Search results

This study aims to investigate the impact of ownership by large shareholders (blockholders) on corporate cash holdings. The study further investigates heterogeneity in the relationship between blockholder ownership and corporate cash holdings.

Building on the precautionary and agency motives of corporate cash holdings, the study focuses on publicly listed firms from 22 European countries for the period from 2006 to 2015. Multiple pooled ordinary least square and fixed effects regression models are employed to examine the relationship between blockholder ownership and firms’ cash holdings.

This study documents a positive relationship between blockholder ownership and corporate cash holdings which indicates the role of blockholders in influencing firms’ cash holdings policies. However, further analyses show that the effect of blockholding on cash holdings depends on the type of blockholder. While the relationship is still positive between cash holdings and ownership by strategic blockholders, it turns negative for the ownership by institutional blockholders.

This study provides evidence for the important role played by firms’ ownership structures, and especially blockholding, in shaping firms’ cash holdings decisions. The findings are therefore of great value for investors, firms’ management and board and policy makers.

This paper contributes to the literature by providing an explanation of the contradictory results documented in the literature on the impact of blockholders on corporate cash holdings. This study, to the best of the author’s knowledge, is the first to examine the effect of blockholder ownership on cash holdings by distinguishing between different types of blockholder.

The purpose of this study was to explore the motives (especially the agency motives) for corporate diversification from the perspective of corporate executives who make such strategic decisions and manage the diversified firms daily.

A qualitative research approach was adopted, and 12 chief executive officers (CEOs) of diversified firms in Nigeria were interviewed for their perspectives on the motives for corporate diversification.

Stewardship motives – diversification to use excess capacities in assets and resources to exploit opportunities in the market and defend against adverse environmental developments – were the most cited reasons for diversification. The relevant agency problem related to corporate diversification motive in Nigeria is the principal–principal (majority shareholder-minority shareholder) one. CEOs with substantial holdings in their firms indicated that they use diversification to reduce their investment risk and retain control of their portfolio.

The findings suggest that in corporate environments such as Nigeria that feature blockholding prominently, the corporate strategy-related agency problem that policymakers should pay greater attention to is the principal–principal conflict rather than the traditional agent–principal problem that has influenced corporate governance over the years. There is also a need to revise the dominant view that diversification is a value-destroying strategy motivated by the self-seeking behavior of managers who have little or no shares in the companies they manage.

The few studies on motives for corporate diversification that incorporated the perspectives of corporate executives did not address the agency motives of diversification. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study that has done so.

This paper aims to review empirical research on the relationship between institutional ownership (IO) and board governance (85 studies).

Based on agency and upper echelons theory, the heterogeneous monitoring function of specific types and the nature of institutional investors on board composition, compensation and chief executive officer (CEO) characteristics will be focused.

The author found that most studies have referred to archival studies, analyzed the impact of board governance on IO, focused on CEO characteristics, neglected IO heterogeneity and advanced regression models to address endogeneity concerns. In line with the theoretical framework, the relationship between total IO and board governance is heterogeneous. However, specific types such as foreign, dedicated and pressure-resistant institutions represent active monitoring tools and push for increased board governance.

The author provided useful recommendations for future research from a content and methodological perspective, e.g. the need for analyzing the impact of IO on sustainable board governance and other characteristics of top management team members, e.g. the chief financial officer.

As many regulatory bodies implemented regulations to promote shareholder rights and board governance, this literature review highlights the connections of both corporate governance mechanisms. Managers should conduct a careful and timely investor analysis and change the composition and compensation of the board of directors in line with institutional investors’ preferences.

This analysis makes useful contributions to prior research by focusing on IO and board governance, whereas the author structured the heterogeneous variables and results within the structured literature review. The authors guides researchers, regulatory bodies and business practice in this corporate governance topic.

This study examines the association between internal corporate governance mechanisms (i.e. board of directors and audit committee) and the information value of bank earnings. The authors comparatively assess this association across different bank types, Islamic versus conventional banks. The authors also investigate the mediating effect of Shariah governance.

The authors utilize a unique and an international sample of 723 bank-year observations representing 100 listed banks from 16 countries during the period 2007–2015. The authors investigate the characteristics of the board of directors and audit committee (i.e. size and independence) and employ three core analyses for earnings informativeness (i.e. earnings persistence, cash flow predictability and reliability of loan loss provisions). Additional analyses address Shariah supervisory boards’ (SSBs’) size, financial expertise and multiple outside directorships. The authors use the random-effect Generalised Least Squares (GLS) estimation technique and provide several robustness checks and sensitivities.

The authors find that, on average, having large and independent boards (and audit committees) increases the informativeness of reported earnings for banks. Conditional on bank type, our results report strong evidence for differential effects across the two alternative banking systems. In Islamic banks, large and independent board of directors (and audit committees) is positively associated with all measures of information value. There is insignificant evidence for conventional banks. However, SSBs show no significant effect on the reported earnings’ informativeness.

This is the first study, to the best of our knowledge, that empirically and comparatively assesses the information value of reported earnings in association with effective internal governance while recognizing the institutional characteristics of different bank types. The authors offer new insights to policymakers, investors and other stakeholders located within countries operating on a dual banking system. The results could help regulators to improve their rules/guidance related to double-layer governance and financial reporting quality.

This paper aims to examine the relationship between earnings quality and corporate cash holdings in an emerging economy. Existing literature posits that earnings quality is a result of information asymmetry and firms with lower earnings quality increases cash holdings, to shield the firm from future uncertainties. In this paper, the authors propose a ‘private benefits hypothesis’, which suggests that lower earnings quality is an indicator of opportunism and expropriation of resources in the firm, through tunneling or excessive executive compensations. As a result, firms with lower earnings quality increase cash holdings in their control, to increase their private benefits and to avoid the scrutiny of the external stakeholders. The authors further examine the monitoring role played by institutional investors on cash holdings, with varying degrees of earnings quality.

This study uses an unbalanced panel data sourced from Prowessdx, from 2000 to 2019. The analysis employs 20,231 firm-year observations from 2,421 firms. Earnings quality is calculated following Dechow and Dichev (2002).

Empirical analysis confirms that the firms with higher earnings quality reduce cash. Further, institutional investors reduce the cash holdings in firms with higher earnings quality. Institutional investors effectively reduce the cash only in firms with at least 10% of equity shareholding. The results are robust to alternative measures of earnings quality and endogeneity concerns.

This study diverges from the information asymmetry hypothesis in the existing literature on earnings quality and cash holdings and highlights the underlying private benefits hypothesis, that will impact cash holdings. Next, the 10% institutional shareholding is important in the Indian context as it represents the minimum threshold at which block holders can request extraordinary general meetings (Section 100 of the Companies Act 2013) or the involvement of the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) (Section 213 of the Companies Act 2013). This study highlights that unlike in Anglo-Saxon economies, institutional investors or other minority shareholders are empowered by the Companies Act 2013 to play a vital role in corporate governance with a mere 10% equity.