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The purpose of this paper is to investigate the way in which CEOs are shielded or rewarded for incurring R&D expenses. Strategic expenses such as R&D yield returns over a long period of time even though GAAP requires them to be written off in the period they are incurred. Going beyond the existing shielding paradigm, the paper investigates whether compensation committees actively reward CEOs for incurring strategic expenses.

The paper uses empirical analysis by using regression analysis with CEO compensation (both cash and equity) as the dependent variable and firm size, firm performance, earnings risk, market‐to‐book ratio, R&D expenses, advertising expenses and governance variables as control, independent and test variables.

The paper shows that CEOs are not only shielded but are actively rewarded for incurring R&D expenses. The paper also shows that the shield/reward effects are stronger in manufacturing firms. Finally, the paper shows that independent compensation committees increase rewards for R&D expenses.

Given the small sample of firms with advertising expense data, a larger sample, possibly using hand‐collected data will be required to arrive at definitive conclusions regarding shielding/rewarding for advertising. Furthermore, the shielding of both R&D and advertising expenses should be looked at in conjunction with the duration of the persistence of benefits of such strategic expenses.

This paper shows how compensation committees can use compensation to induce executives to undertake strategic expenses on behalf of the firm.

This paper aims to study the impact of audit quality on the components of executive cash compensation. It is predicted that as audit quality improves, greater emphasis will be placed on the incentive components of cash compensation, and lower emphasis on the salary (fixed) component. Specifically, it is predicted that as audit quality enhances, greater emphasis will be placed on earnings and sales revenues in determining executive cash compensation. Using auditor specialization as a proxy for audit quality, empirical support is provided for all of our predictions.

This paper provides empirical support with agency theoretic predictions.

This paper developed the following hypotheses: H1 – in executive cash compensation, more weight is being placed on earnings-based measures as auditor specialization improves; H2 – in executive cash compensation, more weight is also being placed on sales revenues as auditor specialization improves; H3 – in executive cash compensation, salary levels decrease as auditor specialization improves; and H4 – the impact of auditor specialization on the weight on earnings, sales and the salary levels is lower in the post-Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) period compared to pre-SOX period.

First, the article limits itself to cash compensation, while current executive compensation is largely made of equity. Second, the measure of audit quality used, ‘national level auditor specialization’, may not be as effective in the post-SOX era.

Compensation committees should pay attention to audit quality (in whatever way it may be proxied by) in determining executive compensation.

This is the first paper to show that audit quality not only improves the earnings response coefficient in firm valuation but also enhances the weight placed on earnings (and sales revenues) in executive compensation.

Research has shown that firms successfully pursuing either a cost leadership or a differentiation strategy are better able to gain competitive advantages over other firms and accordingly achieve superior performance. Thus, if firms actually do realize superior performance based on their strategic orientation, capital markets should recognize this and place a positive value on such strategy‐focused firms. The aim of this paper is to empirically investigate how capital markets perceive and reward the strategies pursued by firms.

The paper uses Tobin's Q as a measure of market perception. By regressing Tobin's Q against relevant control variables and proxies for differentiation and cost leadership strategies, the paper evaluates the relationship between market perception and firm strategy. Furthermore, the paper also conducts abnormal returns analyses (both portfolio and regression analysis) to determine whether the market accurately prices the different strategies, given the complexity in both the nature and the implementation of such strategies.

The analysis shows that markets place a positive value on firms successfully pursuing either a cost leadership or a differentiation strategy; moreover markets place a higher value on firms pursuing a differentiation strategy compared to a cost leadership strategy. The abnormal returns analyses show that the market is not able to fully price the superior performance generated by pursuing differentiation strategy resulting in abnormal returns from portfolios formed based on higher levels of differentiation.

By providing detailed information to the market about the strategies they follow, firms will enable markets to value their strategies accurately, thus reducing their cost of capital. Fundamental investors looking to earn abnormal returns can use firm strategy in their portfolio selection. A variety of characteristics are conceived to influence a firm's strategic positioning and market perception of such characteristics. This evaluation is limited to a macro level assessment of the implications of the overall strategy pursued by a firm. Future research, in the form of detailed field studies, could be directed at evaluating the market perceptions and other implications of multi‐dimensional, lower level, operational strategies on a firm‐by‐firm basis.

To the best of the authors' knowledge, this is the first paper to show how financial markets value firm strategy. The paper also provides evidence to the complexity of a differentiation strategy, and how such complexity can lead to market mis‐pricing.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of certain audit quality attributes, namely auditor size, auditor industry specialization and auditor tenure on a client firm's cost of equity capital.

The paper uses empirical data to construct a measure of ex ante cost of equity capital for each firm and year using analyst forecasts. Independent audit quality measures used are auditor size, auditor industry specialization and auditor tenure. Firm cost of equity capital is regressed against the three independent variables and appropriate control variables.

The paper finds that auditor size (auditor is a member of the BigX), auditor industry specialization and auditor tenure are negatively associated with the client firm's cost of equity capital. However, the paper finds that this effect is limited only to small client firms, potentially reflecting the poor information environment associated with such firms.

The study highlights the importance of audit quality attributes in determining the firm's cost of capital. It also highlights ways in which firms (especially small firms) can reduce the cost of equity capital by improving their information environment through the judicious selection of auditors.

This is believed to be the first paper to examine whether the effects of three audit quality attributes (auditor size, auditor industry specialization and auditor tenure) on a firm's cost of capital are dependent on the client's size. The paper empirically shows that such effects are more pronounced for smaller clients.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act (SOX) on market‐based measures of earnings quality and cost of capital.

The paper uses empirical data to determine measures for the market's perception of earnings quality and the ex‐ante cost of capital. The measures for 2001 (pre‐SOX) are compared to the measures for 2003 (post‐SOX).

The results indicate that in the post‐SOX period, the market's perception of earnings quality has improved, while the firms' cost of equity capital has decreased.

At a time when debate is raging as to the overall impact of SOX on the US economy, this study provides some evidence as to its beneficial nature. A limitation is that the method of computing restricts the sample, potentially creating biases.

This is the first study to investigate the impact of SOX on the market's perception of earnings quality and the firms' cost of equity capital.

The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of the age diversity of the top management team (TMT) on firm performance and on the managerial ability of the TMT. Furthermore, this study investigates how the relationship between age diversity and firm performance is mediated by managerial ability and the contextual nature of the relationship.

This is an empirical study which uses regression analyses and mediation analyses to evaluate the hypotheses.

The authors observe a negative relationship between age diversity and firm performance and also between age diversity and managerial ability of the TMT. Further, the authors find that that the negative relationship between age diversity and firm performance is mediated by managerial ability. The authors also find that the relation between performance and age diversity is context specific – the negative relationship between age diversity and firm performance is ameliorated during times of financial crisis.

In an environment where diversity is beginning to be valued, insights into the impact of different types of diversity on performance become important. Age diversity is a critical component of diversity. Therefore, insights into the impact of age diversity on performance will be of interest to managers, academics and even regulators.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is the first to evaluate the impact of age diversity on the market perception of firm performance of US firms using a large, comprehensive, multi-year data set. Furthermore, this is the only study to evaluate the impact of age diversity on managerial ability and show the mediating effect of managerial ability on the relationship between age diversity and firm performance.

This paper aims to investigate whether the managers’ emphasis on audit in the management’s discussion and analysis (MD&A) section of the 10-K filing, as part of the firm’s “tone at the top,” is linked to audit quality.

Adopting a computational linguistics approach, the authors measure the manager’s audit emphasis as the frequency of audit-related words in the MD&A. The authors then assess the relationship between audit emphasis and audit quality with ordinary least squares and probit regression models.

This study finds that the manager’s audit emphasis, proxied by the count of audit-related words, is positively associated with audit fees, audit delay, the appointment and retention of Big 4 and industry-specialist auditors, and the probability of switching to Big 4 auditors, while negatively linked to abnormal accruals and the possibility of financial misstatements.

The audit emphasis measure suffers from limitations. The computer program determining audit emphasis may misinterpret words in the MD&A. Researchers need to consider procedures to minimize misinterpretations.

Frequency of audit words in the MD&A reflects the firm’s aspiration for audit quality. Auditors, regulators and investors could ascertain such aspiration from past and current MD&As.

This study associates the manager’s emphasis on audit, measured with computational linguistics from the MD&A, with realized audit quality.

The authors investigate whether the different tenure phases of executives have a differential effect on audit pricing. Two alternate views – career concern and power – can explain the effect of executives’ tenure on audit pricing. This paper aims to determine, which viewpoint dominates in explaining the relationship between audit pricing and executive tenure phases.

Using a sample of 11,198 firm-year observations from 2007 to 2016, the authors adopt an ordinary least squares regression model to assess the impact of the middle and long phases of executives’ tenure on audit fees.

Audit fees are significantly lower when executives enter the middle and long phases of tenure. The reduction in audit fees is greatest as both chief executive officers and chief financial officers enter the long tenure phase. Although audit fees gradually decrease as executive tenure is extended, they start increasing two years before the end of executive tenure. Furthermore, the negative association between the executive tenure phase and audit fees is greater when the executive is appointed externally. Finally, the long phase of executive tenure also mitigates the positive relationship between audit fees and internal control weaknesses.

This study is based on US data. Future research may extend this study to other countries.

The findings are important to firms, practitioners and academicians, particularly, as the length of tenure of top executives has increased in recent years. By documenting that executives’ middle and long tenure phases reduce audit fees, the findings highlight the importance of maintaining executives in the firm. Finally, the findings have implications for investors, policymakers and auditors to identify companies with high audit risk.

This study is the first to document the impact of executives’ middle and long tenure phases on audit fees.