Search results

The purpose of this paper is to incorporate historical theories of political economy as means better to clarify and classify contemporary state police and private policing practices.

A diverse historical investigation of largely, non‐traditional public police history was conducted by utilizing a selective variety of social, political, and economic sources.

The paper finds that several theoretical features of eighteenth and nineteenth century Marxian, classical, and neoclassical political economy have contributed in defining the origins of contemporary American public police and private policing practices. Born from these perspectives, public goods theories frameworks, in conjunction with Wilson's police officer job function typologies in Varieties of Police Behavior, more clearly illustrate the current political and economically defined state supported police relative to private market arrangements.

This research describes the positioning of this mixed economy in theoretical fashion, but does not provide contemporary private sector market growths or publicly supplied police trends that are a suitable next step for further research.

The public “monopoly” of state supported police is largely rejected. More interdisciplinary research approaches should be pursued in the twenty‐first century that better reflect the American political and economic realities of public and private forms of policing.

This paper is highly original when considering the paucity of theory utilized in describing simultaneous state and private policing scenarios.

This research seeks to understand the drivers of outward foreign direct investments (FDIs) by state-owned emerging economy firms, the characteristics of their overseas FDI projects and investment locations, and the effects of home and host institutions on the market entry strategies, taking into account the legitimacy of state ownership.

The discussion is based on a comprehensive review of conceptual and empirical literature, as well as case studies available from recognized journals in the field.

State-owned emerging economy firms pursue outward FDIs to respond to policy incentives of the home government and to reduce its political influence over the firm. FDI projects are often large and risky and have low business values. They often enter countries where state ownership is perceived as more legitimate while engaging in legitimacy-building activities in these countries. When their home country has a high level of institutional restrictions, they are less likely to use acquisitions or hold high levels of equity control in foreign subsidiaries. To strengthen local legitimacy, they often use greenfield investments or share equity control with local firms in foreign subsidiaries, particularly when the host country is endowed with strategic assets or when it has a high level of institutional restrictions. However, when having high levels of state ownership or strong political connections, they often commit a high level of resources and hold a high level of equity control in foreign subsidiaries.

The literature mostly investigates the FDI of firms that are structurally separate from the institutions. When the institutions are endogenous as presented in this research, their strategic choices are substantially influenced by noncommercial political motives and perception on their political image.

This chapter contributes to the existing literature on institutional theory and international business research by integrating the concepts of polycentrism and institutional learning to examine how MNEs from emerging economies invest in developed countries. We argue that equity-based market entry modes and non-equity-based modes create different needs for learning about economic, regulatory and political institutions; entry modes with or without local partners lead to different levels of institutional embeddedness and institutional learning speeds. Finally, the content of institutional knowledge also determines its transferability and adaptability. We emphasize the importance of recognizing the integrated nature of economic, regulatory and political institutions from a polycentric perspective and discuss their change in different situations.

In previous efforts I have dated the birth of (modern) Social Catholicism (alias: Roman‐Catholic Social Economycs) with the publication of the closely associated works of Charles de Coux (1832) and Alban de Villeneuve‐Bargemont (1834/37). If indeed (and without going all the way back to Jesus of Nazareth, via Thomas Aquinas, Jerome and Ambrose et al.) that be the case, and the implication of the present assignment be correct, then we should have to date the “birth of solidarism” in the Social‐Catholic vein identically. Undaunted by Gide's virtual declaration that “they were all solidarists then”, this is what we set out to show, viz. that our Solidarism did have its birth therewith.

Purpose – This paper examines the changing regimes of governance and the roles of accounting therein in a less developed country (LDC) by using Sri Lanka tea plantations as a case. It captures the changes in a chronological analysis, which identifies four regimes of governance: (a) pre-colonial, (b) colonial, (c) post-colonial and (d) neo-liberal. It shows how dialectics between political state, civil state and the economy affected changes in regimes of governance and accounting through evolving structures, processes and contents of governance.

Methodology – It draws on the works of Antonio Gramsci and Karl Polanyi to articulate a political economy framework. It provides contextual accounts from the Sri Lankan political history and case data from its tea plantations for the above chronological analysis.

Findings – The above four regimes of governance had produced four modes of accounting: (a) a system of rituals in the despotic kingship, (b) a system of monitoring and reporting to absentee Sterling capital in the despotic imperialism, (c) a system of ceremonial reporting to state capital in a politicised hegemony and (d) good governance attempts in a politicised hegemony conditioned by global capital. We argue that political processes and historical legacies rather than the assumed superiority of accounting measures gave shape to governance regimes. Governance did not operate in its ideal forms, but ‘good governance’ initiatives revitalised accounting roles across managerial agency to strengthening stewardship rather than penetrating it into the domain of labour controls. Managerial issues emerged from contradictions between political state, civil state and the economy (enterprise) constructed themselves a distinct political domain within which accounting had little role to play, despite the ambitious aims of good governance.

Originality – Most accounting and governance research has used economic theories and provided ahistorical analysis. This paper provides a historically informed chronological analysis using a political economy framework relevant to LDC contexts, and empirically demonstrates how actual governance structures and processes lay in broader socio-political structures, and how the success of good governance depends on the social and political behaviour of these structural properties.

Market transition theory has specified general mechanisms to explain change in the balance of power between political and economic actors in transition economies. These mechanisms drive the endogenous construction of informal institutions of a market society; moreover, it is within the context of an ongoing change in relative power that the formal institutions of the emerging market economy arise. The theory makes clear predictions on the declining value of political capital as a consequence of progressive marketization, which incrementally results in transformative change in the direction of more relative autonomy between the political and economic spheres, not dissimilar from established market economies (Kornai, 1995; Evans, 1995; Nee, 2000; Lindenberg, 2000; Ricketts, 2000). In sum, the predicted change in relative power between redistributors and producers explains not only bottom-up entrepreneurial activity, but also the emergence of a market economy in departures from state socialism.

This discussion forwards a political economy framework for the analysis of the role and impact of political intervention on the process and outcome of environmental conflicts. The proposed analytic approach, advocated by the class‐centric state perspective, focuses on the economic roots of political action in conflict situations. The paper provides a critique of the existing analytic approaches to conflict analysis. The paper also offers a brief account of Hawaii's land use policy and history of land‐related environmental conflicts to illustrate the potential of the political economy approach.

Recent proposals for swift privatization of all social property in Eastern Europe overlook the unique history and culture of that region. The neoclassical model of development treats private property and free markets as virtual guarantees of prosperity, stability, and political democracy. However, the more comprehensive method of political economy highlights the social, political, and cultural underpinnings of economic activity. Centuries of authoritarian rule, culminating in four decades under communism, have left Eastern Europe ill‐equipped for the rigours of international competition. Until Eastern Europe develops stable democratic institutions, mass privatization is likely to result in chaos and the reimposition of political authority.