Managerial compensation and fixed intangible assets investment: the role of managerial ownership and firm characteristics

Abstract

Purpose

This study examines how cash and stock bonus compensations influence top executives to allocate a firm's resources to fixed intangible assets investment and the extent to which this relationship is conditional on executives' ownership, firm growth, internal cash flow and leverage.

Design/methodology/approach

Using data from 213 non-financial and non-utility UK FTSE 350 firms for the period 2007–2015, generating a total of 1,748 firm-year observations, panel econometric methods are employed to test the authors’ model.

Findings

The authors observe that executives' cash bonus compensation positively impacts fixed intangible assets investment. However, executives' stock bonus compensation has a negative and significant influence on fixed intangible assets. The authors further observe that executives either cash bonus or stock bonus crucially invest more in fixed intangible assets when the firm has a growth potential. Also, both cash bonus and stock bonus executives in firms with lower internal cash flow spend less on fixed intangible assets. Similar results are also observed for those stock bonus-motivated executives with an increase in fixed intangible assets for low leverage firms but a decrease for high leverage ones.

Research limitations/implications

A key limitation of this study is its concentration on a single country (United Kingdom). Thus, future studies can expand the focus of this study by looking at it from the perspective of multiple countries.

Practical implications

The practical relevance of the study results is that firms with high growth opportunity in fixed intangible assets activity can use more cash bonus compensation (risk-avoiding incentive) to induce corporate executives to invest more in such activity. This finding is particularly important given the increasing appetite of firms in this knowledge-based economy to create expansion through fixed intangible assets investment. That is, for firms to increase fixed intangible assets investment, this study suggests that executive cash bonus compensation cannot be ignored.

Originality/value

While this paper builds on the classic Q theory of investment literature, it is the first – to the best of the authors’ knowledge – to explore how cash and stock bonus compensations influence top executives to allocate a firm's resources to fixed intangible assets investment and the extent to which this relationship is conditional on executives' ownership, firm growth, internal cash flow and leverage.

Citation

Adu-Ameyaw, E., Hickson, L. and Danso, A. (2022), "Managerial compensation and fixed intangible assets investment: the role of managerial ownership and firm characteristics", Journal of Applied Accounting Research, Vol. 23 No. 5, pp. 1071-1094. https://doi.org/10.1108/JAAR-04-2021-0099