This study aims to investigate the use of deceptive negotiation tactics to explain why teams can attain higher negotiation profits than individual negotiators. The study distinguishes deception by commission (i.e. active misrepresentation of preferences) from deception by omission (i.e. passive misrepresentation of preferences).
The sample used to test the mediation hypothesis was made up of data from two electronically mediated negotiation simulations encompassing 75 negotiation dyads with 278 participants. The methodology involved coding deceptive negotiation tactics from the log files by counting utterances related to indifference options that enabled negotiation parties to deceive.
The results show that teams do apply deceptive negotiation tactics more frequently than individual negotiators and that this behavior helps them increase their negotiation profits.
The findings are valuable for two reasons. First, the study included controls for other important antecedents of deceptive behavior and negotiation outcome (e.g. negotiators’ nationalities, first bids). Consequently, the empirical results underline the importance of considering team size to understand its impact on profits through the use of deceptive tactics. Second, although this study does show that deception increases negotiation profits, the absolute level of deception is rather small (on average just one deceptive statement per negotiation).
Earlier stages of this research were part of Tayfun Aykac’s dissertation. The authors thank ESCP Europe’s ‘European Research Funding’, the ‘Granted Research Center for Teams in International Business’, directed by the corresponding author; and Marilyn J. Stone, her copy editor. The authors also thank the Editor and two anonymous reviewers for their valuable suggestions during the review process.
Aykac, T., Wilken, R., Jacob, F. and Prime, N. (2017), "Why teams achieve higher negotiation profits than individuals: the mediating role of deceptive tactics", Journal of Business & Industrial Marketing, Vol. 32 No. 4, pp. 567-579. https://doi.org/10.1108/JBIM-10-2015-0179
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