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In this study, we explored the behaviour of two Canadian multinational companies operating in the context of Arab Spring events in Egypt in 2011.

We conducted a fine-grained analysis of 171 documents of various secondary sources to understand the behaviour of the two firms in Egypt between 25 January 2011 and 30 June 2012.

We suggest that corporate diplomacy should be viewed as portfolios of interdependent actions rather than reactions to discrete events. We also underline the importance for organisations to have a proactive, holistic and inclusive corporate diplomacy strategy, with the objective to secure and balance both explicit political/legal licence and implicit social licence.

We intentionally focused our empirical analysis on two Canadian firms operating in the same host country and belonging to the same industry. It would be useful to carry similar research in different organisational and institutional contexts.

Machiavelli's dictums in The Prince (1977) instigated the modern discourse on power. Arguing that “there's such a difference between the way we really live and the way we ought to live that the man who neglects the real to study the ideal will learn to accomplish his ruin, not his salvation” (Machiavelli, 1977, p. 44), his approach is a realist one. In this text, Machiavelli (1977, p. 3) endeavors to “discuss the rule of princes” and to “lay down principles for them.” Taking his lead, Foucault (1978, p. 97) argued that “if it is true that Machiavelli was among the few…who conceived the power of the Prince in terms of force relationships, perhaps we need to go one step further, do without the persona of the Prince, and decipher mechanisms on the basis of a strategy that is immanent in force relationships.” He believed that we should “investigate…how mechanisms of power have been able to function…how these mechanisms…have begun to become economically advantageous and politically useful…in a given context for specific reasons,” and, therefore, “we should…base our analysis of power on the study of the techniques and tactics of domination” (Foucault, 1980, pp. 100–102). Conceptualizing such techniques and tactics as the “art of governance”, Foucault (1991), examined power as strategies geared toward managing civic populations through shaping people's dispositions and behaviors.

This chapter uses an analytic procedure to uncover how Saddam Hussein made his past decisions, and the decision rule(s) Saddam adopted in choosing his actions. In analyzing Saddam, a leader who was considered one of the most formidable enemies of the Western world, this study utilizes official recordings captured at the Iraq war, which provide a reliable source of information. This chapter adds to the literature on the use of applied decision analysis (ADA) in analyzing leaders’ decisions.

Specifically, an emphasis is placed on the importance of understanding the process that led Saddam Hussein to his key decisions, in order to create his decision profile. Decision profiles describe the decision rules and models that are used by decision-makers en route to choice and can help understand and predict decisions of world leaders. I use the ADA procedure to examine key foreign policy decisions made by Saddam Hussein. Finally, after thoroughly examining each of these decisions, I attempt to uncover what decision rule Saddam used, and elaborate on the implications and recommendations of my analysis.

While most West European nations were formed around pre-existing entities that could be called “countries” before the modern age, this was not the case in the Middle East. Some entities, like Egypt, did have a clear political and cultural identity before colonialism, others, like Algeria, did not. This chapter discusses the four states of the Maghreb: Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya, through the perspective of “country creation” going into and coming out of colonial rule. We can see here two “models” of fairly similar types of historical development, one showing a gradual process through a protectorate period to relatively stable modern nations, another through violent conquest and direct colonization ending in violent liberation and military and wealthy but fragile states. The article asks whether these models for the history of country creation and the presence or absence of pre-colonial identities can help explain the modern history and nature of these states in the Arab Spring and the years thereafter. Then, a more tentative attempt is made to apply these models to two countries of the Arab east, Syria and Iraq. While local variations ensure that no model can be transferred directly, it can show the importance of studying the historical factors that go into the transition from geographical region to a country with people that can form the basis of a nation.

The following is an introductory profile of the fastest growing firms over the three-year period of the study listed by corporate reputation ranking order. The business activities in which the firms are engaged are outlined to provide background information for the reader.

Building industrial clusters is getting much more political attention and strategic orientation in all developing countries. This study started by revising the conceptual and theoretical frameworks for industrial clusters, followed by some insights and contributions about empirical bases for clusters' dynamics and processes. The study focused on the case of Agadir Agreement between four Arab countries (Egypt, Jordon, Morocco, and Tunisia), which was initiated after the Euro-Mediterranean partnerships, and the rationale of the agreement was based on the concept of cumulative value-added origin. The study based its methodology on analyzing the international and bilateral trade flows of six industrial goods from the automotive sector among the four countries and with the EU countries to detect the degree of industrial collaboration and the achieved success of each country in this sector. The study indicated that the four countries used the concept of industrial clusters for economic development, but the results of the analysis showed that till now Agadir Agreement only achieved a shallow integration, while failed to deeply integrate as one big collaborative industrial cluster.