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This study aims to investigate the use of deceptive negotiation tactics to explain why teams can attain higher negotiation profits than individual negotiators. The study distinguishes deception by commission (i.e. active misrepresentation of preferences) from deception by omission (i.e. passive misrepresentation of preferences).

The sample used to test the mediation hypothesis was made up of data from two electronically mediated negotiation simulations encompassing 75 negotiation dyads with 278 participants. The methodology involved coding deceptive negotiation tactics from the log files by counting utterances related to indifference options that enabled negotiation parties to deceive.

The results show that teams do apply deceptive negotiation tactics more frequently than individual negotiators and that this behavior helps them increase their negotiation profits.

The findings are valuable for two reasons. First, the study included controls for other important antecedents of deceptive behavior and negotiation outcome (e.g. negotiators’ nationalities, first bids). Consequently, the empirical results underline the importance of considering team size to understand its impact on profits through the use of deceptive tactics. Second, although this study does show that deception increases negotiation profits, the absolute level of deception is rather small (on average just one deceptive statement per negotiation).

The purpose of this paper is to identify the targets, strategies, and topics of deception employed in the workplace among part‐time service workers.

A taxonomy of deception strategies is used to content analyze 259 narrative accounts of part‐time student employees over two work shifts using Cohen's kappa to measure interrater reliability. Chi‐square analysis is used to determine significant differences between deception strategies and deception targets.

Employees overwhelmingly concealed information and lied primarily to supervisors and customers. Employees deceived in order to cover or protect emotions, evade work, cover mistakes or policy violations, and mislead customers in order to increase sales, commission, or gratuities.

Determining the most salient strategies employed becomes clearer if the deception account describes or reveals the employee's motivation to deceive. Future research should consider motivation of the deceiver and might compare the deception strategies of part‐time and full‐time employees of varying levels of skill, organizational commitment, and role conflict.

This study provides rich examples of the ethically compromising situations in which young workers find themselves, discusses the impact of workplace structures on deception and the importance of socializing young workers on honest organizational practices.

As young workers enter the workforce they are confronted with opportunities to deceive and they do so for a wide variety of reasons. Little work has been done within the organizational context investigating the most common deception strategies employed or the contextual factors influencing the use of deception among full‐time employees much less young, part‐time employees.

In this study, the authors extend upon Brockman et al. (2008), who provide evidence that managers opportunistically accelerate bad news prior to share repurchases, but provide limited evidence that managers withhold good news until after repurchases. The authors examine management forecasts surrounding share repurchases in periods when companies must disclose detailed repurchase information. The authors argue these disclosures increase managers' legal and reputation risks of accelerating bad news, but have a lesser effect on delaying good news.

First, the authors examine whether managers alter the information released to the market before buying back shares by comparing managerial forecasts made within 30 days before the beginning of a repurchasing period with those made outside of this window. Second, the authors examine whether managers are more likely to provide good news forecasts, in terms of both magnitude and frequency, after buying back shares. Lastly, the authors examine the impact of CEO stock ownership on managerial forecasting behavior surrounding share buybacks.

Consistent with the authors’ hypotheses and contrary to Brockman et al. (2008), the authors find limited evidence that the likelihood or magnitude of bad news forecasts is greater in the period before share buybacks. Instead, the authors document that the frequency and magnitude of good news forecasts increase in periods following share buybacks and that these associations are positively moderated by managerial equity incentives. The authors also find that the withholding of good news is associated with lower average repurchase prices and greater repurchase volume. The authors further show that, when litigation risk is greater, managers are less likely to accelerate bad news prior to repurchases and more likely to withhold good news until after. Overall, the study results are consistent with managers balancing the benefits of opportunistic repurchase behavior with the costs.

This study contributes to the management forecast and share repurchase literatures by providing evidence consistent with managers opportunistically releasing earnings forecasts in the period after buying back shares. Most importantly, the authors show that after the rule revision, managers refrain from actively disclosing bad news that carry higher legal costs. Instead, they opt for the omission of good news to repurchase stocks at lower prices. The study results reconcile the conflicting evidence of Brockman et al. (2008) and Ge and Lennox (2011).

Fraud is not yet universally recognised or understood as a crime, in the way that theft is. All sectors of our society recognise shoplifting as a crime, whereas an exaggerated insurance claim tends to be seen more as a matter of personal morality than public law and order.

The purpose of the paper is to bring to the attention of academics the innovations which have rapidly been developed to sell goods and services across sectors using what the authors describe as “confusion marketing”.

This is a conceptual, integrative, critical assessment of a number of marketing disciplines addressing aspects of confusion marketing. Confusion practices are evolving rapidly, with little theoretical explanation of why many of them are successful. This paper seeks to answer such questions by examining a wide range of sectors and confusion practices.

Patterns are identified across sectors, companies and business practices, providing the basis for this holistic assessment of marketing research on confusion since its inception and the design of a systemic framework of confusion.

The study attempts to bring all marketing schools and traditions of confusion together and presents a synthesis of scholarly accomplishments in the area by matching them, where possible, to current practices. It advances extant literature by designing a systemic framework which has, so far, been absent in marketing and by identifying avenues for future research maturation.

This discussion challenges assumptions regarding the ethicality, sustainability and profitability of confusion practices. Businesses practicing confusion are successful, suggesting that such practices may be economically sustainable. Contrary to expectations in marketing, confusion seems to benefit some consumers; confusion practices are not necessarily unethical or detrimental.

Confusion is a controversial area in marketing. Although the literature on confusion has grown, extant research continues to concentrate on consumers’ perceptions of confusion and tends to assume that confusion practices are undesirable, unethical and unsustainable. This paper provides a first integrative critical analysis of marketing thinking and challenges the aforementioned literature assumptions, demonstrating that past research has not sufficiently explained the nature, consequences and success of confusion marketing.

This paper examines the effect of managerial insider trading on analyst forecast accuracy, dispersion and bias. Specifically, the authors test whether insider-trading information is positively associated with the precision of earnings forecasts. In addition, this relationship between Regulation Fair Disclosure (FD) and the Galleon insider trading case is examined.

Pooled ordinary least squares (Pooled OLS) rregressions with year-fixed effects, firm-fixed effects, and firm-level clustered standard errors are used. Our proxies for forecast precision are regressed on alternative measures of insider trading activities and a vector of control variables.

Insider-trading information is positively associated with the precision of earnings forecasts. Analysts provide better forecast accuracy, less forecast dispersion and lower forecast bias among firms with insider trading in the six months leading to the forecast issues. In addition, bullish (bearish) insider trades are associated with increased (decreased) forecast bias. Insider trading information complements analysts' independent opinion and increases the precision of their forecast.

Regulators may pursue rules that promote the rapid disclosure of managerial insider trades, particularly given the increasing availability of Internet tools. Securities regulators may attempt to increase transparency and enhance the reporting procedures of corporate insiders, for example, using Internet sources with direct release to the public to ensure more timely information dissemination.

The authors document a positive association between earnings forecast precision and managerial insider trading up to six months prior to the forecast issue. This relationship is stronger after the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) prohibited the selective disclosure of material nonpublic information through Regulation FD. In addition, the association between insider trading and forecast accuracy has weakened after the Galleon insider trading case.

This paper investigates the use of deception in two negotiation studies. Study 1 (N = 80) demonstrates that direct questions and solidarity curtail deception. Study 2 (N = 74 dyads) demonstrates that direct questions are particularly effective in curtailing lies of omission, but may actually increase the incidence of lies of commission. These findings highlight the importance of misrepresentation to the negotiation process and suggest approaches for contending with deception.

The purpose of this study is to explore the views of practicing negotiators on their experiences of deception and their strategies for detecting deceptive behavior. A thematic analysis of interview data complements the existing experimental literature on deception and negotiation. The authors compare the experiences of practicing negotiators with the results found in experimental studies and provide practical recommendations for negotiators and managers regarding the detection of deception.

Data was collected from 19 practicing commercial negotiators in France by way of semi-structured interviews. The transcribed data was analyzed by way of thematic analysis using the software NVivo 12. Experiences and behaviors identified in the negotiation literature as key factors for the detection of deception acted as a coding framework.

A thematic analysis of the data revealed four themes related to the experience of deception that negotiators perceived as particularly important: the frequency, form, interpretation and consequences of deception. Further, the analysis revealed four factors that negotiators believed influenced their ability to detect deceptive communication: physical cues, such as body language and micro-expressions, and verbal cues, including contradictions and inconsistencies, emotional cues and environmental cues. Finally, the strategies described by negotiators to detect deception could be classified according to six themes: careful listening, asking questions, emotional intelligence, intuition, checking consistency and requesting evidence.

This study elicited the views of commercial negotiators without collecting information from their negotiation counterparts. Hence, it was not possible to verify whether the reported detection of deceptive communication was accurate. Because of optimism bias, the participants in the sample were likely to overrate their ability to detect deception. In part, this was helpful because the negotiators spoke freely about their strategies for dealing with deceptive counterparts allowing the identification of techniques to improve the efficacy of detecting deceptive communication.

Participants overwhelmingly expressed that there is a lack of training on deception in negotiation. It is suggested that the results of this study inform the development of training courses on the detection of deception. In particular, it is recommended that training courses should cover the following topics: how to anticipate and avoid deceptive behavior; how to effectively respond to deceptive behavior; the role of emotional intelligence in detecting deceptive behavior; careful listening and asking questions; and the role of intuition in detecting deception.

Prior empirical studies on the detection of deception have not specifically investigated the range of self-reported strategies used by practicing negotiators to detect deceptive communication. This study addresses this gap. This study complements existing experimental works by widening the spectrum of potential variables that play a role in the effective detection of deceptive communication.

This study examines the salesperson-driven unethical behavior toward consumers in the retail banking context.

Consumer posts on an online social platform were analyzed using content analysis. Cluster analysis and word association analyses were conducted to analyze the posts across ethics dimensions, customer intentions and banking services.

Complaints about salesperson-driven unethical behavior were classified into three clusters: disrespect, fee deception and other deception. Four themes of consumer intentions emerged from data: expecting an action regarding the staff, fixing the problem, exiting the bank, or just expressing the problem on the social platform. There was a significant difference among clusters in terms of intentions. The deception clusters had a stronger association with fixing the problem, while the disrespect cluster had a stronger association with consumers’ willingness to express their complaints and requests regarding corrective actions for the salespeople.

Banks must differentiate their service recovery approach depending on the problem. While a refund can be more appropriate for recovering deception, a corrective action regarding misbehaving sales staff is expected by the customers for the disrespect problem.

This study contributed to the need for current research on personal selling practices and salesperson ethics in banking services. The unethical sales practices were linked to customer intentions, and several associations were found. An unethical sales behavior framework that can be used in future research was represented.

The Bureau of Economics in the Federal Trade Commission has a three-part role in the Agency and the strength of its functions changed over time depending on the preferences and ideology of the FTC’s leaders, developments in the field of economics, and the tenor of the times. The over-riding current role is to provide well considered, unbiased economic advice regarding antitrust and consumer protection law enforcement cases to the legal staff and the Commission. The second role, which long ago was primary, is to provide reports on investigations of various industries to the public and public officials. This role was more recently called research or “policy R&D”. A third role is to advocate for competition and markets both domestically and internationally. As a practical matter, the provision of economic advice to the FTC and to the legal staff has required that the economists wear “two hats,” helping the legal staff investigate cases and provide evidence to support law enforcement cases while also providing advice to the legal bureaus and to the Commission on which cases to pursue (thus providing “a second set of eyes” to evaluate cases). There is sometimes a tension in those functions because building a case is not the same as evaluating a case. Economists and the Bureau of Economics have provided such services to the FTC for over 100 years proving that a sub-organization can survive while playing roles that sometimes conflict. Such a life is not, however, always easy or fun.