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Purpose – Drawing from social psychology and economics, I propose several mechanisms that may affect ownership stakes among entrepreneurs, including norms of distributive justice, negotiation constraints, and network constraints. The processes are explored empirically for a representative dataset of entrepreneurial teams.

Methodology/Approach – Between 1998 and 2000, entrepreneurial teams were sampled from the U.S. population for the Panel Study of Entrepreneurial Dynamics. I analyze the distribution of ownership stakes at both the individual and group levels.

Findings – The results suggest that principles of macrojustice, affecting the distribution of resources in teams as a whole, deviate considerably from principles of microjustice, affecting the resources received by individual entrepreneurs. While aggregate inequality increases in teams that have a diverse set of members, the effect is not reducible to discrimination on the basis of individual status characteristics. Instead, the relational demography of teams – characterized in terms of the degree of closeness in network ties and homogeneity in demographic attributes – serves as a uniquely social predictor of between-group variation in economic inequality.

Originality/Value of the paper – Empirical research on inequality has paid little attention to the process of group exchange in organizational start-ups, where entrepreneurs pool resources and skills in return for uncertain or indirect payoffs. This paper offers both theoretical frameworks and empirical analyses to shed light on economic inequality among entrepreneurs.

This chapter shares ideas about how to encourage students to take responsibility for their individual learning and their role as a team member through the use of team contracts and peer evaluations. We also share how instructors can more easily determine individual grades for team projects. Team contracts can help instill a sense of responsibility, encourage accountability, and add structure by promoting the clarification of task-specific roles. In conjunction with team contracts, peer evaluations can reinforce the responsibilities assigned through the contract. Peer evaluations provide an opportunity for students to objectively and thoughtfully evaluate team member contributions to the collective result and reward individual participants more equitably related to the outcome obtained.

The chapter provides discussion and examples of student-developed team contracts and a sample peer evaluation form along with a discussion of how these documents have been used in the classroom. Using responses from a convenience survey of undergraduate and graduate students, we conclude by examining student feedback to suggest patterns of the perceptions of students toward the use of these tools.

While innovative work practices (IWPs), such as self-directed teams and performance related pay, have become commonplace in firms around the world, little is known about their nature and effects in emerging market countries. This study uses new data collected from face-to-face interviews with large samples of workers from two manufacturing firms in Lithuania in 2005 mainly to investigate hypotheses concerning the effects of IWPs on firm and worker outcomes. In these cases we find: (i) the range of IWPs is limited though particular IWPs, notably self-directed teams, are strongly evident; (ii) in view of the historical legacy, the incidence of some outcomes, notably monitoring, was surprisingly high; (iii) typically self-directed teams positively impact worker outcomes, notably job satisfaction and employee involvement, though effects on monitoring and effort are less frequent; (iv) typically equity ownership and bonuses do not affect worker outcomes, though positive impacts on effort and peer monitoring sometimes are found; (v) the evidence for complementary effects of teams and performance pay or financial participation is very weak. In the main, these findings do not support the mutual gains theory that IWPs positively impact both firm and worker outcomes.

There is abundant evidence that innovative work practices (IWPs) of various kinds, such as teams, quality control circles, no-layoff policies, job rotation, and employee ownership, have spread rapidly in developed market economies during the past thirty years or so. Between 1983 and 1993, Freeman, Kleiner, and Cheri (2000) report survey evidence that the number of nonmonetary incentive programs offered by firms increased by 500% in the United States. Similar trends appear to be at work in other countries including the United Kingdom, Japan (e.g., Kato, 2000), Denmark (e.g., Datta Gupta, & Eriksson, 2004), and Finland (e.g., Kalmi & Kauhanen, 2008). Whereas the corresponding evidence for transition economies is much slimmer, the available evidence is also suggestive that such practices are limited though spreading.¹ Unsurprisingly, both theoretical and an empirical literature have appeared to examine the impact of IWPs on both business performance and employee outcomes. As different scholars from diverse fields in the broad area of industrial relations have applied varying approaches to explore several research questions, those literatures have grown rapidly. At the same time, while it is clear that analytical work of the kind is becoming commonplace for advanced economies, work that focuses on developing and transition economies is very slim. As it is important to determine whether findings for firms in advanced market economies carry over to other economies, the first contribution of this chapter is to extend the geographical coverage of the empirical literature. This we do by assembling and analyzing new survey data set for a large Croatian manufacturing firm with our chapter perhaps representing one of the first such investigations for a former communist economy.

What enables some employee ownership firms to overcome the free rider problem and motivate employees to improve performance? This study analyzes the role of human resource policies in the performance of employee ownership companies, using employee survey data from 14 companies and a national sample of employee-owners. Between-firm comparisons of 11 ESOP firms show that an index of human resource policies, nominally controlled by management, is positively related to employee reports of co-worker performance and other good workplace outcomes (including perceptions of fairness, good supervision, and worker input and influence). Within-firm comparisons in three ESOP firms, and exploratory results from a national survey, show that employee-owners who participate in employee involvement committees are more likely to exert peer pressure on shirking co-workers. We conclude that an understanding of how and when employee ownership works successfully requires a three-pronged analysis of: (1) the incentives that ownership gives; (2) the participative mechanisms available to workers to act on those incentives; and (3) the corporate culture that battles against tendencies to free ride.

Bringing together our analysis from the previous chapters allows us to lay out the various contradictions and issues surrounding ownership models that have arisen for fans of football clubs. Exactly when are most English football clubs supposed to have conformed to the normative model? Our analysis reveals that the context in which football clubs operate is that of global business and has developed in line with the practices of other businesses that exist outside the sporting arena. There is always going to be an uneasy tension between a fan ideal and something that has to operate within global contexts. However, in the modern game ideal and practice find themselves not merely in tension, but often completely in opposition to one another. Football finds itself in a position where something has to give, be it ownership models or the affective ties of the fans themselves. Fans can either continue to wrestle with the contradictions that arise from what they think their club is or fandom itself changes to embrace the context of the ownership. Given the moral injunction that is almost invariably built into the idealised image that fans have of their club, there is one question that we must always ask in the contemporary climate: How far is too far before all of this means nothing?

In 2001, Carlsberg became the fourth largest brewer in the world – but that world was increasingly competitive. This chapter explores how Carlsberg's top management team translated its vision into a few critical priorities, their must-win battles – and then cascaded these throughout the organization to create the alignment, energy, and motivation to realize its goals. At the core, its approach was creating not only shared priorities intellectually, but also a strong culture of cooperation. Five key factors underpin Carlsberg's significant improvements in market position and financial returns: (1) walking the talk, (2) communicating constantly on many levels, (3) maintaining a solid grip on reality, (4) embedding the agenda in the core processes of the organization, and (5) the personal commitment and ownership of the CEO.