International climate regimes: effects of delayed participation

Strategic Direction

ISSN: 0258-0543

Article publication date: 18 April 2008




Keppo, I. (2008), "International climate regimes: effects of delayed participation", Strategic Direction, Vol. 24 No. 6.



Emerald Group Publishing Limited

Copyright © 2008, Emerald Group Publishing Limited

International climate regimes: effects of delayed participation

Article Type: Abstracts From: Strategic Direction, Volume 24, Issue 6.

Keppo I., Rao S. Technological Forecasting & Social Change, September 2007, Vol. 74 No. 7, Start page: 962, No. of pages: 18

Purpose to examine the effects of delayed regional participation on international climate regimes. Design/methodology/approach remarks on the incompleteness of the Kyoto protocol as developing countries have not signed up to it (and the US withdrew). Discusses problems with optimal results under such partial participation conditions by the MESSAGE model using updated 2000 IPCC Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (A2r and B1 baselines to 2100). Introduces 2030, 2060 cut-off points for delayed region entry. Determines effects of delaying six regions under multiple conditions (32 scenarios run). Identifies their delay impact on cost, timing, magnitude, feasibility and nature of the “full efficiency” global response. Examines effects of multiple non-participation. Findings interprets graphs, pie charts, and histograms. Concludes, inter alia, short-term participation delay gives no great long-term global mitigation impact, as participants can still achieve targets, but long-term participation delay would require increased effort from those signed up, and global postponement would result in targets becoming unachievable. Finds coal use and technologies greatly increase under non-participation (causing inertia in the energy system) and mitigation costs rise. Research limitations/implications suggests means of broadening the non-participation analysis e.g. using agent-based modelling. Practical implications considers the best strategy is to sign up as many mitigation players as possible at the outset. Originality/value identifies effects of regions not participating in global mitigation programmes the long-term result being that global targets become unachievable if global postponement occurs (unless those already signed up increase their mitigation efforts).ISSN: 0040-1625Reference: 36BA252DOI: 10.1016/j.techfore.2006.05.025

Keywords: Comparative tests, Environmental management, Environmental politics, Global warming, Mathematical modelling, Temperature rise

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