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Based on a sample of 1,435 Vietnamese listed firms over the period from 2005 to 2017, this study examines the sensitivity of unexpected investment to free cash flow and its mechanism.

We tested three hypotheses using two-step system-GMM to investigate investment–cash flow sensitivity for various firm scenarios while accounting for confounding variables.

Firms with negative free cash flow are more likely to engage in underinvestment; conversely, overinvestment is found primarily in firms with positive free cash flow. In terms of the mechanism, while underinvesting decisions are caused mainly by financial constraints, overinvesting behaviour primarily resulted from agency problems, typically in the form of principal-principal conflicts. Interestingly, under the impact of negative cash flow observations, financial constraints tend to decrease investment–cash flow sensitivity. Conversely, the agency costs hypothesis reveals that agency problems are more likely to increase investment–cash flow sensitivity.

These findings not only contribute to the current corporate literature but also provide some important practical implications for stock market investors, corporate managers, and policy-setting bodies, specifically in the Vietnamese market.

On the basis of principal-agent and financing constraints theories, the purpose of this paper is to construct a unified research framework via mathematical models and to provide a logical and consistent explanation of the contradictory discovery of the relationship between dividend payment and I-CFO in the previous literature.

Establishing the economic mathematical models, this paper uses the comparative static analysis to figure out the equilibrium results, to further testify the conclusions, the authors initiate the empirical tests to make the discussion more realistic.

The authors observe that overinvestment caused by agency problems is the primary reason for I-C sensitivity when the investment expenditure is less than the internal capital; dividend payout suppresses the overinvestment caused by the agency problem, thus alleviating the investment’s dependence on the internal capital. However, underinvestment caused by the financing constraints is the primary cause of I-C sensitivity when the investment expenditure is greater than the internal capital. The payment of cash dividends increases the investment shortage caused by the financing constraints, thus increasing the sensitivity. Further, the authors explore the impact of dividend payments on I-CFO sensitivity. They argue that dividend payment is not an appropriate measure of financing constraints. Both I-CFO sensitivity and I-C sensitivity are functions of agency cost and information cost.

This study provides a logical and consistent explanation of the contradictory discovery of the relationship between dividend payment and I-CFO in the previous literature and provides a clear framework and reference for future studies on the impact of financial constraints, agency cost on the investment’s dependence on the internal capital.

The theoretical model of this paper supports this differentiated mandatory dividend policy and provides reference and evidence for China's financing policies and dividend distribution policies.

This study theoretically and empirically analyzes and verifies the roles of agency cost and financial constraints on the determinants of I-C sensitivity for the first time. First, different from earlier literature, this paper puts forward I-C sensitivity as a new measure of investment’s dependence on internal capital, making the measurement more accurate. In the case of a firm with positive liquidity reserves, using the I-CFO sensitivity as a measure of external financing constraints could overestimate the firm’s financial constraints. Second, by constructing an economic static analysis framework, this study analyzes how I-C and I-CFO sensitivities change with the agency cost, the financing constraints and the dividend payment ratio. The research provides a basic framework and explanation on the contradictions of the earlier literature. The results are supposed to serve as a foundation for estimations of investment’s dependence on internal capital and should be embedded in general empirical tests in future research.

The history and divestiture of the Bell System is of immediate importance to several economies around the globe, especially those undergoing the change from state owned operations to private ownership. Similarly, those economies experiencing rapid expansion of telecommunications can also learn from the experiences of AT&T's development, maturity, and subsequent divestiture. In addition to a brief history, this study examines preliminary empirical evidence which suggests agency costs, particularly those associated with free cash flow, were reduced following the divestiture.

This paper aims to investigate whether all-equity firms are a heterogeneous group as it relates to agency costs when compared to a matched sample of levered firms and to contribute toward the understanding of the “low leverage” puzzle and the motivations behind such a perplexing phenomenon.

Propensity score matching (PSM) is used to control for endogeneity issues common to this line of research. Because all-equity firms are self-selecting, it is not possible to conduct a true randomized study. PSM attempts to simulate a randomized study by selecting matching observations with similar propensity scores as the all-equity observations.

Agency costs are not the only explanation leading to the implementation of an all-equity capital structure. The motivation of such structure is strongly influenced by free cash flows (FCF) and growth opportunities (GO), whereby firms that have high levels FCF combined with low GO exhibit higher levels of agency costs versus their levered peers, while those that have low levels of FCF and high GO exhibit no significant difference in agency costs.

A better understanding of why a firm chooses such an extreme capital structure can help investors, auditors and potential future creditors in their decision-making process.

Most prior research treats capital structure as an exogenous variable. By applying PSM, not previously used in prior research, a new methodology is used to address the endogeneity issue related to observational studies such as this one. This paper contributes toward further understanding the perplexing “low-leverage” puzzle often discussed in the financial and accounting literature.

Existing studies on corporate governance mainly focus on how a strong governance system enhances the valuation of firms with cash holding or free cash flow agency problem. The aims of this paper are threefold. First, it investigates the impact of surplus free cash flows (SFCF) on earnings predictability. Second, it investigates whether corporate governance variables moderate the negative impact of SFCF on earnings predictability. Finally, this study examines whether the ability of corporate governance to mitigate SFCF and improve the predictive value of earnings varies between large and small firms.

This paper uses heteroskedasticity-corrected least square regressions upon a sample of Malaysian listed firms.

This paper finds that firms with high SFCF experience less earnings predictability. It also indicates that earnings of firms with high SFCF are more predictable when institutional investors hold a large stake of shares and when a chairperson is independent. Finally, this paper reveals that the role of institutional and managerial ownership in mitigating agency conflict of free cash flow and improving earnings predictability is more prominent in larger firms. This study implies that investors still have reservations about the ability of boards to enhance earnings numbers in Malaysia, although efforts were taken to reform the corporate governance mechanisms following the Asian financial crisis.

This research is considered as the first attempt to examine the relationships between SFCF, corporate governance, firm size, and earnings predictability in a developing county such as Malaysia. The findings of this paper serve as a wake-up call to policy makers to evaluate the importance of governance structure in enhancing earnings predictability in emerging economies.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of family ownership on investment-cash flow sensitivity and on firm performance.

The author uses panel data to examine the relationship between investment and cash flow and between family ownership and the firm performance of Thai listed firms from 2001 to 2008. To account for the endogeneity of the lagged dependent variable, the investment equation is estimated by the generalized method of moments, following Arellano and Bond (1991).

The presence of family owners reduces the sensitivity of investment and cash flow. At low and high levels of family ownership, an increase in family shareholding leads to lower investment-cash flow sensitivity. In contrast, firms with medium family ownership levels have higher investment-cash flow sensitivity. Only at high levels of family ownership is firm performance positively related to family shareholding.

The ownership levels of family shareholders affect the investment-cash flow sensitivity in an S-shaped relation, supporting the interest alignment and entrenchment effects. When family shareholders have high ownership incentives, their interest alignment reduces the agency costs of free cash flow problems and leads to higher firm performance.

This paper aims to examine the mediating effect of dividend payout on the relationship between internal governance mechanisms (board of directors and ownership structure) and the free cash flow level.

Linear regression models are used to investigate such relationships applying data from a sample of 207 non-financial firms listed on the Gulf Cooperation Council countries’ stock markets between 2009 and 2016. To test the significance of mediating effect, the author uses the Sobel test.

The author finds a partial mediation effect of dividend on the relationship between both board independence and managerial ownership and the level of free cash flow. The results confirm the major role of outside directors in corporate governance. This governance mechanism contributes to the protection of shareholders’ interests through a generous dividend policy. However, the author finds that large managerial shareholdings increase the level of free cash flow through lower dividend payouts. This result suggests that powerful managers follow their preference of retaining excess cash to their own interests.

This paper offers insights to policy-makers of emerging economies interested in the development of the corporate governance. This study provides guidance for firms in the construction and implementation of their own corporate governance policies.

The main contribution of the present paper is to examine the dividend payout as a potential mediating variable between internal governance mechanisms and free cash flow. Moreover, it highlights the issue of efficient management of substantial funds in Sharia-compliant and non-Sharia-compliant firms.

The purpose of this study is to examine the extent to which the quality of corporate governance mechanisms and growth opportunities affect agency problems in hotel firms.

The effects of cash flows on investments and cash holdings were analyzed using three-stage least square analysis to determine the extent to which agency problems are due to the quality of corporate governance in hotel firms.

The findings showed that the effects of cash flows on investments and cash holdings were greater in well-governed hotel firms than in poorly governed hotel firms. These effects were also greater in low-growth hotel firms than in high-growth hotel firms. However, the results from a concurrent examination of the quality of corporate governance and growth opportunities showed that poorly governed hotel firms with low-growth opportunities are exposed to agency problems.

These results suggest that neither corporate governance mechanisms nor growth opportunities alone indicate agency problems. Theoretical implications are discussed within the realms of free cash flow theory and growth hypothesis.

High-growth hotel firms should retain all of their cash and cash flows to undertake value-increasing projects when they become available. Shareholders’ wealth is more likely to be maximized in high-growth firms regardless of the quality of corporate governance.

Although various aspects of corporate governance have been investigated in hospitality literature, previous studies did not examine the concurrent effects of corporate governance and growth opportunities on agency problems.

This paper aims to examine the effect of dividend regulation on cost stickiness (i.e. the asymmetric change in firm expense between sales increase and sales decrease) and explore the underlying mechanism.

Based on the quasi-natural experiment of the Guideline for Dividend Policy of Listed Companies issued by the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) in 2013, the authors employ a difference-in-difference model to investigate the impact of dividend regulation on cost stickiness.

The authors find that the cost stickiness of treatment group firms has decreased significantly when compared with control group firms after the dividend regulation. Moreover, this effect is more pronounced among firms in lower marketization regions, in lower competition industries and those with less analyst coverage and lower cash flow levels. Further analyses show that dividend regulation reduces the cost stickiness of firms by mitigating agency problems. Finally, the conclusion holds after several robust tests, including controlling for firm fixed effect, propensity score matching (PSM), placebo test and reconstruction of expense variable.

This paper confirms that dividend regulation serves an important role in corporate governance, which reduces firms' agency costs and thereby decreases cost stickiness. The conclusions shed light on the dividend policies of listed companies and capital market regulation in the future.