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The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, it evaluates the impossibility proposition, called the “Arrow impossibility theorem” (AIT), which is widely attributed to Arrow’s social choice theory. This theorem denies the possibility of arriving at any collective majority resolution in any group voting system if the social choice function must satisfy “certain natural conditions”. Second, it intends to show the reasons behind the proliferation of this impossibility impression.

Theoretical and philosophical.

Arrow’s mathematical model does not seem to suggest or support his impossibility thesis. He has considered only one voting outcome, well known by the phrase “the Condorcet paradox”. However, other voting results are equally likely from his model, which might suggest unambiguous majority choice. This logical dilemma has been created by Arrow’s excessive dependence on the language of mathematics and symbolic logic.

The languages of mathematics and symbolic logic – numbers, letters and signs – have definite advantages in scientific argumentation and reasoning. These numbers and letters being invented however do not have any behavioural characteristics, which suggests that conclusions drawn from the model merely reflect the author’s opinions. The AIT is a good example of this logical dilemma.

The modern social choice theory, which is founded on the AIT, seems to be an academic assault to the system of democratic governance that is dominating current global village. By highlighting weaknesses in the AIT, this paper attempts to discredit this intellectual omission.

The paper offers a counter example to show that the impossibility of social choice is not necessarily implied by the Arrow’s model. Second, it uses Locke’s theory of human understanding to explain why the concerned social scientists are missing this point. This approach is probably entirely novel in this area of research.

To provide an overview of the Australian Research Repositories Online to the World (ARROW) project.

An retrospective analysis of the first three years of the ARROW project.

Provides information about the decisions made by the ARROW project, and reviews how they turned out.

This paper provides a review of the first three years of the ARROW project (which was the original funding horizon) from the perspective of the project team.

Looks at Arrow’s early background in New York and his subsequent development in the field of econometrics and mathematical economics. Covers his work in depth and his achievements in the school of thought of economics, adding that the modern school of thought is complementary to the classical school.

This paper aims at examining the possibility of constructing an Arrow‐social welfare function (SWF) in an Islamic community, that is abide by the Islamic tradition (i.e. the Shari'ah), where the domain of the individuals is defined in the context of Islamic framework. This domain is defined by the Shari'ah, where part of that domain is constrained, such that those actions that lie in the wajib (i.e. obligatory) or haram (i.e. prohibited), where the individual has no choice, must be thoroughly explored with respect to such a welfare function to consistency with the Shari'ah. Individual choice functions only within that segment of the domain that Islamic law leaves to the individual; the individual makes choices concerning actions in which they will not lose any praise or reward if they do or do not act one way or another. My concern in this regard will be the Mubah (i.e. permissible) range of the individual domain. In the process of examining the possibility of constructing an Arrow form (SWF) in an Islamic community, I have added a new Axiom to those suggested by Arrow (1951, pp.22–31). Kenneth J. Arrow, in his book Social Choice and Individuals Values (1951), has argued that five requirements of ‘fairness’ must characterize an acceptable social welfare function. He finds that these are inconsistent with each other. In fact, no welfare function exists that will satisfy all of those conditions simultaneously. As laid out by Arrow, these five conditions are, respectively: (1) universal domain; (2) positive association of individuals' values; (3) independence of irrelevant alternatives; (4) citizens' sovereignty; (5) nondictatorship. These conditions, characterized by Arrow as “seemingly innocuous” together rule out the possibility of deriving a complete and consistent (SWF) (Luce and Raiffa, 1957, p.328). The new axiom which I will refer to as Islamically imposed axiom such that, in the process of formulating an Arrow form social welfare function, it is important to be consistent with the Shari'ah. The Islamically imposed condition will thus guarantee the consistency with the Shari'ah in the process of formulating a social welfare function. This axiom implies that to maintain consistency the following must hold: When ti, (which refers to actions that individuals must do) is an element of the choice set (xi, ti), ti will always be chosen over xi (which refers to the feasible set of alternatives that individuals can choose from), and when tio is an element of the choice set (which refers to actions that individuals must not do), it will never be chosen. I came to the conclusion that when the choice set contains alternatives that the individual must do (wajib) or must not do (haram), the former will be chosen and the latter will never be chosen. Thus, for the general case, Arrow's negative results follow. If these elements are not in the choice set (i.e. all elements in the choice set belongs to Mubah activities), then Arrow's results follow in a straightforward fashion.

The purpose of this research is to investigate customer purchase of a service organization's logo/branded merchandise as a type of customer voluntary performance behavior.

The article employs three separate studies; two are conducted with customers of Curves, the world's largest fitness franchise, and the other is conducted at a weight‐lifting gym. Two empirical studies test a proposed mediation model using structural equation modeling and bootstrapping techniques. The third study represents a humanistic inquiry that elucidates the social influences that encourage a customer to purchase a service firm's logo products.

The results show that a customer's integration into a service‐based community encourages him or her to purchase the firm's logo merchandise. In addition, a customer's ability to identify with the firm mediates this relationship. The immersion of customers' self‐ and social identities in a firm emerges as a critical factor to enhancing their appreciation of the firm by purchasing financially lucrative logo consumables.

The article theoretically links customer voluntary performance with a customer's integration into a service community (ISC), organizational identification, and pooled associations. Because the concept of ISC is newly coined in this article, researchers are encouraged to develop the concept both empirically and theoretically.

Service and retail managers should understand that a key to selling organizational logo/branded merchandise is to encourage customers to form in‐house social relationships with other customers and employees.

The article demonstrates that service‐based customer communities are often lucrative for service firms. Customers may demonstrate their appreciation for commercially based friendships by purchasing and displaying the host organization's logo products.

This chapter tells the story of how the concept of Pareto efficiency was shipped from Lausanne to the modern US theory of competitive general equilibrium, focusing on the specific role of Maurice Allais. It identifies similarities in both epistemological approach and theoretical achievements realized first by Pareto, then by Allais, and finally by Debreu and Arrow and Hahn. It also shows that these similarities are not casual, since historical circumstances account for the influence of Pareto on Allais and later of Allais on Arrow and Debreu.

The Arrow–Pratt approximation to the risk premium is only valid for small risks. In this paper we consider a second approximation, based on risk-neutral probabilities and which requires no greater information than the Arrow–Pratt approximation, that works well for both small and large risks.

The paper is theoretical in nature, although it also provides illustrative numerical simulations.

The new approximation proposed here appears to be significantly superior to Arrow–Pratt for approximating the true value of the risk premium when the risk is large. It may also approximate better even for relatively small risks.

As far as we are aware, there are no other known approximations for the risk premium when the risk involved is large.

Making links between micro and macro levels has been problematic in the social sciences, and the literature in strategic management and organization theory is no exception. The purpose of this chapter is to raise theoretical issues in developing micro-foundations for strategic management and organizational analysis. We discuss more general problems with collectivism in the social sciences by focusing on specific problems in extant organizational analysis. We introduce micro-foundations to literature by explicating the underlying theoretical foundations of the origins of individual action and interaction. We highlight opportunities for future research, specifically emphasizing the need for a rational choice programme in management research.