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Holding the number of outside directorships constant, this paper aims to test whether executive directors from superior performing firms are subsequently rewarded with better quality outside directorships.

The quality of new outside directorship appointments is modelled using a two‐step Heckman selection procedure to control for the probability of acquiring a new outside board seat. Outside directorship quality is estimated using an index formed from series of observable firm‐specific characteristics proxying for the following three latent aspects of quality: prestige, reputational risk and monetary rewards. The index aggregates across these three dimensions to produce an overall quality score, with higher scores signifying higher quality directorships.

Tests based on a sample of UK executive directors who subsequently acquire at least one new outside board seat show that the quality of newly acquired outside directorships is positively related to past and contemporaneous performance at the executive's own firm. Recent past performance appears to be a more important determinant of the quality of outside directorships than long‐run performance reputations. However, effects are largely confined to executives that either switch between boards or enter the outside directorship market for the first time.

Findings support the view that the market for outside directorships operates (at least in part) as a meritocracy by rewarding executives from superior performing firms with better quality outside board appointments.

Prior work on the market for outside directorships focuses on explaining cross‐sectional variation in the number of outside board seats held. The paper is the first to measure and model directorship quality.

Drawing from social capital theory, this study aims to investigate the manifested critical barriers in deriving and implementing gender diversity policies, paying particular attention to the role multiple directorships play in shaping the directors’ behavior and the dynamic of the board of directors. The study comprehends social capital as a multi-dimensional concept and uses combinations of interconnected internal, external, expressive and instrumental networks.

The study uses a mixed-method approach through which the quantitative approach is supplemented by a qualitative research method to comprehensively examine the development and impact of female directors’ networks in Australia. To do so, a large data set consisting of 2,527 observations of all Australian firms and data emerged from semi-structured interviews with female directors were brought together and analyzed.

The findings reveal an inverted U-shaped relationship between the size of women’s directorate networks and firm performance. The study additionally explicates the key moderating factors influencing the optimal number of multiple directorships. The key power-based and psychological well-being-related benefits of the inter- and intra-organizational interactions and “open” directorate networks for individual directors are further discussed. The findings also elucidate the status quo vis-à-vis labyrinth metaphor and excessive numbers of directorships.

The study should be of interest to those interested in effective gender diversity management. The findings would assist in enabling tangible outcomes for women through advanced processes and systematic investment in and institutionalization of well-structured, equitable opportunities provided via gender-responsive policies dedicated to the education and training of future female directors.

Calling for social dialogues and discussions on non-financial factors, this study adds to the scarce literature on influential factors related to diversity management policies and practices on the board of directors.

The main objective of this paper is to analyze the influence of multiple directorships, as a critical component of board social capital, on CSR reporting. This study also explores the moderating effect of certain board attributes on multiple directorships.

The authors’ sample is composed of Spanish listed firms in the Madrid Stock Exchange for the period 2011–2017. A dynamic panel data model based on the Generalized Method of Moments (GMMs) is employed.

Relying on a resource dependence view, the authors’ results highlight an ambiguously positive association between multiple directorships and the level of CSR reporting. In particular, this relationship is positively moderated by both board size and gender diversity.

These findings contribute to academic debates concerning the value of board members intellectual capital. In particular, the authors emphasize the importance of board social capital, as well as the need to consider the context in which directors make decisions.

This evidence may prove helpful to firms when configuring the board of directors, and for regulators and professionals when refining their legislations and recommendations.

To the best of the authors' knowledge, this is the first study that empirically analyzes the impact of an important element of board social capital, such as multiple directorships, on CSR reporting, which has become crucial in financial markets.

The purpose of this paper is to examine whether the number of outside directors on the board of directors and dividend payout are substitutes or complements mechanisms applied by UK firms to control agency conflicts of interest within the firm.

The authors use tobit and logit regression models to examine the extent to which firms with a majority of outside directors on their boards experience significantly lower or higher dividend payout after controlling for insider ownership, profitability, liquidity, asset structure, business risk, firm size, firms' growth rate and borrowing ratio.

Based on a sample of 400 non‐financial firms listed at London Stock Exchange for the period from 1991 to 2002, it was found that dividend payout is negatively associated with the number of outside directors on the board of directors.

The results suggest that firms pay lower dividends when higher number of outside directors is employed on the board. This evidence is consistent with the substitution hypothesis, which indicated that firms with weak corporate governance need to establish a reputation by paying dividends. In other words, dividends substitute for independent directors on the board. This finding offers novel insights to policy makers interested in agency conflicts of interest within the firm. It also provides evidence on the use of different substitute mechanisms for reducing agency costs.

The purpose of this study is to investigate whether the likelihood that a firm will face financial statement fraud litigation is affected by the disclosure of internal control material weaknesses (MW) and the “busyness” of a firm’s board of directors.

The results are derived from logistic regression models and data are collected from the Audit Analytics database augmented by data from CompuStat, the Stanford Law School website and the SEC Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases. The authors also test for endogeneity with a propensity score matching procedure.

The authors find that an MW report is strongly associated with the likelihood of subsequent financial statement fraud litigation, and that the influence of entity-level MW on litigation likelihood is stronger than that of account-level MW. Moreover, the number of outside board directorships significantly increases the influence of entity-level MW on the likelihood of litigation, indicating that board of directors’ busyness significantly increases the risk of litigation.

Previous research notes that board members holding multiple directorships cannot effectively oversee the financial reporting process and, thus, are associated with poorer governance. The authors extend this implication of board busyness to the association between disclosure of MW type and the filing of subsequent litigation alleging financial statement fraud. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, no other research has done so.

This paper aims to examine the research questions: Do executive and non‐executive directors face similar labor market penalties upon revelation of accounting fraud? Are all executive directors treated by markets as a homogenous group? Or, do executive directors who are top managers face stiffer penalties than other executive directors?

Board membership of incumbent directors in US firms accused of accounting fraud are tracked for three years after the revelation. Two labor market consequences/penalties are considered. Probability of losing internal, own firm board seat is the likelihood that incumbent directors leave the accused firm's board upon accounting fraud revelation. The likelihood of losing at least one external board seat (outside directorship) is also examined. Both univariate tests and multivariate LOGIT regressions are used to conduct the analysis.

Compared to non‐executive directors, executive directors are more than twice as likely to lose own firm board seat and at least five times as likely to lose at least one outside directorship. Moreover, all executives, top or otherwise, appear to face similar tough penalties.

Accounting fraud is a rare event; this may limit the generality of the findings. Results obtained from a US sample may be applicable to countries with well‐developed capital and labor markets. Results imply that the labor market for directors serves a vital function in the US‐style corporate governance environment; labor market discipline provides at least some incentives for board members, including non‐employee directors and other executive directors, to perform their fiduciary duties.

This is the first study that utilizes a single corporate event to analyze the operation of the labor market across different categories of directors. Also, while studies have examined penalties on top executives there is no evidence that other executives who also serve on the board of the accused firms suffer labor market penalties.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of high‐level‐executives joining the Board of another US company on the shareholder wealth of the firms in which these executives work.

The “event‐study” methodology is used first to estimate the shareholder effects and then, through multivariate regression analysis, establish a relationship of these effects with executive characteristics.

The paper documents that the abnormal return becomes more positive the closer the executive is to retirement and more negative as the number of other corporate Boards the executive already sits on increases. Unlike previous research, it is not found that prior performance of the employing company helps explain the cross‐sectional variation in the announcement day abnormal returns.

The result supports the concerns of shareholder activists that key executives joining the Boards of other companies do their home shareholders a disservice by being spread too thin. It supports the hypothesis that investors interpret a CEO joining the Board of another firm as value decreasing.

The paper provides a link between managerial labor and shareholder wealth. Important and high‐level‐executives, while attempting to enhance their own personal benefits by joining other Boards, can destroy shareholder value of the company for which they work.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the moderating effect of the board of directors on the strategic decisions made by family firms, and to understand the board attributes that can alleviate the aversion of family-owned firms toward mergers and acquisitions (M&A).

The study uses a sample of several firms listed in India from 2006 to 2019 with 19,813 firm-year observations. The empirical tests have been performed using logistic and negative binomial regressions. The study also tests for endogeneity with the help of Heckman (1979) two-step treatment effects model.

The study shows that board characteristics like smaller board-size, presence of outside directors, lower intensity of board activity, presence of busier board members and separation of board chair and CEO positions alleviate the inhibition of family firms toward M&A.

The findings imply that investors and policymakers can encourage family firms to have smaller boards, more independent directors, passive boards and CEO nonduality to reduce their aversion toward risky activities. Family-owned firms could consider a board comprising members with multiple directorships who can bring wider knowledge and expertise which can reduce the perceived threat to socioemotional wealth (SEW) and alleviate their aversion toward M&A.

Ownership concentration in family firms posits a unique challenge in terms of their aversion toward M&A. This study is one of the few that highlight the relevance of the monitoring and advisory role of the board in alleviating this aversion in an emerging market like India.

This paper aims to investigate the impact of women on the board of directors on corporate tax avoidance in Australia.

The authors use multivariate regression analysis to test the association between the presence of female directors on the board and tax aggressiveness. They also test for self-selection bias in the regression model by using the two-stage Heckman procedure.

This paper finds that relative to there being one female board member, high (i.e. greater than one member) female presence on the board of directors reduces the likelihood of tax aggressiveness. The results are robust after controlling for self-selection bias and using several alternative measures of tax aggressiveness.

This study extends the extant literature on corporate governance and tax aggressiveness. This study is subject to several caveats. First, the sample is restricted to publicly listed Australian firms. Second, this study only examines the issue of women on the board of directors and tax aggressiveness in the context of Australia.

This research is timely, as there has been increased pressure by government bodies in Australia and globally to develop policies to increase female representation on the board of directors.

This study is the first to provide empirical evidence concerning the association between the presence of women on the board of directors and tax aggressiveness.

Due to stakeholders’ concerns on the contribution of corporate governance in monitoring insurance companies during financial crisis, this study aims to investigate whether and how various corporate governance practices would have affected firm performance of listed and non-listed insurance firms in the UK during financial crisis.

This study uses a unique manually collected data set from listed and non-listed insurance firms in the UK and applies different regressions models to test the hypotheses and to address the endogeneity problem.

The findings show that board non-duality and the presence of a majority shareholder improve firm performance in insurance companies. Furthermore, the findings for the sub-samples indicate a stronger positive association between board of directors and firm performance in listed insurance companies after the financial crisis, while a positive impact has been found between large shareholders and external audit firms in non-listed insurance companies before and during the crisis.

The results offer important practical implications for the government, management, shareholders and policymakers. For example, regulators and policymakers should benefit from these results to revise the recommendations for corporate governance mechanisms that prove to be effective on firm performance, as well as those mechanisms that have different or unexpected effects among listed or non-listed firms and/or during the turbulent periods. Investors should be aware of those specific corporate governance mechanisms that would have higher effect on performance of UK insurance firms in which they are considering to invest in.

This study contributes to the current literature by exploring the effect of corporate governance on financial performance by comparing between listed and non-listed insurance companies during financial crisis. Further, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study to use two new insurance-related performance measures, the revenue growth ratio and the adjusted combined ratio, as performance proxies to explore whether these new variables create any insights.