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Investors often utilize brokers to assist them in property acquisitions. These brokers are compensated through a cooperative commission, or bonus, that is publicized on the listing service. The purpose of this paper is to determine the relationship between advertised compensation packages and selling price, time-on-market and listing characteristics.

To examine variables likely to influence earnings of the buyers' broker, this study utilizes multiple and logistic regressions. Given the range of prices found in the 196,276 listings, the data was sorted on listing price and then split into ten, approximately equal, deciles.

The explanatory power of models with cooperative commission as the dependent variable was highest in the lowest deciles with type of financing, size and distressed status being highly significant. When comparing list- to selling price the average was 96.1%. As cooperative commission increased, the higher priced parcels sold at a higher price relative to list price. This potentially justifies higher cooperative commissions or exemplifies the principal-agent problem where effort is based on potential earnings. Fixed bonuses were used predominately for parcels under $62,234, likely to provide a minimum earnings amount. However, surrounding the median, it seems they may differentiate a property.

This research provides insight for practitioners on the impact of different variables, including cooperative commissions, on sale price and time-on-market. For example, cooperative commission increased for properties in the outer deciles implying that agents may be compensating for suspected difficulty. Additionally, the seasonality findings imply that agents can determine when to list and when to provide a fixed bonus to solicit attention. Results also suggest that practitioners will find it beneficial to market at an appropriate price rather than list high to create negotiating room.

This paper follows only one paper that covered a similar topic. However, this paper uses twenty years of multi-unit property listings from a major US city from 1996 to 2015. The focus on multi-unit properties is an effort to focus on a more sophisticated group of buyers that may be more experienced and make decisions more rationally.

Given the serious question raised by the subprime of the 2008 global financial crisis over the rising practices of excessive rewarding of executives in the USA and European firms, the executive pay-performance nexus has emerged as a popular topic of debate in the contemporary corporate finance research. Conducted mostly on the Anglo-Saxon contexts, research outcomes have been inconclusive and dichotomous. Considering this backdrop, this study aims to investigate the endogenous relationship between executive compensation and risk taking in the context of the USA.

Using a large sample of non-financial firms from 2010 to 2020 based on panel data and two-stage least square regression. In this study, the riskier corporate decision is measured as book leverage and ratio of R&D expense to total assets. Chief executive officers’ (CEO) experience and age are used as instrumental variables, and these are expected to influence compensation incentives and, hence, affect firm riskiness indirectly. Firm size, return on assets and CEO turnover are reported to affect compensation and corporate decisions, therefore, included as control variables. Given that higher executive compensation is related to riskier corporate decision in firms, this study incorporates total wealth (i.e. accumulated equity related compensation) as an additional proxy of compensation, and this selection is justifiable by the perfect contracting notion of the agency theory.

The results of this study show a significant positive and increasing nexus among compensation and riskier corporate decisions. Besides, the compensation level proxied through the percentage of each form of compensation in total compensation is very important as greater equity and greater salary diminishes risk taking.

The outcomes of this study have useful implications for firm stakeholders and policymakers.

The level of pay measured by the percentage of each type of compensation in total compensation is of utmost importance as it can increase or decrease risk taking in corporate decisions.

This study aims to examine student perceptions regarding the mid-semester transition from face-to-face to online delivery in an accounting course during spring 2020.

Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, numerous universities and colleges worldwide transitioned from face-to-face instruction to online delivery during spring 2020. We find some evidence in line with prior literature that COVID-19 affected student learning experience from various aspects.

Thanks in part to effective teaching techniques implemented by the instructor during the transition, including online lecture videos recorded by the instructor, online class materials, early posting of answer keys, frequent communication through emails and bonus points for watching lecture videos, students still perceived their learning outcomes positively in general.

These teaching techniques can be used to enhance student learning experience and satisfaction during class modality transitions in unforeseen circumstances, for both hybrid and online business courses.

This study investigates the relationship between media and social media sentiment and the likelihood of CEO pay cuts. The purpose is to examine whether and how these pay cuts influence market reactions. The study aims to provide insights into how external sentiment affects corporate decision-making and market perceptions, particularly in the context of CEO compensation.

Using a sample of 6,331 firm-year observations from 2015 to 2021, this paper employs quantitative analysis to assess the association between media and social media sentiment and CEO pay cuts. We utilise company DEF14A SEC filings to identify CEO pay cut dates and capture traditional media and Twitter sentiment 30-days prior to these filing dates.

We find a negative association between media and social media sentiment and CEO pay cuts, indicating that firms facing more negative sentiment are more likely to engage in pay cuts. We find evidence that CEO pay cuts are negatively correlated with market reactions, suggesting markets generally do not seem to favour decisions to cut CEO pay. This relationship, however, is complex and influenced by multiple factors, including the nature of sentiment and the specific components of CEO compensation.

The study faces limitations in identifying the varying degrees of pay cuts and their motivations. Additionally, the content of news articles and Twitter posts used to measure sentiment was not specifically identified, which may affect the accuracy of sentiment measurement.

This research offers valuable insights for managers and corporate decision-makers, highlighting the potential impact of public sentiment on critical executive compensation decisions.

The study underscores the influence of media and social media in shaping public opinion and driving corporate actions, highlighting the growing intersection between social perceptions and corporate governance. This has broader implications for how firms engage with media platforms and manage their public image, particularly in the realm of executive compensation.

We are the first to study the impact of media and social media sentiment on CEO compensation decisions and market reactions. By employing DEF14A filings as event dates for market reaction studies, we offer a novel approach to analysing the impact of executive compensation changes on market behaviour.

The Covid-19 pandemic appears to have engendered heterogeneous effects on individuals’ labour market prospects. This paper focuses on two possible sources of a heterogeneous exposition to labour market risks associated with the pandemic outbreak: the routine task content of the job and the teleworkability. To evaluate whether these dimensions played a crucial role in amplifying employment and wage gaps among workers, we focus on the case of Italy, the first EU country hit by Covid-19.

Investigating the actual effect of the pandemic on workers employed in jobs with a different degree of teleworkability and routinization, using real microdata, is currently unfeasible. This is because longitudinal datasets collecting annual earnings and the detailed information about occupations needed to capture a job’s routine task content and teleworkability are not presently available. To simulate changes in the wage distribution for the year 2020, we have employed a static microsimulation model. This model is built on data from the Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (IT-SILC) survey, which has been enriched with administrative data and aligned with monthly observed labour market dynamics by industries and regions.

We measure the degree of job teleworkability and routinization with the teleworkability index (TWA) built by Sostero et al. (2020) and the routine-task-intensity index (RTI) developed by Cirillo et al. (2021), respectively. We find that RTI and TWA are negatively and positively associated with wages, respectively, and they are correlated with higher (respectively lower) risks of a large labour income drop due to the pandemic. Our evidence suggests that labour market risks related to the pandemic – and the associated new types of earnings inequality that may derive – are shaped by various factors (including TWA and RTI) instead of by a single dimension. However, differences in income drop risks for workers in jobs with varying degrees of teleworkability and routinization largely reduce when income support measures are considered, thus suggesting that the redistributive effect of the emergency measures implemented by the Italian government was rather effective.

No studies have so far investigated the effect of the pandemic on workers employed in jobs with a different degree of routinization and teleworkability in Italy. We thus investigate whether income drop risks in Italy in 2020 – before and after income support measures – differed among workers whose jobs are characterized by a different degree of RTI and TWA.

It is widely accepted that one criterion for determining if a construction project is successful is whether it is completed within the expected budget. There have been advancements in the management of building projects throughout time but cost overruns remain a key concern in the construction sector internationally, particularly in emerging economies such as Ghana. This study aims to answer the question, “What are the critical success factors (CSFs) that can assist reduce cost overruns in public sector infrastructure projects in the Ghanaian construction industry?”

This study used a quantitative survey method. The questionnaire was pre-tested by interviewing 15 contractors to ascertain the validity of the content. Factor analysis and multiple regression were adopted to analyze the data.

This study discovered that the critical factors that can reduce cost overruns in construction projects in Ghana are directly linked to five themes: early contractor involvement in the project planning stage, adequate funding, good project team relations, competent managers/supervisors and project participant incentives/bonuses. This study identifies indestructible, empirically measurable important success criteria for reducing cost overruns in public building projects in Ghana.

When well thought through from the project initiation stage to completion, these critical successes can also be used to deal with damaging economic effects such as allocative inefficiency of scarce resources, further delays, contractual disputes, claims and litigation, project failure and total abandonment.

The uniqueness of this research resides in the fact that it is, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, a first-of-its-kind investigation of the CSFs for reducing cost overruns in public building projects in developing countries.

This study explores a hegemonic alliance and the role of relational forms of accounting and accountablity in the making of contemporary capitalism.

We use the WikiLeaks “Cablegate” documents to provide an account of the detailed machinations between interest groups (corporations and the state) that are constitutive of hegemonic activity.

Our analysis of the “Cablegate” documents shows that the US and Chevron were crafting a central role for Turkmenistan and its president on the global political stage as early as 2007, despite offical reporting beginning only in 2009. The documents exemplify how “accountability gaps” occlude the understanding of interdependence between capital and the state.

The study contributes to a growing idea that official accounts offer a fictionalized narrative of corporations as existing independently, and thus expands the boundaries associated with studying multinational corporate activities to include their interdependencies with the modern state.

The study traces how global capitalism extends into new territories through diplomatic channels, as a strategic initiative between powerful state and capital interests, arguing that the outcome is the empowerment of authoritarian states at the cost of democracy.

The study argues that previous accounting and accountability research has overlooked the larger picture of how capital and the state work together to secure a mutual hegemonic interest. We advocate for a more complete account of these activities that circumvents official, often restricted, views of global capitalism.

This paper aims to analyse the gender wage gap (GWG) in the board of directors at the executive-director level. The authors aim to answer two questions: (1) Is the GWG explained by differences between males and females, by discriminatory causes or by both? and (2) what are the main factors that cause or increase the existence of GWGs? Specifically, the authors pay special attention to compliance with good governance codes as a fundamental variable in explaining the GWG.

The study uses a sample of directors in Spanish companies listed on the continuous market from 2013 to 2021 and uses Blinder–Oaxaca decomposition and unconditional quantile regressions to analyse the GWG.

The findings demonstrate both discriminatory reasons and differences between individuals when explaining the GWG and showing that compliance with remuneration practices issued by good governance codes considerably reduces the GWG for all remuneration components.

The study confirms adequacy of regulator remuneration recommendations but highlights GWG persistence within boards. To counter this, enforcing pay transparency aids female directors’ advancement, reducing bonuses’ impact on wage disparity, necessitating monitored laws for fairer compensation systems and meeting 40% of women directors’ proposals.

Primarily, this study significantly influences public attitudes towards GWG. Specifically, it calls for companies to not only increase female leadership representation but also to ensure equitable remuneration aligned with their male counterparts, conduct regular pay equity assessments, implement pay transparency policies and support work-life balance through flexible hours and parental leave. Furthermore, the work serves as a crucial resource for female directors, empowering them to advocate for their rights in the context of GWG.

This research offers nuanced insights into the GWG in corporate boards, corrects the main limitations of previous studies and calls for regulatory reinforcement and the active involvement of female directors and firms in creating equitable policies.

There is growing scholarly interest in the use of penalty in employment contracts which reduce employees' pay if the employee's performance does not meet a pre-specified performance threshold. Prior accounting research has focused exclusively on the effect of penalty on employee performance. In this study, the authors extend earlier research by examining how penalty affects the employers' wage offers. Prior research suggests that employers' generous wage offers in employment contracts are normally translated as trust by employees who in turn reciprocate with higher effort. The authors present a theory that predicts penalty reduces employers' wage offers. Then, the authors propose unrestricted communication between employers and employees as a potential moderator for the negative effect of penalty on trust and reciprocity.

The authors implement a controlled lab experiment with a 2 × 3 experimental design (Penalty: Present and Absent; and Communication: None, One-Way and Two-Way).

The authors develop their predictions by utilizing insights from motivational-crowding and organizational communication theories. The authors hypothesize and find evidence that employers' ability to penalize employees can reduce employers' motivation to offer generous wages. As a result, reduced trust demotivates employees to provide high effort. However, the authors find that a two-way communication moderates the negative effect of penalties by restoring trust, thereby, increasing reciprocity. Finally, the authors find evidence that relationship-oriented messages explain the moderating effect of communication.

This study is subject to limitations inherent in all experimental studies. The decisions in the study experiment are less complex than those found in practice. Moreover, there are significantly higher costs and potential benefits to shirk on effort in practice. The authors encourage future research on other organizational features that would influence the generalizability of their theory and results. Nonetheless, this study makes an important contribution to the literature on trust, reciprocity, gift-exchange contracts, managerial controls and communication.

This paper has several important implications for theory and practice. The authors show that the presence of penalty may not automatically result in increasing employees' effort level, contrary to traditional economic theory predictions. This effect is driven mainly by the crowding out effect of a penalty on employers' desire to signal trust. Therefore, the presence of an open communication channel may become an important tool to reverse the psychological effect of reduced trust when penalty is present. Therefore, the study's findings contribute to the trust–reciprocity literature on how management control system influences employers' and employees' behavior. These findings are especially germane given the trend in the workplace toward establishing open communication at different levels within the firm hierarchy. The study also contributes to the literature on trust–reciprocity as critical informal controls and social norms in accounting practices (Bicchieri, 2006; Stevens, 2019), shedding light on how firms may influence employees' reciprocity in management control practices and induce them to act in line with the firm's objectives by opening communication channels.

Prior accounting research document that penalty in employment contracts increases employee performance due to loss aversion. The study, however, demonstrates that the positive effect of penalty is not sustained in a gift-exchange contract. Specifically, the study's experimental results provide evidence that the availability of penalties can psychologically change the way employers perceive their decisions on offering generous wages (i.e. trust) and consequently reduce employees' reciprocation of high effort levels. Yet, the authors propose a two-way communication as a restorative mechanism for the lost trust. Implications for theory and practice are discussed.