Opposition of retail sales staff to shopping hours liberalization: An application of the insider‐outsider theory

Abstract

The classical insider‐outsider theory explains involuntary unemployment by the bargaining power of insiders that prevents wages decreasing to the level of the reservation wages of unemployed outsiders. Extends the traditional argument about wages to a conflict of interest between insiders and outsiders about the schedule of working time. Argues that attempts to liberalize shopping hours often fail because of the resistance and arguments of retail sector employees (insiders) who fear that this would cause deterioration in their working conditions. This resistance leads to a reduction of employment possibilities for outsiders who would have been willing to work during fringe hours.

Citation

Wolter, S.C. (2001), "Opposition of retail sales staff to shopping hours liberalization: An application of the insider‐outsider theory", International Journal of Manpower, Vol. 22 No. 5, pp. 445-456. https://doi.org/10.1108/EUM0000000005851