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1 – 10 of 32James Keyte, Paul Eckles and Karen Lent
In 2009, the Third Circuit decided Hydrogen Peroxide, which announced a more rigorous standard under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) for assessing whether a putative…
Abstract
In 2009, the Third Circuit decided Hydrogen Peroxide, which announced a more rigorous standard under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) for assessing whether a putative class could establish antitrust injury. Earlier this year, the Supreme Court decided Comcast v. Behrend, a case that carries potentially broad implications for both antitrust cases and Rule 23(b)(3) class actions generally. A review of the case law starting with Hydrogen Peroxide and continuing through Comcast and its progeny reveals the new rigor in antitrust class action decisions and suggests what the future may hold, including the type of arguments that may provide defendants the most likely chance of defeating class certification. After Comcast, rigor under 23(b)(3) can no longer be avoided in assessing all class actions questions, and courts should now apply Daubert fully in the class setting concerning both impact and damages. Courts should also closely evaluate plaintiffs’ proposed methodologies for proving impact to determine if they apply to each class member. Finally, courts will inevitably have to determine how rigorously to scrutinize experts’ damages methodologies and whether Comcast requires or suggests more scrutiny in assessing common evidence for measuring damages.
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This article responds to James Keyte, Paul Eckles, and Karen Lent’s article “From Hydrogen Peroxide to Comcast: The New Rigor in Antitrust Class Actions” (“The New Rigor”). It…
Abstract
This article responds to James Keyte, Paul Eckles, and Karen Lent’s article “From Hydrogen Peroxide to Comcast: The New Rigor in Antitrust Class Actions” (“The New Rigor”). It argues that The New Rigor offers valuable strategic advice to defense counsel – and insight into defense counsel’s strategic thinking – but is much less effective as an objective statement of the law or a normative argument for legal reform. In the parlance that I adopt, The New Rigor succeeds in the role of coach but much less so in the roles of commentator and critic.
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Michael D. Hausfeld, Gordon C. Rausser, Gareth J. Macartney, Michael P. Lehmann and Sathya S. Gosselin
In class action antitrust litigation, the standards for acceptable economic analysis at class certification have continued to evolve. The most recent event in this evolution is…
Abstract
In class action antitrust litigation, the standards for acceptable economic analysis at class certification have continued to evolve. The most recent event in this evolution is the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1435 (2013). The evolution of pre-Comcast law on this topic is presented, the Comcast decision is thoroughly assessed, as are the standards for developing reliable economic analysis. This article explains how economic evidence of both antitrust liability and damages ought to be developed in light of the teachings of Comcast, and how liability evidence can be used by economists to support a finding of common impact for certification purposes. In addition, the article addresses how statistical techniques such as averaging, price-dispersion analysis, and multiple regressions have and should be employed to establish common proof of damages.
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The purpose of this chapter is to outline new methodological developments in business valuation, with particular attention to how those developments are being used in litigation…
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The purpose of this chapter is to outline new methodological developments in business valuation, with particular attention to how those developments are being used in litigation involving lost profits and the value of operating businesses. In addition to methodological developments, the chapter also includes a discussion of recent legal developments, particularly selected cases that affect the use and standards for business valuation techniques within litigation settings. Finally, the chapter includes a mathematical appendix.
This chapter examines whether the view of the jury in cases involving forensic evidence can be changed from that of “naïve automatons” to that of “sophisticated decision makers”;…
Abstract
This chapter examines whether the view of the jury in cases involving forensic evidence can be changed from that of “naïve automatons” to that of “sophisticated decision makers”; whether the defense and prosecution must provide the jurors with information to help them develop a schema upon which to evaluate the forensic evidence; and whether to remove decision making from the expert forensic scientist and return it to the jury. The chapter uses secondary sources of information collected from criminal cases, the current federal law, as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court dealing with expert testimony, studies of how to enable juries confronted with forensic evidence, as well as a framework of learning theory and persuasion games. I argue that expert forensic scientists make errors. Juries are capable of making decisions based on complex forensic evidence if provided the knowledge within which to develop schema to evaluate that evidence. Competition between the defense and prosecution in presenting interpretations of scientifically valid evidence, as well as providing schema to enable the jury to evaluate the information, provides juries with the ability to arrive at a full information decision. Expert nullification of jury decision making should be halted and decision making returned to the jury. The value of this chapter is to integrate learning theory from cognitive psychology with one-shot and extended persuasion games to evaluate the roles of the jury and the expert forensic scientists within the criminal justice system.