Table of contents(19 chapters)
In 2001, we gathered a group of researchers in Nice, France to focus discussion on performance measurement and management control. Following the success of that conference, we held subsequent conferences in 2003, 2005, and 2007. This volume contains some of the exemplary papers that were presented at the most recent conference. The conference has grown in number of participants, quality of presentations, and reputation and this year attracted leading researchers in the field from North America, South America, Europe, Asia, Australia, and Africa.
The management control and performance measurement literature reflects a long history of discussion related to organizational, team, and individual rewards. Yet, much of the research and guidance in the academic and managerial literature has been inadequate. Reflecting work on three current research studies, this chapter examines the gaps in our current understanding of the relationship of performance measurement, rewards, and performance and suggests some research questions that are of significant interest.
Kerr's (1975) examination of the “folly of rewarding A while hoping for B” led him to encourage organizations to align reward system and desired employee behavior. Since then, much of the accounting and control literature has increasingly reduced the reward system to one of its components – incentive compensation plans – and has increasingly ceased to examine other behavioral levers used by corporations, thus implicitly or explicitly treating measurement and reward as a sufficient condition to obtain desired employee behavior. This chapter considers the complexity of the reward system (including its inevitable subjective dimension) and discusses its role, in connection with other important managerial levers, in corporations’ broader efforts to shape employee behavior. The chapter concludes with a review of literature streams in economics and psychology, suggesting that an intense incentive alignment approach may be self-fulfilling and hence counter-productive.
Based on the more than 120 papers presented at the fourth conference on Performance Measurement and Control, this paper examines the current state of research in this field. It examines the diversity in research settings, theoretical backgrounds, research designs, and topics covered. The picture that emerges is that of a dynamic field where different ideas and perspectives converge to create a rich and interesting environment. The papers show the progress that this field has made both in terms of the quality of the research as well as the attractiveness of the research questions being addressed. The paper concludes with some thoughts about how to improve even more the quality going forward and an optimistic assessment of the future of the field.
Although performance assessment systems are widely used in government agencies, they are underutilized in promotional decisions. Most promotions are based on the results of knowledge-based exams to the exclusion of other data such as job performance ratings, personality constructs, and motivation. Two empirical studies examined this and made recommendations for change. The first study examined the relationship between early career performance appraisal scores and future organizational advancement. The second study examined how personality variables correlated with desire to advance in the organization to attain supervisory positions. Findings provide support for incorporating job performance measures and personality constructs in promotional decision-making.
The literature on post-completion reviews (PCRs) either does not deal with the tying of PCRs to extrinsic rewards or provides scant theoretical reasoning or empirical analysis to back up its recommendations.
Based on research from psychology and empirical studies, the present chapter proposes that several effects of a PCR, which must be deemed rather dysfunctional, will increase when extrinsic rewards are linked to such a review. At the same time some possibly functional effects, however, are likely to remain constant. The propositions, therefore, call the usefulness of tying PCRs to rewards into question and call for further investigation.
The behavioural accounting literature suggests that managerial motivation and commitment are affected by the way in which managerial performance is evaluated, but little is known about what aspects of rewarding system are crucial in evoking desired outcomes. In this chapter we explore whether managerial motivation and commitment depend on the level of objectivity of the rewarding system, and what variables mediate this relationship. We develop a causal model in which we set up hypotheses about the intervening role of managerial perceptions of justice. We test these hypotheses using survey data from a sample of 161 managers from 11 commercial banks. The chapter contributes to the literature by providing empirical evidence on the antecedents and consequences of justice in an applied setting, suggesting the important mediating role of justice in the relationship between rewarding systems and managerial motivation.
This chapter investigates if and how the introduction of an Enterprise Resource Planning System (ERPS) influences the information characteristics quality, timeliness and complexity. Subsequently we analyze whether the influence of an ERPS adoption on these information characteristics has an impact on the perceived value of information available for performance measurement (PM) purposes. On the basis of the extant literature a structural model is developed which tries to capture the direct and indirect effects of the degree of ERPS adoption on the perceived value of the information available for PM.
This chapter focuses on what the key decision makers in organizations decide after having received information on the current state of the organizational performance. Because of strong attributions to success and failure, it is impossible to predict in advance which concrete actions will occur. We can however find out what kinds of actions are decided upon by means of an organizational learning model that focuses on the hastenings and delays after performance feedback. As an illustration, the responses to performance signals by trainers and club owners in Dutch soccer clubs are analyzed.
The aim of this chapter is to develop a performance measurement framework for understanding the relationships among drivers of customer profitability in internet companies.
We recognize an opportunity to improve management control systems for internet companies, where performance measurement systems currently focus on measuring web data, such as number of customers, cost of service, cost of acquisition (CoA), and churn rate. However these indicators, taken separately, do not provide useful information to make decisions.
To fill this gap we developed a framework, which we designate as the Lifetime Value Scorecard, to investigate the relationships between customer data and financial data, providing an early indication as to whether or not the marketing strategies being implemented are successful. We then offer an application of the Lifetime Value Scorecard to the mobile value-added services industry, where content and services are provided to consumer cell phones, mainly using wireless networks.
The Balanced Scorecard (BSC) proposes four dimensions to represent business performance: Financial, Customer, Innovation and Internal Business, and Learning and Growth. Surprisingly, little attention has been paid to the BSC as a valid construct representing performance. Despite surveys reporting that a growing number of firms use the BSC, little is known about the reliability and validity of the measures and dimensions it proposes. Validity problems impact on the importance and credibility allocated by management to certain BSC measures.
This study's objective is to empirically examine the construct validity of the BSC. Through a literature review and field study, a set of measures associated with all four BSC dimensions is selected. Next, survey research is conducted to examine the reliability of selected measures and the structure of BSC dimensions. Lastly, we examine the convergent and discriminate validity of the BSC's measures using the multitrait–multimethod (MTMM) matrix.
Results show that the BSC – with its four dimensions and related measures – represents a valid construct. This study responds to research calls on the importance of validating the BSC framework – and its associated measures – in order to enhance consistency on BSC research.
Airport privatization has led to the emergence of new industry players enabling them, it is claimed, to raise additional capital, improve efficiency, reduce costs, generate new revenue streams and engage in new commercial airport investments in the market economy. A question remains about the impact and benefit of airport privatization reforms on stakeholder groups. It is also debatable how overall privatized airport performance can be formally assessed. This chapter reports the perceptions of key stakeholder groups on the privatization of Sydney Airport. Preliminary attributes and indicators of the airport performance stakeholder model, with an emphasis on assessing privatized airport performance from stakeholders’ perspectives are considered. A qualitative paradigm was applied to this field research. Leximancer data mining software was used for the thematic analysis of the interviews conducted with key Sydney Airport stakeholders.
This study extends prior balanced scorecard (BSC) research by incorporating the effects of uncertainty, payment schemes and the strength of causal relations proposed in the performance measurement model (PMM) on the budgetary dynamics. Our analysis was restricted to two strategic business units (SBU), engineering projects and electricity distribution service, from a Brazilian electric power concessionaire. We postulate a mediated moderation association between uncertainty (treatment), bonus scheme (mediator), dispersion of payment scheme and the strength of causal relations proposed in the PMM (moderators) on budgetary slack (outcome). Additionally, we postulate that the use of accounting-based measures (ABM) also mediates the effect of uncertainty on budgetary slack. We gathered monthly observations from 102 indicators containing the target and achievement values throughout 2002–2006. Managers were later asked to answer questionnaires about the possible cause–effect relations between these indicators, then 215 causal maps of the department and corporate indicators were drawn up. Econometric analysis provided evidence that the budgetary slack observed is directly impacted by uncertainty, and this impact is moderated by the dispersion of payment scheme. However, we did not find any evidence that supported the mediation process proposed between uncertainty, ABM and budgetary slack. Incomplete implementation of BSC and the level of analysis adopted are possible explanations for that.
This study examines the links between financial performance and executive compensation for high-performance companies (HPC). HPC display sustained and superior cash flow returns, asset growth, and total shareholder returns. In previous empirical analysis, HPC companies displayed specific identifiable financial performance drivers and measures when compared to companies in the S&P 500 (Needles et al., 2004). Most recently, HPC sustained their high performance when compared to the S&P 500 over varied economic periods. Further, the research identified operating asset management characteristics of these companies, especially as they relate to the cash cycle (Needles et al., 2004). Continuing this stream of research, this study first identifies the financial and non-financial performance measures related to compensation of top management of HPC as reported in the companies’ public disclosures. Then, these findings for HPC are matched to a set of comparable non-HPC. Finally, we evaluate the stated performance measures for executive compensation in light of the performance drivers and measures identified by previous research to be distinguishing characteristics of HPC. We hypothesize that HPC will more closely align stated performance measures for executive compensation with performance characteristics that have been shown to be characteristics of HPC. We find that HPC are more focused and unambiguous in their use of both financial and non-financial performance measures in executive compensation.
Following the optimal contracting hypothesis, this study investigates the issue of whether the board of director's ex ante choice to incorporate individual performance evaluation (IPE) measures into the CEO bonus plan rewards managerial decisions not reflected in measures of the firm's current financial performance. Empirical results provide evidence that the use of IPE in the CEO bonus plan is an increasing function of the proportion of outsider directors on the board and a decreasing function of the informativeness of financial performance measures. This study also demonstrates how the use of IPE in incentive contracting can explain CEO cash compensation that is not explained by the firm's current performance and governance variables. Finally, the CEO incentive cash compensation not explained by observable performance measures or governance structure is positively associated with firm future performance one year after its award. Overall, results support the optimal contracting hypothesis. IPE appears to be used to increase the informativeness of CEO actions and determine the level of current CEO cash incentive compensation.