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The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has initiated policies and legal challenges that have shaped the evolution of competition in healthcare. This chapter discusses not only discusses the current matters in healthcare competition, but it also gives a history of past issues faced by the FTC and the approaches used to resolve them. These FTC actions range from challenges to hospital mergers to preventing “reverse payments” from patent holders to generic entrants in pharmaceuticals. Ultimately the healthcare industry faces many unique regulatory and competitive aspects that, while challenging, do not require special rules.

Brand-name pharmaceutical companies have engaged in a variety of business conduct that has increased price. One of these activities involves “product hopping,” or brand switches from one version of a drug to another. The antitrust analysis of product hopping implicates antitrust law, patent law, the Hatch–Waxman Act, and state drug product selection laws, as well as uniquely complicated markets characterized by buyers different from decision makers. As a result, courts have offered inconsistent approaches to product hopping.

In this chapter, we offer a framework that courts and government enforcers can employ to analyze product hopping. The framework is the first to incorporate the characteristics of the pharmaceutical industry. It defines a “product hop” to include instances in which the manufacturer (1) reformulates the product to make the generic nonsubstitutable and (2) encourages doctors to write prescriptions for the reformulated rather than the original product.

When the conduct meets both requirements, our framework offers two stages of analysis. First, we propose two safe harbors to ensure that the vast majority of reformulations will not face antitrust review. Second, the framework examines whether the hop passes the “no-economic-sense” test, determining if the behavior would make economic sense if the hop did not have the effect of impairing generic competition. Showing just how far the courts have veered from justified economic analysis, the test would recommend a different analysis than that used in each of the five product-hopping cases that have been litigated to date, and a different outcome in two of them.

The purpose of this paper is to understand why managers, internal auditors and compliance staff (in financial firms specifically and using Malaysia as a concrete example) can want to ignore compliance-related legislation (a law on anticompetitive behaviour in this case).

The authors review, discuss and critique the literature on compliance and institutions in the light of existing data from Malaysia’s financial industry (literally confronting theory with data).

Legislative design can actually encourage managers and their auditors disobey/ignore the law for reasons which previous theories cannot explain.

This research does not use the regression techniques in vogue now. The findings, nevertheless, imply that attempts to explain phenomenon in management auditing should start with the laws governing managerial activity.

Auditors may use the methods used in this study to assess the extent to which financial services firms’ managers have incentives to comply with laws. Similarly, this research can quantify the extent to which internal auditors in these firms have incentives to find untoward conduct.

Poorly designed laws affecting managerial auditing derive from pre-existing social relationships, as well as help shape them (as shown using data). Identifying areas of non-compliance may actually signal deeper problems in the way businessmen and lawmakers make and enforce laws requiring compliance and self-assessment.

The authors know of no study looking at the economic incentives driving internal auditors’ behaviour – particularly in the area of antitrust. They show how law shapes management and auditors’ incentives, quantify these incentives and show how/why previous research fails to explain these incentives.

In the absence of a clear property rights regime in outer space, commodification might bypass several legal considerations and instill a regime through customary practice, which could collide with international space law ethics, and thus, erode the corpus juris spatialis. The purpose of this paper is to find a way to prevent such an erosion.

Through an interdisciplinary review of the literature pertaining to space law, space property rights, economic goods, resources and commodities, this paper explores potential solutions to prevent further fragmentation of the corpus juris spatialis when confronted with the elusive transnational lex mercatoria dynamics and potential commodification of the space ecosystem.

This paper explores solutions to prevent this outcome through decentralized frameworks ranging from polycentric governance to a new “space antitrust” regime. Polycentric governance could prove very useful to address the plurality of space property rights and their complexity while space antitrust would not be precluded to intervene in a commoditized space market. Commodities benefited in the past from a certain antitrust immunity, however, due to globalization, technological development and deregulation, commodities have become more competitive, and therefore, the immunity is being gradually overturned.

This paper explores the benefits of unlocking antitrust potential forces into channeling, hand in hand with polycentricity, the development of the space ecosystem in light of international space law ethics. “Space antitrust” could become a discipline per se and better resonate with non-traditional stakeholders in the space sector in a context of commercialization and commodification of resources. Today, benefit-sharing causes debate among spacefaring nations in terms of property rights. However, it could be enforced through competition law dynamics.

The purpose of this research is to identify five lessons of the Trinko decision and apply them to internet access issues.

The research identifies five lessons and then relates these lessons to access issues involving the internet.

Based on application of the lessons of Trinko, it is likely that access to the public internet will be maintained but it is uncertain as to what the nature of access requirements will be, if any, for private internets.

The research provides an economic analysis of the milestone legal decision in Trinko and applies the lessons of Trinko to access issues involving the internet.

The purpose of this paper is to describe the background and reasoning behind the June 18, 2007 US Supreme Court decision in Credit Suisse Securities (USA) v. Billing et al.

The paper explains the US District Court for the Southern District of New York's dismissal of two antitrust class action lawsuits filed against a group of investment banks in 2002, the reversal by the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in 2005, and the Supreme Court's rejection of the Second Circuit's analysis in 2007.

The Court found that, due to the specialized knowledge required to parse the SEC's rules and distinguish permissible from prohibited conduct, there was a “serious risk” that antitrust courts would produce inconsistent results. The Court also expressed a concern that allowing antitrust claims here would weaken the heightened pleading requirements in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, which Congress passed to weed out “umeritorious securities lawsuits.”

The decision undoubtedly will have important implications regarding the extent to which the antitrust laws may be applied to other conduct regulated by the securities laws, or in the context of other regulated industries.

The paper provides practical interpretation and guidance by experienced securities lawyers.

This paper presents a “Granger Causality” analysis of the relationship between the antitrust enforcement activities of the Department of Justice and economic growth in the U.S. economy from 1891 to 2002. Professor Posner posed the question 35 years ago about whether there was a relationship between the two economic variables. The empirical results show some economic impact from antitrust enforcement on economic growth and little feedback.