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Jensen and Murphy (1990) and others have found a small but statistically significant relationship between firm performance (as measured by change in shareholder wealth or firm profits) and executive compensation. In this study we investigate the pay‐ performance relationship further by considering the relationship between an outside measure of firm performance (changes in the firm's bond rating) and the contemporaneous change in the compensation of the firm's CEO. We find that when a firm's bond rating is down‐graded, CEO total compensation declines by a relatively small amount ($165,500) and when a firm's bond rating is upgraded, CEO total compensation increases markedly ($3,202,900). Thus, while a positive pay‐performance relationship exists, the relationship is not symmetric. CEO compensation changes (increases) much more when firm performance improves than it changes (decreases) when firm performance declines. Further, most of the change in CEO compensation occurs in the stock gains (profits from the exercise of stock options) category for both firms experiencing bond rating upgrades and down‐grades.

The purpose of this paper is to empirically analyze the impact of chief executive officer (CEO) turnover on strategic change and explore the mediating role of organizational slack between them, as well as the moderating role and joint moderating role of top management team (TMT) external social network, ownership nature and industry type.

Based on the upper echelons theory, resource allocation theory and structuration theory, this paper takes the unbalanced panel data of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges of China from 2001 to 2018 as the research sample, uses ordinary least squares (OLS) regression method and fixed effect model to study the relationship between CEO turnover and strategic change, and focuses on the mediating mechanism and moderating mechanism between them.

The authors find that CEO turnover is positively related to strategic change. When a CEO turns over, a new CEO will initiate strategic change. Precipitation organizational slack plays a mediating role between CEO turnover and strategic change. Non-precipitation organizational slack has no mediating effect between CEO turnover and strategic change, which is embodied as “suppressing effects.” When the non-precipitation organizational slack variable is controlled, the impact of CEO turnover on strategic change will be enhanced. TMT external social network, ownership nature and industry type all negatively moderate the relationship between CEO turnover and strategic change. TMT external social network and ownership nature have a joint moderating effect between CEO turnover and strategic change. When TMT external social network is small, CEO turnover has a positive effect on strategic change in both state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises, but the promotion effect is stronger in non-state-owned enterprises. When TMT external social network is large, the positive effect of CEO turnover on strategic change in state-owned enterprises is from strong to weak, but in the non-state-owned enterprises is from weak to strong. TMT external social network and industry type have a joint moderating effect between CEO turnover and strategic change. When TMT external social network is small, CEO turnover has a positive impact on strategic change in high-tech enterprises and non-high-tech enterprises, but the promotion effect is stronger in non-high-tech enterprises. When TMT external social network is large, the positive impact of CEO turnover on strategic change in high-tech enterprises is from strong to weak, but in the non-high-tech enterprises is from weak to strong.

On the basis of previous studies, this paper further expands the research scope of the mechanism of CEO turnover on strategic change, echoing the research arguments of relevant scholars. At the same time, the research results reveal the mechanism of organizational slack, TMT external social network, ownership nature and industry type in the relationship between CEO turnover and strategic change, and further deepen the application of upper echelons theory, resources allocation theory and structuration theory in China. In addition, the research conclusions of this paper also provide reference value for Chinese enterprises in carrying out strategic change, promoting enterprise transformation and improving the level of corporate governance, and help to enhance the understanding and attention of Chinese enterprises to CEO turnover, organizational slack, TMT external social network, strategic change and corporate governance under the background of high-quality economic development.

The purpose of this paper is to examine how the magnitude of strategic change may be influenced by Chief executive officer (CEO) underpayment relative to comparison CEOs. Based on equity theory, the authors propose that compensation inequity motivates underpaid CEOs to restore equity, which can take the form of making a greater magnitude of strategic change. In addition, this study proposes three important moderators of the relationship between CEO underpayment and strategic change.

Results from a sample covered in the Standard & Poor’s (S&P) ExecuComp database for the years 1996-2014 provide support for these theoretical predictions.

CEO underpayment has a positive effect on the magnitude of strategic change. Top management team compensation gap and firm slack are proposed to weaken the impact of CEO underpayment on strategic change, while environmental complexity is predicted to strengthen the relationship between CEO underpayment and strategic change.

This study contributes to strategic change literature by linking research on CEO relative compensation to strategic change studies. This study contributes to equity theory and CEO relative compensation literature by extending its implications to firms’ decisions on strategic change. Moreover, it also contributes to equity theory by revealing the boundary conditions that mitigate or aggravate the impacts of CEO underpayment on firms’ strategic decisions.

This paper aims to investigate the influence of implicit self-theories and the change in CEO of a firm after product failure on consumers’ preference of the enhanced product.

Three experiments were conducted involving product failure and CEO change scenarios.

Studies demonstrate that incremental theorists prefer the enhanced product after the CEO change (vs no change), whereas entity theorists do not prefer the enhanced product after the CEO change. This effect is mediated by consumers’ perception of the likelihood of success of the firm after the CEO change. Furthermore, entity theorists prefer the enhanced product only when the CEO change is external (vs internal).

Future research could investigate if the impact of CEO change on product perception depends on the severity of the situation, and identify boundary conditions under which the CEO change is not beneficial.

The results suggest that organizations can take advantage of the leadership change by introducing new products strategically around the period of leadership change. Marketers can induce incremental mindset in their advertisement material during the period of leadership change to ensure that all consumers have a positive perception of the enhanced products.

This is the first research to investigate how consumers respond to leadership changes made by organizations. The findings show that different signals (internal vs external CEO change) can generate different reactions across different receivers (incremental vs entity theorists).

Boards of directors often attempt to foster corporate entrepreneurship by replacing a firmʼs chief executive officer (CEO). Compelling theoretical arguments and anecdotal evidence suggest that when firm performance has suffered, a new CEO is best suited to lead the firmʼs creative endeavors. On the other hand, among firms that retain their existing CEO after a decline in performance, manipulating the CEOʼs compensation package is a common governance practice used by boards to encourage innovation. In these cases, some have argued that increasing the CEOʼs pay will encourage corporate entrepreneurship, because the CEO has been compensated for assuming additional risk. Counter to these propositions, this study develops theoretical arguments that a firmʼs existing CEO is better equipped to foster corporate entrepreneurship and that this probability increases when the CEOʼs cash compensation is decreased. Results from a sample of 100 single-product manufacturing firms suggest firms that retain their current CEO and decrease the CEOʼs cash compensation are most likely to engage in corporate entrepreneurship. Implications that this research has for corporate entrepreneurship, corporate governance, and firm performance are discussed.

Many studies have examined the antecedents of firms' strategic change on a micro and meso level, but few studies have explored it from the macrolevel (e.g. economic policy uncertainty) perspective. This research draws attention to the impact of economic policy uncertainty on firms' strategic change.

This research empirically tests hypotheses based on a sample of listed firms in China during the period between 2010 and 2017.

Based on real options theory, the authors theorize and find that economic policy uncertainty will negatively affect firms' strategic change through the mediating effect of CEO turnover. Moreover, organizational inertia will strengthen the negative impact of economic policy uncertainty on CEO turnover and will weaken the positive impact of CEO turnover on firms' strategic change.

First, this research contributes to the strategic change literature by demonstrating the important impact of economic policy uncertainty on firms' strategic change. Second, this research expands the literature on the economic consequences of economic policy uncertainty. Third, this research clarifies the path and boundary conditions of economic policy uncertainty affecting strategic change by introducing the mediating effects of CEO turnover and the moderating effects of organizational inertia.

Prior research has shown evidence of earnings management in financial reports of US and Australian firms changing chief executive officer (CEO). This paper examines whether corporate boards, with certain characteristics associated with strong corporate governance, are effective in controlling any earnings management in the financial reports of Australian firms that change CEOs. Since hiring, monitoring and replacing the CEO are key roles of the board of directors, research in this specific context is considered particularly appropriate. After controlling for contemporaneous and lagged profitability in the year of CEO change, we find evidence of negative unexpected accruals in our sub‐sample of firms where the CEO resigned. For this group, larger boards and a higher proportion of independent directors appear to limit observed negative earnings management. In the case of CEO retirements there is evidence of positive unexpected accruals in the period of CEO change. However, none of the board characteristics show any significant relationship with unexpected accruals. In the period after CEO change, we find no evidence of positive unexpected accruals for CEO resignations and none of the board characteristics show any significant relationship with unexpected accruals. For CEO retirements, our analysis indicates that a higher proportion of executive and affiliated director shareholding goes some way towards counteracting the observed positive unexpected accruals. When lagged unexpected accruals are included in the regression equation to control for accrual reversals, CEO duality significantly increases the already positive earnings management found in CEO retirements in the period following CEO change.

Drawing on the literature on CEO succession research and impression management, the present study examines how the selection of CEO successors affects their motivation to initiate postsuccession strategic change. Based on the perspective of reference-dependence in prospect theory, the study also explores the impact of boards' reference-point setting on the intensity of CEO successors' inclination to change corporate strategy after assuming office.

Two-stage Heckman model and a spline function analysis are used to analyze data of 4,373 firm-year observations from Chinese listed companies between 2001 and 2016.

The empirical findings indicate that the intensity of CEO successors' willingness to change corporate strategy is diluted by the gap between the focal firm's performance on succession and its prior performance, while it is strengthened by the gap between the focal firm's performance on succession and the industry-average level of performance

By establishing a theoretical model, the present study analyzes the process of CEO selection to explore the role of boards of directors in this process and its effect on CEO successors' willingness to initiate postsuccession strategic change. Significantly, this study shows that the boards of directors would adopt internal and external reference setting when evaluating CEO successors in the postsuccession phase, which would impact the intensity of successors' motivation to manage impression by initiating postsuccession strategic change.

The purpose of this paper is to examine how analyst recommendation change is associated with a firm’s magnitude of strategic change.

This study argues that unfavorable analyst recommendation change serves as a powerful external assessment that current strategies are inappropriate and that changes are needed. This study also incorporates the moderating roles of CEO power and board’s informal hierarchy in the relationship between analyst recommendation change and firm’s magnitude of strategic change. Results from a sample of 824 observations generally support our predictions.

The findings of this study show that the greater the analysts downgrade for the company’s stock, the larger the magnitude of strategic change will be made. This study also considers the moderating roles of CEO power and the clarity of board’s informal hierarchy. In particular, the higher the CEO power, the weaker the relationship between analyst recommendation change and the magnitude of strategic change will be. The higher the clarity of board’s informal hierarchy, the more positive the relationship between analyst recommendation change and the magnitude of strategic change will be.

It extends research on the external predictors of strategic change by incorporating the role of unfavorable analyst recommendation change. In addition, it contributes to institutional theory by showing how external legitimacy pressure and internal corporate governance tool complement each other.

Scholars working in the strategy area have long held that one of the primary ways in which organizations adapt to external changes is through strategic choice. Inasmuch as a new CEO can result in a new strategic direction for the firm, the CEO turnover event itself is an important way by which organizations can signal an alteration in the direction of the firm. In this chapter, we explore how and why CEO turnover has become one of the most powerful indicators of adaptation the firm can make and propose a research agenda to guide future work on CEO turnover.