football teams and head coaches over two years to test their hypotheses. They measure the human capital of the team and the human capital of the head coach. In addition, the authors assess the percentage earned by the head coach of the maximum potential bonus possible.

The authors find that a coach's human capital and the human capital of their team positively and significantly predict the percentage of the maximum possible bonus earned by the head coach.

The results of this study indicate the importance of leader human capital to a leader's ability to earn more of their maximum potential bonus. Additionally, if a leader is able to surround himself or herself with highly talented employees, it will benefit the leader in terms of the amount of bonus earned.

This study extends previous research to provide a more complete picture of factors that influence a leader's ability to earn more of their maximum possible bonus. The authors’ findings that both the human capital of the leader and the human capital of employees who work for the leader impact the amount of bonus earned by the leader add value to human resource management research. Specifically, when examining factors that impact a leader's bonus earnings, it is important to consider not only characteristics of the leader but also factors apart from the leader, such as the leader's employees.

This paper aims to examine the effects of global financial crisis (GFC) on chief executive officers’ (CEO) compensation and earnings management relationship. Specifically, the authors examine whether the recent financial crisis had moderated the relationship between CEO bonus and discretionary accruals.

The authors use panel data for 1,800 firm-year observations (over a period of six years from 2005 to 2010) and use univariate and multivariate tests to test their hypothesis. The authors divide the period into pre-crisis, during-crisis and post-crisis periods to examine how the different financial crisis periods affect the relationship between CEO compensation and earnings management. Various alternative tests including endogeneity test suggest that the results are robust.

The authors’ multivariate results indicate that the relationship between CEO’ compensation and earnings management changes because of the GFC.

The findings, therefore, justify more monitoring and scrutiny to limit the existence of opportunistic managerial behaviour and for the appropriate designing of CEO compensation packages during abnormal economic circumstances.

So far as the authors’ knowledge goes, this is the first study which examines the relationship between CEO compensation and earnings management during GFC.

Jensen and Murphy (1990) and others have found a small but statistically significant relationship between firm performance (as measured by change in shareholder wealth or firm profits) and executive compensation. In this study we investigate the pay‐ performance relationship further by considering the relationship between an outside measure of firm performance (changes in the firm's bond rating) and the contemporaneous change in the compensation of the firm's CEO. We find that when a firm's bond rating is down‐graded, CEO total compensation declines by a relatively small amount ($165,500) and when a firm's bond rating is upgraded, CEO total compensation increases markedly ($3,202,900). Thus, while a positive pay‐performance relationship exists, the relationship is not symmetric. CEO compensation changes (increases) much more when firm performance improves than it changes (decreases) when firm performance declines. Further, most of the change in CEO compensation occurs in the stock gains (profits from the exercise of stock options) category for both firms experiencing bond rating upgrades and down‐grades.