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Auditors use behavioral red flags (BRFs) to examine which individuals are more prone to unwarranted behavior such as corruption and asset misappropriation. Using a rich data set from the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE), we analyze the impact of BRFs on loss sizes from asset misappropriation. We control for antifraud mechanisms established at the company level and other factors both at the individual and the firm level. Performing an exploratory factor analysis yields six factors for BRFs which capture the principal perpetrator's situation both at the private level and the workplace. A general wheeler-dealer attitude and financial distress significantly increase loss sizes. By contrast, we find no evidence that nonmonetary private problems lead to higher losses.

This chapter adopts Porter’s ‘audit trinity’ approach comprising internal audit, external audit and audit committee to discuss the role auditing can play in the management of corporate fraud.

The chapter maps the historical background of and the developments in external audit as an assurance service, the internal audit function and the audit committee. Based on this, it explains the nature, types and possible causes of corporate fraud within the context of business risk with a view to establishing how auditing can help in managing such frauds.

The chapter highlights the relationships that should exist between the three audit types in order to support a sound internal control system as a tool for preventing and detecting corporate fraud.

The chapter identifies cost, opportunity, connivance and managerial override as factors that could limit the ability of auditing to manage corporate fraud. It also suggests ways of addressing these limitations.

As the current upward trend in IT adoption for corporate operations continue to open new sets of corporate fraud windows, this chapter examines how an entity’s internal controls can be used to prevent and detect these growing fraud schemes.

The chapter’s unique strength is its adoption of a holistic approach to auditing to suggest ways of managing corporate fraud – a novelty in the corporate fraud literature. It is hoped that future research in the area will bring empirical insights to the issues raised and perspectives covered in the chapter.

The need for independent audit goes back to the agency theory, the theory of delegation of power and the issue of trust. Stakeholders delegate power to management to manage the business on their behalf, yet they face the risk of information asymmetry and management motivations to commit fraud. The main aim of having an independent auditor was therefore to reduce the risk of information asymmetry and fraudulent behaviour by management. Auditors are required by the International Auditing Standards to detect material fraud and error, and they are expected to have a duty of care for stakeholders. However, recently independent auditors, whether conducting private or public audit, have been scrutinised for failing to detect material fraud. There have been a lot of discussions in the literature about the role of private auditors in detecting fraud, but very little discussions about the role of public auditors in detecting fraud. This chapter will outline the difference between private audit and public audit; explain the legal liability of public auditors in relation to fraud detection; the role of public auditors in detecting fraud; and will critically review the root causes for auditors’ failure to detect fraud.

Purpose – This study investigates the nature, types, and methods of fraudulent financial reporting committed by Chinese listed companies with a view to understanding corporate behavior relating to management fraud in China. Such an understanding is important for preventing frauds and achieving better financial reporting compliance.

Design/Methodology/Approach – This study adopts a descriptive research approach using the data based on 182 punishment bulletins issued by the China Securities Regulatory Commission from 2002 to 2006. The study considers three categories of frauds (i.e., false income statements, false balance sheets, and insufficient or false disclosure) and uses these categories to describe and analyze the fraud cases.

Research findings/Insights – Based on the sample of 83 cases over the 5-year period from 2002 to 2006, this study finds that all the frauds in the sample involved the manipulation, alteration, and falsification of reported financial information. Fraud schemes often contained more than one technique to misstate financial statements, typically through overstating revenues and assets, and understating liabilities and expenses. Most of the sample companies committed several frauds simultaneously. This study also reveals that most of the frauds committed by Chinese listed companies lasted more than 2 years, with the longest being 9 years, and common intervals between the initial fraud year and the announcement year of punishment were more than 3 years, with the longest being 11 years.

Theoretical/Academic implications – This study provides an empirical analysis of fraudulent financial reporting cases committed by Chinese listed companies. These cases were rarely studied in the Western literature. This study contributes to the extant literature by providing an insight into management fraud in China. Research into fraudulent financial reporting in the largest developing economy is certainly of interest as prior research into this area is mostly based on developed economies.

Practitioner/Policy implications – The implications drawn from this study could be useful for a better understanding of the management behavior of companies in developing and transitional economies. This study has a potential to assist regulators and accounting professional bodies to set guidelines facilitating corporate compliance of regulated financial reporting.

The authors investigate the joint effects of two environmental variables, performance-based pay (PBP) and performance monitoring (PM), on behavioral dishonesty in a setting where the controls subsequently are absent. In a laboratory study using 88 participants in a 2×2 experimental design, simulating a work environment, the authors manipulate the presence of PBP and PM. Once the participants are accustomed to their assigned work environment and have completed contractual tasks unrelated to the dishonesty experiment, the authors allow them to privately roll dice to determine the size of a bonus gift card. Dishonesty levels are inferred from differences between treatment groups in the prizes claimed. The authors find an interaction effect, where inferred dishonesty in the performance-based-pay group is higher than the fixed-pay group when there is no PM, but lower when there is PM. Although theory and existing literature did not lead us to hypothesize these exact results, they offer important insights into a complex relationship. By jointly examining the effects of worker contracts and workplace monitoring on dishonesty, this research extends the understanding of the potential consequences of formal controls. As the workplace grows more complex, employers increasingly rely on information provided by frontline employees and managers. Thus, unintended effects of managerial controls on honesty are an important topic in the business literature.

This paper reports the results of a study that was conducted to investigate the performance of senior-level business students as it pertains to recognizing certain clues or risk factors that are frequently associated with the misappropriation of entity assets. Based on three of the risk factors identified in SAS No. 82, an experiment was used to examine differences in performance based on academic major, fraud-specific knowledge, and certain experiences of the students.

The primary contributions of this study are the discovery that: (1) an increasing number of risk factors; (2) knowledge accumulated in an accounting curriculum; (3) reading additional articles on the topic of employee theft; and (4) direct encounters with employee theft in the workplace were positively and significantly associated with recognizing an increased possibility that employee theft may be occurring. The results also indicate that neither employer-provided fraud training, nor part-time work experience, helped the subjects recognize an increased level of vulnerability of an organization to employee theft.

This chapter is about the reorganisation of the auditing firms in the Post-Sarbanes Oxley Era, in the light of quality concern. The chapter opens up with definitions of related concepts. The importance of audit quality is emphasised in the second section. Discussion on the factors associated with audit quality is the following part. The need for reorganisation of the audit firms follows and the chapter concludes with proposals section. The audit firms seem to be squeezed to catch up with both the national and international regulations. One of the ascertainments is that the audit firms all over the world need to cope with the standards; another is their obligation to provide high-quality audits. Globally speaking, the unwillingness of the profession to alter its habits and to sacrifice the profits historically earned is another obstacle to overcome. In the aftermath of the establishment of the Public Oversight Board in the late 2012, Turkish case follows with an almost 10-year gap.