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We examine whether the percentage of independent members sitting on the audit committee, in different institutional settings, impacts the market reaction (measured by the abnormal stock returns variance and the abnormal trading volume) to earnings announcements. For our sample composed of more than 7'600 earnings announcements made by European firms from 15 countries between 2006 and 2014, we find that the market reactions to earnings announcements are significantly larger when the audit committee is more independent in countries with weak institutional setting. Our results generally hold after controlling for numerous methodological issues. We conclude that more independent audit committees are substitutes for weak institutions to increase the credibility of earnings announcements. Our results should be of great interest for European regulators who recently introduced new requirements for public firms regarding audit committees’ independence.

This paper examines whether firms choose to source from multinational (MNC) suppliers instead of local suppliers as a means of overcoming weak contract enforcement institutions and as a means of accessing supply chain management capabilities. It uses a unique dataset of international contract manufacturing orders constituting the global supply chains of many of the world’s largest brands in footwear, sportswear, and apparel. It finds strong evidence that buyers are more likely to source from MNC suppliers in countries where contract enforcement is weak and when they have less experience sourcing from a given country. Further, it finds evidence that buyers are more likely to source from MNC suppliers when they source a wider variety of products, have smaller supplier networks, or have smaller order volumes.

While many studies on institutional environment have primarily focused on the influence of the host country environment, limited insights have been offered on how the different dimensions of home institutions affect firm internationalization. This paper aims to fill this gap by investigating the effects of regulatory institutions at home.

Using country governance quality to proxy quality of regulatory institutions, this study attempts to reveal how regulatory institutions at home facilitate a multinational enterprise's (MNE's) international expansion and why the influence differs in different country clusters. Using hierarchical linear modeling and cluster analysis, proposed hypotheses were tested with a three‐year panel of 511 firms from 38 countries.

The results provide substantial support for the authors' hypotheses that MNEs with high governance quality at home are more engaged in internationalization than those with low governance quality at home. Moreover, differences in institutional effect do exist between country clusters.

This study provides evidence that while country differences exist, governance quality at home can facilitate MNEs' expansion into foreign markets. This finding will help managers of any MNEs to consider country‐level factors and evaluate the governance quality at home before committing resources into foreign operations.

Building on the institutional environment literature, this theory and results make original contributions by underscoring how the consideration of regulatory institutions at home can significantly improve understanding of institutional influence on MNEs. The findings have important implications for both international business researchers and managers of MNEs.

This study aims to examine the effect of private (PRST) and public (PUST) sector-led financial sector transparencies on bank interest margins (BIM) termed as social cost of financial intermediation in different institutional quality setups.

This study uses a two-step dynamic generalized method of moments panel data and bootstrapped quantile models with 91 economies between 2004 and 2016. Data is sourced from World Development Indicator and Global Development Finance databases.

The results show that under strong and weak political and financial regulatory institutional setups, the reducing effect of PRST on BIM are observed and reported while the full sample reports no significant nexus between PRST and PUST on BIM. Furthermore, under political institutional quality sample, economies with strong corruption control and regulatory quality are able to reinforce the dampening effect of PRST on BIM while under the same political institutional quality sample, economies with weak rule of law are able to heighten the reducing effect of PRST on BIM. Moreover, under financial regulator institutional quality sample, economies with strong overall weighted and unweighted, chief executive officer and policy dependent central banks are able to intensify the diminishing effect of PRST on BIM while under the same financial regulator institutional quality sample, economies with weak limits on lending are able to amplify the reducing effect of PRST on BIM. However, PUST is reported to propel lower levels BIM in the bootstrap models, especially in strong institutional economies.

These findings imply that policymakers may rely on PRST to reduce BIM, especially under financial regulatory institutional quality. Additionally, economies must be careful on their reliance on PRST because the effectiveness of PRST to tame high BIM is dependent on the strength of political and financial regulatory institutions.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study presents first time international evidence on the effect of private and public sector-led financial transparency on BIM in strong and weak political and financial regulatory institution economies.

Although multinational enterprises (MNEs) based in emerging economies arose quickly during the past decade, most of these firms lack marketing capabilities and strong brands. Emerging-economy MNEs that have tried to build their own brands have been largely unsuccessful. The purpose of this paper is to argue that corruption in the MNEs’ home countries has been detrimental to their brand values. Corruption makes it more difficult for consumers to govern their transactions with local firms, thus decreasing firms’ trustworthiness and brand values.

Data of the global top 500 most valuable brands of 2008 and 2014 and the Poisson regression model are used.

This study finds that firms based in countries with lower levels of corruption establish more valuable brands than those based in countries with higher corruption, even when GDP and GDP per capita are controlled.

Policymakers who want to help local firms increase their marketing capabilities and establish strong brands should strive to increase the trustworthiness of local firms by undertaking anti-corruption reforms aimed at protecting consumers.

Few studies have address the research question that why emerging-market MNEs lack marketing capabilities and strong brands. This study finds that institutional factors such as corruption at country level prevent them from establishing strong brands.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the significant association between political institutions and the control of corruption.

This study uses ordinary least squares model to examine the following: quality of political institutions; the association between the strength of democratic institutions and control of corruption; the association between government effectiveness and control of corruption; and the association between legal institutions and control of corruption.

The result shows that there is positive association between democratic institutions, government bureaucracy and rule of law with the control of corruption. From the political perspective, stronger democratic institutions are found to be associated with higher ability to control corruption in a country. When viewed from country’s economic and social well-being perspective, highly effective government bureaucracy is positively associated with ability to control corruption. Finally, rule of law is also associated with the control of corruption.

This study points toward clear priorities for reform as stronger democratic institutions, efficient government bureaucracy and adherence to the rule of law improve the control of corruption. The results show that stronger democratic institutions, highly effective government bureaucracy and rule of law are associated with higher control of corruption. This supports the theory that quality political institutions reduce corruption in the long-run. In addition, this study shows that press freedom, regulatory quality and political stability further enhance the capacity of such institutions to combat corruption. Conversely, crony capitalism systems undermine this positive association.

This cross-border study’s main purpose is to examine whether there is a significant association between political institutions and the cost of debt. In addition, it also investigates whether this association is moderated by the country’s corruption levels.

This study uses a unique cross-border data set comprising 45,848 firms from 117 countries from 2002 to 2017 to investigate these research questions. Further, the authors use the two-stage least squares method to mitigate issues of endogeneity.

This study finds that political institutions are significantly associated with cost of debt. Specifically, the cost of debt is lower in countries with stronger democratic institutions, smaller government bureaucracies and higher adherence to the rule of law. Further, this association is strengthened by low corruption levels.

This study provides new insights into the relationship between political institutions and the cost of debt. Overall, the results reveal that democratic institutions, government bureaucracy and the rule of law are significantly associated with cost of debt. This association is stronger in countries with low levels of corruption and consistent with Transparency’s International notion that accountability and transparency by government political institutions promote sustainable economic growth.

This study focuses on home country institutions as sources of variation in the level of foreign investment into India. Our findings support the idea that institutional voids found in India are less of a deterrent to investments from home countries with high levels of institutional development than from home countries with similar institutional voids. Overall, foreign investments in India are found to be significantly related to the strength of institutions within home countries. The levels of both approved and realized foreign direct investment (FDI) are strongly influenced by economic factors and home country regulative institutions, and weakly influenced by home country cognitive institutions. When considered separately, the cognitive institutions and regulative institutions within a given home country each significantly influence the level of approved/realized FDI into India. However, when considered jointly, only the strength of regulative institutions is predictive of FDI inflows.

The environment of most organizations is beset by continuous change, instability, flux, and unpredictability. If organizations are to survive and prosper under such conditions, they must be capable of dynamic adaption and stable and reliable performance. Organization theory recognizes the importance of both imperatives, but typically assumes that they pull organizations in different directions. Building on Selznick’s theory of institutionalization, we argue that institutions can, should and sometimes do master the challenge of being responsive and stable, while avoiding the potentially destructive tendencies of rigidity and opportunism. Contrary to a prominent view that strong institutionalization leads to inertia, Selznick’s theory suggests that strong institutions are capable of preemptive adaptation to protect the character of their institutions. We describe this state as one of dynamic conservatism and explore four types of preemptive internal reform strategies: strategic retreat, self-cannibalization, experimentation, and repositioning. We conclude with a consideration of factors that might moderate the ability of strong institutions to proactively change in order to remain the same.

This study aims to investigate the impact of terrorism on financial inclusion that is achieved through automated teller machine penetration and bank branch expansion.

Eight countries that are the most terrorized countries in the world were analysed using the panel fixed effect regression model and the generalized linear model.

The results provide evidence that terrorism reduces the level of financial inclusion in countries experiencing terrorism, but the presence of strong legal institutions, accountability governance institutions and political stability governance institutions mitigate the adverse effect of terrorism on financial inclusion.

A growing literature has shown that terrorism affects the economy, yet little is known about its impact on financial inclusion.