Search results

We investigate the social and legal blame that investors assign to auditors following unfavorable outcomes using the precision of accounting guidance described as principles-based (i.e., less-precise) or rules-based (i.e., more precise), and why investors assign blame at differing levels. We also examine how the precision of accounting guidance is related to perceptions of auditors’ ethical characteristics. We posit that blame assigned to auditors differs based on auditors’ perceived decision-making control. Results indicate a significant association between the precision of accounting guidance and social blame, and a positive association between social blame and legal blame under standards described as less-precise. Investors are also more likely to make negative evaluations of the auditor’s ethical characteristics under less-precise accounting following an unfavorable outcome, which helps explain the association between social and legal blame. Our findings suggest that auditors could face additional blame as a result of a trend toward less-precise accounting guidance, with investors being more likely to question the auditors’ ethical characteristics following unfavorable outcomes.

The purpose of this paper is to examine investors’ propensity to litigate when harmful events occur subsequent to accounting choices. Consistent with Culpable Control Theory, the authors find that investors are more likely to pursue litigation against management when managers are perceived to have more financial reporting flexibility, such as when they apply imprecise, principles-based accounting guidance. Investors are more likely to pursue litigation when they find management more responsible for harmful events, and they find management more responsible for those events when they perceive management to have more reporting flexibility. To provide additional insight, the authors investigate how the relationship between reporting flexibility and assessed manager responsibility is mediated by investors’ perceptions of management’s self-interested behavior. The authors consider monetary and non-monetary motivations for litigation against management such as recouping financial losses and punishing management. The results suggest that recouping financial losses is not the sole motivation for litigation. The authors provide evidence that punishing management is an important non-monetary component of the litigation decision. The results contribute to the limited literature on investor litigation decisions and inform the debate surrounding the potential effects of more principles-based accounting standards.

The authors test the hypotheses using an experiment with a 2×1 between-subjects design in which the authors manipulate reporting flexibility at two levels by varying the precision of accounting guidance and measure all other variables of interest. Participants are 82 part-time executive MBA program students at a major public university in the USA. Most participants work full-time (94 percent), own or have owned stocks either directly or through retirement plans (84 percent), indicate general investment knowledge (97 percent), and report high levels of familiarity with corporate financial statements, including balance sheets and income statements (92 percent). Thus, the authors conclude that these executive MBA students are reasonable surrogates for investors.

Consistent with the predictions, perceived management reporting flexibility affects investors’ propensity to pursue litigation against management. The authors find that the assignment of responsibility to management for harmful events such as investor losses, employee job losses, and economic losses suffered by a community mediates the relationship between reporting flexibility and investors’ intention to litigate. The authors also find that the relationship between reporting flexibility and assignment of responsibility to management for harmful events is not direct but instead works through the effect of reporting flexibility on perceived management self-interested behavior. As predicted, assessed management responsibility for the harmful event is positively related to investors’ propensity to litigate against management, and this relation is only partially mediated by investors’ perceptions that the litigation will be successful. This result suggests that the litigation decision is driven at least in part by corporate governance goals such as the desire for retribution or punishment of management. The second experiment provides additional support for the theory that the desire to punish management is an important component of investors’ litigation decisions.

The research makes important contributions to the literature on investor litigation and to the ongoing debate regarding principles- vs rules-based accounting standards. While some archival research addresses the conditions under which securities litigation occurs, little empirical research has directly addressed the investor decision to litigate. The paper provides additional evidence to address the question of why investors litigate. By doing so, the authors add to the debate on the desirability of shifting from more rules-based to more principles-based accounting standards.

The theory tested in this study could be used to design mechanisms to mitigate the differential propensity for investors to litigate under differing accounting regimes. As standard setters discuss a move to more principles-based standards in the USA, some observers have expressed concern that investor litigation will increase. The theory suggests that if the standard-setting body can control perceptions of management reporting flexibility such that investors believe principles-based standards provide no more flexibility than rules-based standards, they can limit an increase in the amount of investor litigation.

The authors contribute to theory by providing evidence regarding why investors desire to pursue litigation against management. The authors find that the assignment of responsibility to management for harmful events mediates the relationship between reporting flexibility and investors’ intention to litigate. The authors also find that the relationship between reporting flexibility and assignment of responsibility to management for harmful events is not direct but instead works through the effect of reporting flexibility on perceived management self-interested behavior. Furthermore, assessed management responsibility for the harmful event is positively related to investors’ propensity to litigate against management, and this relation is only partially mediated by investors’ perceptions that the litigation will be successful. Those findings provide theoretical contributions to the literature.

The purpose of this study is to examine the impact of psychological climate perceptions on the employee’s intent to comply with the organization’s whistle-blower policies. This study also endeavors to add evidence to the debate concerning the effectiveness of implementing anti-retaliation measures to improve whistle-blowing behavior. Survey results show that psychological climate perceptions of fairness and commitment to the organization influence the employee’s attitude toward whistle-blower policies, perception of how important others within the organization view the act of whistle-blowing and the employee’s intent to blow the whistle. The results of this study also suggest that anti-retaliation measures used by government policy makers and organizations to improve whistle-blowing behavior may not be an effective strategy. This manuscript discusses the implications of the findings on whistle-blowing behavior and the debate concerning anti-retaliation measures.

This paper examines how the UK Chartered Accountants Joint Ethics Committee’s (CAJEC) 1996 Statement Integrity, Objectivity and Independence, which was developed at a time of mounting levels of criticism of the auditing profession, provides legitimization for the accounting profession’s increased commercial activities, particularly in the area of other business services. Parallel with a major shift in the nature of the activities of the professional firm, this ethics Statement gives expression to changes in the profession’s concept of independence. It adopts a more accommodating method for evaluating the adequacy of an auditor’s independence, introducing a “framework” approach in contrast with its predecessor’s “rule book” approach. Both the Statement and respondents to the preceding Consultation Papers support the flexible system afforded by the framework in terms of promoting clients’ economic interests. Moreover CAJEC’s proposals did not include any initiatives to promote audit firm transparency which might have enabled external monitoring of compliance with the framework. Thus, while the Statement does place some limitations on the flexibility of the framework and retains the distinction between audit and other activities, it ultimately embodies a notion of independence that is at one with the interests of the profession.

The introduction of the IFRS in the European Union, and many other countries, has not eliminated the need for research concerning the comparability of financial statements. The IFRS still offers many options. Extensive theoretical literature exists concerning the definition of comparable financial statements and the factors that influence this comparability. This paper aims to investigate this issue.

The paper uses a survey of 426 individuals who use European IFRS financial statements.

This study shows that most of the respondents (67 per cent) interpret comparability as uniformity, that is, that all companies using the same accounting methods. Comparability of financial statements over time and of companies operating within the same industry are considered to be the most important types of comparability. Both types are jeopardised because of continuous changes in IFRS and the lack of industry specific guidance. Only 41 per cent of the respondents believe that all IFRS financial statements are comparable. Not only accounting methods used, but also judgements made by preparers and interpretation differences are viewed as important factors influencing the comparability of financial statements.

As surveys are uncommon in accounting literature, often because of sampling problems, the validity of this research should be further improved by additional surveys or other empirical research approaches.

This study contributes to the research by determining which factors influence the comparability of financial statements according to the auditors, analysts and other users and what their view is on the comparability of financial statements.

The subject area of the assignment is financial accounting and AICPA core competency skill development. This instructional tool enhances coverage of financial accounting topics in undergraduate Intermediate Accounting courses and graduate level Financial Accounting courses.

This paper provides a series of mini-cases which can be assigned to students to complete either in writing, through a brief presentation or both. Assignments can be completed on an individual basis or as a group. This provides flexibility for targeting different skill sets.

Mini-cases are short and less time-consuming than traditional cases, so instructors can use multiple assignments with different formats in a single semester. This provides students the opportunity to improve skills over a number of assignments within a semester.

A list of supplementary materials is made available and includes sample mini-cases, sample search results from the AICPA Codification, and sample memorandums.

The mini-cases provided in this paper are designed to facilitate the development of AICPA core competencies. This includes communication and leadership skills, strategic and critical thinking skills, problem solving, anticipating and serving evolving needs, synthesizing intelligence to insight, and integration and collaboration.

Barton and Simko argue that the balance sheet information would serve as a constraint on accrual‐based earnings management. This paper aims to extend their argument by examining whether the balance sheet constraint increases managers' propensity to use either downward forecast guidance or real earnings management as a substitute mechanism to avoid earnings surprises.

Following Barton and Simko, the paper uses the beginning balance of net operating assets relative to sales as a proxy for the balance sheet constraint. The argument is that because of the articulation between the income statement and the balance sheet, previous accounting choices that increase earnings will also increase net assets and therefore the level of net assets reflects the extent of previous accrual management. Models from Matsumoto and Bartov et al. are used to measure forecast guidance. Following Rochowdhury and Cohen et al., a firm's abnormal level of production costs and discretionary expenditures are used as proxies of real earnings management. The empirical analysis is conducted based on the 1996‐2006 annual data for a sample of nonfinancial, nonregulated firms.

The paper finds that firms with higher level of beginning net operating assets relative to sales are more likely to guide analysts' earnings forecasts downward, and more likely to engage in real earnings management in terms of abnormal increases in production costs and abnormal reductions in discretionary expenditures.

Overall, the paper's evidence suggests that managers turn to real earnings management or downward forecast guidance as a substitute mechanism to avoid negative earnings surprises when their ability to manipulate accruals upward is constrained by the extent to which net assets are already overstated in the balance sheet.

This study adds to prior literature that examines how managers trade off different mechanisms used to meet or beat analysts' earnings expectations. It also contributes to the extant literature by providing further insights on the role of balance sheet information in the process of managing earnings and/or earnings surprises.

This study, based on our analysis of survey data from 1,242 partners and employees of a U.S. national public accounting firm, examines the impact on psychological well-being from the moderating effects of flexibility and role clarity on work-home conflict experienced by public accountants. Most prior research in public accounting deals with the antecedents and consequences of role stress and primarily focuses on job outcomes of turnover intentions and job satisfaction as dependent variables. Public accounting firms have responded to stressors with worker-friendly policies, largely by introducing flexibility and clarity in their organizational culture. Using a multi-disciplinary research model, we analyze the causal relationships of flexibility and clarity as moderators of the bi-directional nature of work-home conflict (work interference with home and home interference with work) on psychological well-being. Our study finds that perceptions of flexibility and role clarity drawn from a career position in public accounting can mitigate role conflict between work and home environments and contribute to enhanced psychological well-being. We also find that certain relationships described in the model are moderated by family status and age, but not by gender. Results of our study have implications to both individual public accountants and to their firms.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of a principles-based accounting standard with guidance (principles-with-guidance approach), stringency (conservativeness) of numerical thresholds, and incentives (high or low debt-equity ratio environment) on the judgments of Japanese auditors in a lease accounting setting.

To reflect Japanese auditors’ judgmental features, this study adopts a quasi-experiment that uses both manipulation for different environments (i.e. stable or critical financial condition) and perceptions about the importance of “principles” and “guidance” in different types of lease accounting standards (i.e. substantially all, approximately 90 and 88 percent).

“Principle” (substantially all) has a positive effect, while “guidance” (approximately 90 percent) has a negative effect on encouraging Japanese auditors to capitalize lease transactions. “More stringent guidance” (approximately 88 percent) has a positive effect only when clients are in critical financial conditions. Other findings indicate that judgments of Japanese auditors are strongly influenced by their colleagues’ perceived judgments.

This is the first quasi-experiment to examine Japanese auditors’ professional judgments using a lease accounting setting. To find out whether Japanese auditors interpret and apply International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in the similar manner as their counterparts in other countries will be important when Japanese policymakers make their final decision regarding the adoption of IFRS. The discussion and findings also contribute to the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) with regard to enhancing global convergence of financial reporting.

The purpose of this paper is to examine how a firm’s mergers and acquisitions (M&A) goals influence its voluntary disclosure policy. Specifically, this paper examines how a firm’s M&A financing intentions influence the degree of aggregation in management guidance prior to and after the M&A transaction.

Using a logistic model, this study tests the relation between M&A financing and the decision to issue disaggregate earnings guidance for 3,929 acquiring firms from 2007 to 2011.

The logistic regression results show that firms are more likely to provide disaggregate earnings guidance when using mostly stock to finance M&A and that the incentives to disaggregate guidance vary throughout the M&A transactional window. Alternatively, because the value of cash is independent of the true value of the acquirer, the results show that firms offering mostly cash to finance M&A are less likely to issue disaggregate earnings forecasts. Additional analysis reveals that the decision to issue disaggregate earnings guidance also influences post-merger outcomes such as CEO turnover.

The choice to disaggregate earnings guidance and the choice to use stock as a means to finance an acquisition is made by management, thus are endogenous which could introduce bias.

This study provides insights into management’s incentives and attitudes toward the use of management forecasts to effect a potential merger and acquisition. Given the flexibility management has in issuing voluntary forecasts, management can tailor a financial message toward investors and potential targets in attempt to facilitate a merger and acquisition and to further the firm’s goals.