Search results

In view of the recent enhanced concerns of the SEC and PCAOB that Accounting Principles Board Opinion No. 23 (APB 23)–asserting firms do not comply with the “sufficient evidence” criteria of APB 23, we examine whether APB 23–asserting firms that declared their foreign earnings as permanently reinvested abroad are less likely to repatriate those foreign earnings under the American Jobs Creation Act (AJCA) of 2004, compared with similar non-asserting firms. The asserting firms are required to disclose sufficient evidence that validates an ability to meet their domestic cash needs with only earnings generated in the United States and their plans to indefinitely reinvest foreign earnings outside the United States. Estimates show that asserting firms are more likely to repatriate their foreign earnings than non-asserting firms. In addition, we find that the probability of making an election to repatriate permanently invested foreign earnings under the AJCA of 2004 is higher for firms with nonbinding foreign tax credit (FTC) limitations that have made an APB 23 declaration to permanently invest foreign earnings abroad. These findings suggest that asserting firms’ declarations to indefinitely reinvest foreign earnings abroad are not well grounded, thereby indirectly validating the SEC’s and PCAOB’s increased scrutiny for supporting evidence for APB 23 assertion. The estimates also show that the likelihood of making an election to repatriate foreign earnings under the AJCA of 2004 increases with asserting firms’ liquidity constraints and financial distress: the financial characteristics listed as part of APB 23 criteria of sufficient evidence and highlighted by the SEC and PCAOB comment letters, indicating that asserting firms raid permanently reinvested foreign earnings to satisfy their financial needs and constraints.

Prior studies document increased share repurchase activity after the temporary tax holiday under the American Jobs Creation Act (AJCA) of 2004. Our study examines the moderating effect of financial statement readability on share repurchases in response to a temporary reduction in repatriation tax. Building on prior literature, we argue that firms with excess cash overseas, despite the lack of investment opportunities, produce less readable financial statements to hide bad news. We find that firms with less readable financial statements initiated higher levels of share repurchases after the AJCA. Our results contribute to the existing literature showing (1) firms hold excess cash overseas mainly for tax reasons rather than for nontax reasons such as precautionary motives or empire-building concerns and (2) firms return excess funds to investors rather than squander the funds once the tax cost of repatriation is reduced. Firms that suffer from the overinvestment problem using hard-to-read financial statements to hide the bad news of a lack of investment opportunities are more likely to benefit from the tax cut. Our study provides timely evidence of potential firm response to the 2017 Tax Cut and Jobs Act, which permanently removes the repatriation tax.

The extent to which firms repatriate indefinitely reinvested foreign earnings (IRFE) has been a major issue in the US tax system. Congress enacted provisions in the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) specifically to remove tax barriers to repatriation. However, little is known regarding the repatriation of IRFE outside of the temporary tax incentive provided by the 2004 American Jobs Creation Act (AJCA). In this chapter, I provide evidence on such repatriations by identifying a sample of 67 firms from 2009 to 2015 that reverse the indefinite reinvestment designation of foreign earnings and announce a repatriation of foreign cash. In contrast to repatriations following the 2004 AJCA, I do not find evidence that a single economic factor, such as share repurchases, motivates the repatriation. Although, in general, I do not find evidence of a significant market response to the announcements, I find evidence of a negative market reaction to announcements by low foreign effective tax rate (ETR) firms without tax offsets, suggesting that the tax may not be fully priced. Overall, I provide insight into the reasons and implications of the announced repatriation of IRFE.

We examine the stock market reaction to the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) of 2017 during its enactment process, focusing on its international provisions. Consistent with extant evidence, we find lower returns for high-foreign-activity firms, indicating a negative market reaction to the international provisions overall. Considering specific international provisions, we find that the market reaction was more positive (negative) for firms likely most affected by the shift to a quasi-territorial system for taxing foreign earnings (the transition tax on existing unrepatriated earnings, the tax on global intangible low-taxed income, and/or the base erosion and antiabuse tax) than for other firms. Our findings imply that investors are able to disentangle the economic implications of complex and interactive tax law changes.

In this chapter we analyze how the designation of foreign earnings as “permanently reinvested” outside the US (PRE) is related to subsequent firm growth and market returns. Prior research suggests that firms that hold excess cash in foreign markets to avoid the US corporate income tax experience lower growth, since such “trapped” cash is inefficiently invested. However, foreign earnings can be inefficiently invested in forms other than cash. We hypothesize and find that as the ratio of PRE to total assets increases, firms' growth rates decline. Our results suggest that trapped earnings, and not just trapped cash, are associated with lower growth. Because PRE have also been associated with earnings management in the literature, we further analyze the association between the use of PRE to meet or beat earnings targets and subsequent growth, observing a significant and persistent negative association. Finally, we note that the market discount for PRE, and especially for the use of PRE to manage earnings, appears to be relatively small. Our results provide support for FASB's stated plans to increase disclosure requirements surrounding the tax accrual.

Krull (2004) finds that US multinational corporations (MNCs) increase amounts designated as permanently reinvested earnings (PRE) to maximize reported after-tax earnings and meet earnings targets. We extend this research by examining the relationship between executive equity compensation and the opportunistic use of PRE by US MNCs, and the market reaction to earnings management using PRE designations. Firms use equity compensation to incentivize executives to strive for maximum shareholder wealth. One unintended consequence is that executives may engage in earnings management activities to increase their equity compensation. In this study, we examine whether the equity incentives of management are associated with an increased use of PRE. We predict and find strong evidence that the changes in PRE are positively associated with the portion of top managers' compensation that is tied to stock performance. In addition, we find this relationship to be strongest for firms that meet or beat forecasts, but only with the use of PRE to inflate income, suggesting that equity compensation incentivizes managers to opportunistically use PRE, especially to meet analyst forecasts.

Further, we provide evidence that investors react negatively to beating analysts' forecasts with the use of PRE, suggesting that investors find this behavior opportunistic and not fully convincing. This chapter makes an important contribution to what we know about the joint effects of tax policy, generally accepted accounting principles, and incentive compensation on the earnings reporting process.

The use of corporate aircraft has increased as businesses place more value on ease of mobility. The bonus depreciation incentives of 2002 and 2003 provided growth opportunities for the general aviation market by allowing accelerated depreciation deductions for the purchase of new corporate aircraft. These incentives allowed more than twice the traditional MACRS allowance for depreciation for the first year of operation of an asset, but the present value of the tax savings after the full depreciable life of the corporate aircraft only generated a 3.25 percent reduction in the after-tax-cost. This study documents that the bonus depreciation incentives did not generate significant growth in the general aviation aircraft market via increased production of aircraft. These incentives may have simply slowed the recession that might have taken place in this industry otherwise. However, the incentives in this study did play a significant role in determining which type of aircraft to purchase, piston or turbine.

The WTO dispute settlement process is an improvement to the original GATT dispute settlement mechanism. However, it fails to assure a timely implementation and enforcement of the dispute settlement body (DSB) recommendations. To this date, the issue of mandatory enforcement is still open to interpretation. The number of ‘matters’ that have been subject to WTO dispute settlement stands at 266 over the 1995–2006 period. The number of implementation disputes has increased since 1998 and stand at 34 as of January 1, 2007. This chapter reviews the process of dispute settlements and enforcements since 1995 and to argue for the interpretation of ‘WTO agreements’ as ‘binding contracts’ whose breach must be evaluated as either ‘efficient’ or ‘non-efficient’ when discussing enforcement. In this context the non-compliance issue may be viewed as an ‘efficient breach’ where the only efficient remedy is a ‘fine’ rather than the usual practice of ‘suspension of concessions or other obligations’ to the Respondent. What sets our approach apart from earlier discussion is that it does not view ‘suspension of concessions’ as a sufficiently burdensome and efficient sanction. A ‘fine’ on the other hand may serve as a ‘buy out’ of a Respondents WTO obligations, and can be transferred to the negatively affected domestic producers in the Complainant's market as compensation for losses.

This chapter examines the ethics and business diplomacy of legal tax avoidance by multinational enterprises (MNEs).

The methodology assembles the relevant literature and examines alternative interpretations of corporate tax strategy. Key topics include business ethics and responsibility, business sustainability, economic patriotism and corporate inversions, tax havens, and possible solutions.

The debate concerns whether legal tax avoidance is unethical and/or poor business diplomacy. There are three possible strategies for MNEs. One strategy is intentional tax avoidance. Another strategy is business–government negotiation concerning tax liability. Another strategy is business diplomacy aimed at maximizing the social legitimacy of the firm across multiple national tax jurisdictions.

The chapter assesses four possible solutions for corporate tax avoidance. One solution is voluntary tax payments beyond legal obligations whether out of a sense of ethics or a strategy of business diplomacy. A second solution is international tax cooperation and tax harmonization in ways that minimize opportunities for tax avoidance. A third solution is increased stakeholder pressure emphasizing business diplomacy and tax cooperation and harmonization. The fourth solution is negotiated tax liabilities between each business and each jurisdiction.

The chapter provides an original systematic survey of the key aspects of corporate international tax avoidance in an approach in which business ethics and business diplomacy are better integrated. The value of the chapter is that it provides information and assembles relevant literature concerning corporate international tax avoidance, and addresses possible solutions for this problem.