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The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of supervision on banking risk to determine whether prudential measures taken especially after financial crises are effective in limiting banking risks.

The empirical study focused on 210 annual reports of almost all Tunisian banks during the 2010–2019 period. Banking supervision effectiveness is measured by enforcement outputs (i.e. on-site audits and sanctions). The generalized least squares method of multivariate analysis was used to analyze this study.

The results show that supervision set up and on-site audits reduce bank risk, while the relationship between sanctions and risk appears to be non-significant. The results still hold after robustness tests by changing the bank's risk-taking indicators.

This study has important implications for managers and investors in the Tunisian context. In particular, the findings provide microevidence for the impact of supervision in Tunisian banks to reduce their risk-taking. The empirical results have important implications for the decision-making of bank managers and regulators in Tunisia as well as for relevant actors in similar emerging economies.

This study extends the previous literature on supervision by examining the relationship between supervision and banking risk in an emerging country, which has been little explored, Tunisia in particular. Furthermore, this study examines whether supervision reduces risk borne by Tunisian banks, and to the best of the researchers' knowledge, it is one of the pioneering studies of supervision in the Tunisian market. This latter market has different economic, political and social attributes compared to developed countries. So, this paper helps to clarify the impact of supervision enforcement and macroprudential policies. In addition, this paper strongly contributes to the various stakeholders “understanding of the importance and implication of supervision practices. However, since banks tend not to reduce their participation in risky activities to seek higher profits, supervisory policymakers and practitioners should also take a closer look at the composition of banks” investment portfolios to reduce moral hazard and regulatory arbitrage behavior. Empirically, the authors measure supervision by on-site audits and sanctions and examine how they affect bank risk level, which was never approached in Tunisia.

The paper aims to offer an exploration of the Banking Act 1987 which was passed following the failure of Johnson Matthey Bankers (JMB) in 1984. This Act extended the role of auditors in banking supervision by removing traditional confidentiality constraints and created a new role of “reporting accountant”. The paper seeks to examine the origin and development of these new reporting roles. In addition, the paper considers the extent to which the findings of this historical investigation might contribute to current debates on the role of auditors in banking supervision.

The paper draws on official documents, personal accounts of individuals responsible for dealing with the JMB crisis, and semi‐structured interviews conducted with audit partners and banking supervisors who had direct experience of implementing the supervisory reforms instituted under the Banking Act 1987. Power's explanatory schema of controversy, closure and credibility is adopted as a framework for the analysis of documentary sources and interview data.

The failure of JMB generated sufficient controversy so as to require reform of the system of banking supervision. The paper shows that JMB was a controversy since it disturbed what went before and carried with it sufficient allies for change. To achieve closure of the controversy, agreement by key actors about changes to the nature of the role of auditors was required to ensure legitimacy for the reforms. Backstage work undertaken by the auditing profession and the Bank of England provided the necessary credibility to renormalise practice around the new supervisory arrangements.

The paper develops Power's schema which is then employed to analyse the emergence of the new role of reporting accountant and extended role for auditors in UK banking supervision. The paper provides empirical evidence on the processes of controversy, closure and credibility that help to ensure the legitimacy of accounting and auditing change.

The objective of this work is to analyse worldwide trends in financial supervision architectures. The focus is on the key issue in the debate – the single supervisor versus multiauthority model – in order to build up indexes of supervision unification, essential to perform studies on the causes and effects of various supervisory regimes. First, the paper introduces a Financial Authorities’ Concentration (FAC) Index. A comparative analysis of 69 countries confirmed that an increase in the degree of concentration of supervisory powers is evident in the developed countries, and particularly in the European Union. Secondly, the paper considers the nature of the institutions to which control responsibilities are entrusted. In particular, the role the central bank plays in the various national institutional settings is examined. An index of the central bank’s involvement in financial supervision is introduced, the Central Bank as Financial Authority (CBFA) Index. Each national institutional structure can be identified with the two above characteristics. Two models are the most frequent: (a) countries with a high level of unification of powers and weak central bank involvement (single financial authority regimes); and, (b) countries with a low level of unification of powers and strong central bank involvement (central bank dominated multiple supervisor regimes). A trade‐off therefore emerges between the degree of financial sector unification and the role of the central bank. Two possible explanations of this relationship emerged: the blurring hazard effect and the monopolistic bureau effect.

This paper aims to analyse the economics of financing banking supervision and attempts to respond to two questions: What are the most common financing practices? Can the differences in current financing practices be explained by country‐specific factors, using a path‐dependence approach?

The paper performs an empirical analysis that identifies the determinants of the financing structure of banks' prudential supervision using a sample of 90 banking supervisors (central banks and financial authorities).

The paper concludes that supervisors in central banks are more likely to be publicly funded, while financial authorities are more likely to be funded via a levy on the regulated banks. The financing rule is also explained by the structure of the financial systems. Public funding is more likely in bank‐oriented structures. Finally, the geographical factor is also significant: European bank supervisors are more oriented towards the private funding regime.

In general, the paper does not find evidence of the role of the political factor, the size of the economy, the level of development and the legal tradition.

The paper analyses the financial governance of banking supervision in a sample of 90 countries world‐wide. The empirical analysis focuses on the financing rules and identifies factors that explain the differences between supervisory authorities.

This paper aims to examine the impact of bank regulation and supervision on financial stability. Financial sector reform, especially in developing countries, takes the form of a sudden adjustment in regulation and supervision. The main objective of the paper is to examine whether this fast and sudden adjustment in regulation and supervision has an undesirable impact on financial stability. Furthermore, the paper examines the role of real economic development in determining the impact of financial reform on financial stability.

Empirically, on a sample of 57 developing countries over the period 2000-2013, the author explored the impact of bank regulation and supervision on financial stability for different sub-groups of countries. The division is based on the real level of economic development and, most importantly, on the speed of adjustment in regulation and supervision. The study uses the cross-sectional–ordinary least square model. Each country has three observations (average 2000-2004, average 2005-2008 and average 2009-2013), which are convenient, with the date of the three surveys on regulation and supervision (2002-2006-2011). The period of the averages is selected to cover periods before and after the survey as regulation and supervision may be adopted before the survey and as its impact may persist for the period after.

The major finding of this study is that it supports the important role of the speed of adjustment in regulation and supervision, and its impact on financial stability. Soft adjustment in regulation and supervision has more positive impact on financial stability than fast adjustment. Activity restrictions have positive and significant impact on financial stability in soft adjustment countries’ group. On the other hand, in countries with fast adjustment, results show negative and statistically significant impact on financial stability, especially for supervisory independence. More time is needed for supervisors to adapt to new regulation and supervision and gain expertise to monitor financial condition of banks in a consistent manner. Results also show that the level of economic development is an important factor when testing the impact of regulation and supervision on financial stability. In lower income countries, more room is available for corruption in lending, which has a negative impact on financial stability.

This study advocates the necessity of taking the speed of adjustment in regulation and supervision by policymakers in developing countries, while initiating reform in the financial sector. Financial sector reform that takes the form of a sudden adjustment in regulation and supervision may have undesirable results in terms of financial stability. On the other hand, soft adjustment in regulation and supervision, which gives more room for supervisors to adapt and gain expertise, may have more positive impact on financial stability.

This paper is the first paper to explore new methods of calculating the speed of adjustment in regulation and supervision, and to examine whether the high speed of financial reform in developing countries has an undesirable impact on financial stability.

The purpose of this study is to examine how banking regulation and supervision affect the performance of microfinance institutions (MFIs). It proposes performance of the MFIs from the aspect of social and financial efficiency because the MFIs nowadays not only view to sustain the social role of poverty eradication but in the same time they must strive the financial sustainability to maintain the operation in long run. This study also includes the macroeconomic condition and firm level variables to control for social and financial efficiency of the MFIs.

The data consists 168 MFIs from five countries in Southeast Asia from year 2011 to 2017. First stage of analysis is to identify level of social and financial efficiency by using data envelopment analysis approach. Second stage is to examine impact of bank regulation and supervision to the social and financial efficiency by applying panel regression analysis and generalized method of moments for robust estimation methods.

The finding shows the MFIs own lower social efficiency and higher score in financial efficiency. This indicates in pursuing financial sustainability, the MFIs in Southeast Asia countries have lost sight of their original mission of poverty reduction. Furthermore, the result also presents a significant impact of bank regulation and supervision to the social and financial efficiency of the MFIs. However, the results appear in different direction when more negative effect is associated with social efficiency. This specifies that bank regulation and supervision are not appropriate to accommodate the social needs, thus hampering the effort of poverty reduction by the MFIs.

The present study only concentrates on the impact bank regulation and supervision to the performance of the MFIs. As the operation of the MFIs currently has been largely exposed in banking operation, it is suggested that future studies to look for other special issues such as country governance that might influence specifically in social and financial aspect of the MFIs.

The empirical findings from this study could be useful and may have significant implications for the regulators. The regulators or policymakers could establish the new regulation framework that fulfil the dual needs (social and financial) of the MFIs. Furthermore, the empirical findings also could serve as guidance to regulators and decision-makers in designing new policies for a sustainable and competitive sector of the MFIs. Although the MFIs recently brings a similar role as commercial banks, they need to retain the social aspects as that is the original mission of the MFIs

The present study proves that the bank regulation and supervision have brought a significant influence to the performance of the MFIs in ASEAN 5 countries.

Supervision of banks in the UK is conducted by the Bank of England. The Bank which was created by Royal Charter in 1697 was nationalised by the Bank of England Act 1946. This Act gave the Treasury the power to require the Bank to act in the ‘national interest’, however, this power has never been utilised and the Bank has retained a high degree of autonomy from the Government, thus enabling the Bank to apply a laissez‐faire approach to the supervision of banks. Traditionally the Bank has never favoured a heavy‐handed approach to regulation, but has relied upon the use of moral suasion in its capacity as lender of last resort. The Bank's supervisory philosophy has been summed up thus:

This article reviews the history of international coordination in the supervision of financial institutions noting why cooperation developed first and has been most extensive in oversight of banks relative to securities firms and insurance companies. It also poses the question of whether the extent of international coordination can be sustained or may even diminish.

The history of international coordination is used to illustrate the hypotheses that cooperation is more likely: the broader the international consensus on policy objectives and the potential gains from cooperation, the wider the international consensus on policy objectives and the potential gains from cooperation, the deeper the international agreement on the probable consequences of policy alternatives, the stronger the international institutional infrastructure for decision-making and the greater the domestic influence of experts who share a common understanding of a problem and its solutions.

All five of these factors that have enabled deepening and broadening of international cooperation have diminished in strength so that international cooperation is not likely to expand and may even be in retreat.

This article clarifies the factors that facilitate international cooperation and highlights the key obstacles to sustaining international cooperation.