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In user-oriented websites, e.g. in news websites or in seller websites, it is important to take the user’s preferences into account when deciding which items to place in higher-exposure locations. The traditional approach to solving this problem, based on maximizing the average user utility, leads to unfair solutions, and this eventually hurts the company’s bottom line. Because of this, researchers have proposed complex schemes that explicitly add fairness to the formulation of this problem. But since utilities already describe human preferences, it is strange that it is necessary to add something beyond utilities.

In this paper, the authors analyze the problem of selecting exposure level for different items from the viewpoint of decision theory, the basic theory underlying all our activities, including economic ones.

The authors show that a more adequate use of utilities, namely, taking into account that Nash’s bargaining solution is a proper way to make group decisions, not maximizing average utility, already leads to fair solutions.

The idea to apply Nash’s bargaining solution to the problem of assigning exposure level to different items is new, as well as the analysis that shows that this application restores the fairness, which is missing in the current solutions.

One of the distinctive features in Korea and the U.S. trucking industries is the huge difference in the share of owner-operators. While it is around 10~15 percent in the U.S., 80~90% of drivers operate their own truck in Korea. Different from historical explanations of previous researches, this paper deals with this feature theoretically. We examine what brings the difference in asset ownership structures between the Korean and the U.S. trucking industries. Using an analytic framework, we investigate the determinants of truck ownership and the changes in ownership patterns. The model introduces several parameters related to productivities of drivers’ efforts and contractibility to affect drivers’ decision, and values of these parameters in both countries are discussed qualitatively and found to be consistent with the aforementioned characteristics.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the impact of supply capacity constraint, water delivery loss and fairness concern on the operational decisions/efficiency of the IBWT supply chain under the random precipitation.

Two game-theoretic decision models for the IBWT supply chain coordination considering water delivery loss without/with fairness concern under the supply capacity constraint and random precipitation are developed, analyzed and compared. On this basis, the corresponding numerical analyses are conducted and compared to derive the corresponding management insights and policy implications.

The research results indicate that the two-part tariff contract could effectively coordinate the IBWT supply chain and achieve operational performance improvement; the binding supply capacity constraint makes the water capacity to be allocated among IBWT distributors in accordance with fair shortage allocation rule and reduces the profit (or utility) of the IBWT supply chain and its members; the existence of fairness concern reduces the utility of the IBWT supply chain and its members; a lower precipitation utilization factor in the case with non-binding capacity constraint is beneficial for improving the profit/utility of the IBWT supply chain while a higher precipitation utilization factor in the case with binding capacity constraint is beneficial for improving the profit/utility of the IBWT supply chain; and reducing the water delivery loss rate, the mainline transfer cost, the branch-line transfer cost, the holding cost and the shortage cost and setting a higher retail price are beneficial for improving the profit/utility of the IBWT supply chain.

Two innovative coordination decision models under random precipitation are developed, analyzed and compared through game-theoretic approaches to investigate the impact of supply capacity constraint, water delivery loss and fairness concern on the operational decisions/efficiency of the IBWT supply chain, which have enhanced the optimization decision theory for the operations management of IBWT projects and provided a better decision support for the IBWT stakeholders to make better operations strategies.

The authors consider the mutual benefits of the ceding company and reinsurance company in the design of reinsurance contracts. Two objective functions to maximize social expected utilities are established, which are to maximize the sum of the expected utilities of both the ceding company and reinsurance company, and to maximize their products. The first objective function, additive, emphasizes the total gains of both parties, while the second, multiplicative, accounts for the degree of substitution of gains of one party through the loss of the other party. The optimal price and retention of reinsurance are found by a grid search method, and numerical analysis is conducted. The results indicate that the optimal solutions for two objective functions are quite different. However, optimal solutions are sensitive to the change of the means and volatilities of the claim loss for both objective functions. The results are potentially valuable to insurance regulators and government entities acting as reinsurers of last resort.

In this paper, the authors apply relatively simple, but in the view significant, methods and models to discuss the optimization of excess loss reinsurance strategy. The authors only consider the influence of loss distribution on optimal retention and reinsurance price but neglect the investment factor. The authors also consider the benefits of both ceding company and reinsurance company to determine optimal premium and retention of reinsurance jointly based on maximizing social utility: the sum (or the product) of expected utilities of reinsurance company and ceding company. The authors solve for optimal solutions numerically, applying simulation.

This paper establishes two optimization models of excess-of-loss reinsurance contract against catastrophic losses to determine optimal premium and retention. One model considers the sum of the expected utilities of a ceding company and a reinsurance company's expected utility; another considers the product of them. With an example, the authors find the optimal solutions of premium and retention of excess loss reinsurance. Finally, the authors carry out the sensitivity analysis. The results show that increasing the means and the volatilities of claim loss will increase the optimal retention and premium. For objective function I, increasing the coefficients of risk aversion of or reducing the coefficients of risk aversion of will make the optimal retention reduced but the optimal premium increased, and vice versa. However, for objective function 2, the change of coefficient of risk aversion has no effect on optimal solutions.

Utility of the two partners: The ceding company and the reinsurance company, may have different weights and different significance. The authors have not studied their relative significance. The simulation approach in numerical methods limits us to the probability distributions and stochastic processes the authors use, based on, generally speaking, lognormal models of rates of return. This may need to be generalized to other returns, including possible models of shocks through jump processes.

In the recent two decades, reinsurance companies have played a great role in hedging mega-catastrophic losses. For example, reinsurance companies (and special loss sharing arrangements) paid as much as two-thirds of the insured losses for the September 11, 2001 tragedy. Furthermore, large catastrophic events have increased the role of governments and regulators as reinsurers of last resort. The authors hope that the authors provide guidance for possible balancing of the needs of two counterparties to reinsurance contracts.

Nearly all governments around the world are engaged in regulation of insurance and reinsurance, and some are reinsurers themselves. The authors provide guidance for them in these activities.

The authors believe this paper to be a completely new and original contribution in the area, by providing models for balancing the utility to the ceding insurance company and the reinsurance company.

我們探討分出公司和再保險公司在再保險合約的設計上、如何能達至互利互惠。研究確立了兩個目標函數，分別為把分出公司和再保險公司兩者之預期效用的總和最大化，以及把它們的產品最佳化。第一個目標函數是加法的，強調兩個參與方的總增益;而第二個目標函數則是乘法的，這個目標函數，闡釋參與方因另一方虧損而有所收益之取代度。再保險的最佳價格和自留額是利用網格搜索法找出的，數值分析也予以進行。研究結果顯示，兩個目標函數的最佳解決方案甚為不同。唯最佳解決方案會對就這兩個目標函數而言的追討損失的波動、以及其平均值之改變產生敏感反應。研究結果將會見其價值於作為在萬不得已的時候的再保險人的保險業規管機構和政府實體。

在這學術論文裡，我們採用了相對簡單、但我們認為是重要的方法和模型，來探討超額賠款再保險策略的優化課題。我們只考慮虧損分佈對最佳自留額和再保險價格的影響，而不去檢視投資因素。我們亦考慮對分出公司和再保險公司兩者的利益，來釐定最佳保費和再保險的自留額，而這兩者則共同建基於把社會效益最大化之上：再保險公司和分出公司的預期效益的總和 (或其積數) 。 我們採用類比模仿方法、來解決尋求在數字上最佳解決方案的問題。

本研究建立了就應對嚴重虧損而設的兩個超額賠款再保險合約的優化模型，來釐定最佳的保費和自留額。其中一個模型考慮了分出公司和再保險公司兩者各自的預期效益的總和。另外的一個模型則考慮了兩者的預期效益的積數。透過例子，我們找到了保費和超額虧損再保險自留額的最佳解決方案。最後，我們進行了敏感度分析。研究結果顯示、若增加追討損失的平均值和波動，則最佳自留額和保費也會隨之而增加。就第一個目標函數而言，若增加風險規避係數、或減少這個係數，則最佳自留額會隨之而減少，但最佳保費卻會隨之而增加，反之亦然。唯就第二個目標函數而言，風險規避係數的改變，對最佳解決方案是沒有影響的。

• – 有關的兩個夥伴之效用性：分出公司和再保險公司或有不同的份量和重要性。我們沒有探討兩者的相對重要性。

• – 我們以數值方法為核心的類比模仿研究法、使我們局限於機率分配和一般而言建基於投資報酬率對數常態模型之隨機過程的使用。我們或許需要調節研究法。以能概括其它回報收益，包括透過跳躍過程而可能達至之沖擊模型。

– 有關的兩個夥伴之效用性：分出公司和再保險公司或有不同的份量和重要性。我們沒有探討兩者的相對重要性。

– 我們以數值方法為核心的類比模仿研究法、使我們局限於機率分配和一般而言建基於投資報酬率對數常態模型之隨機過程的使用。我們或許需要調節研究法。以能概括其它回報收益，包括透過跳躍過程而可能達至之沖擊模型。

在過去20年裡，再保險公司在控制極嚴重災難性的損失上曾扮演重要的角色。例如、再保險公司 (以及特殊的損失分擔安排) 為了2001年9月11日的災難事件而支付多至保險損失的三分之二的費用。而且，重大的災難性事件使政府及作為最後出路再保險人的調控者得扮演更重要的角色。我們希望研究結果能為再保險合約兩對手提供指導，以平衡雙方的需要。

全球差不多每個政府都參與保險和再保險的管理工作，有部份更加本身就是再保險人。研究結果為他們的管理工作提供了指導。

我們相信本學術論文、提供了平衡分出保險公司和再保險公司效用性的模型，就此而言，本論文在相關的領域上作出了全新和獨創性的貢獻。

The restructuring of shipping and shipbuilding companies in the midst of rapidly shrinking global shipping demand has become a prominent issue in Korea. In shipping finance, loan syndication featuring many creditors surges as the preferred option. However, increasing the numbers of creditors in the syndicate results in two opposite effects. First is the beneficial effect from their enhanced monitoring power. On the other hand, there is the adverse effect resulting from increased difficulty in coordination when syndicate members increase, particularly in bankruptcy. Our aim of this paper is to analyze the role of finance in the shipping and shipbuilder markets, and determine the theoretical optimal number of creditors for the shipping finance syndicate based on Bolton and Scharfstein (1996). The two issues above result from moral hazard and non-verifiability: coordination among many creditors for collection of bonds in case of default, and the enhancement of monitoring private benefit exploitation by the ship-owner during default. Considering the two conflicting forces result from an increase in creditor membership, we draw conclusions on determining the optimal number of creditors by considering trade-offs between these two factors: More creditors are preferred when the monitoring effect dominates. Otherwise, less creditors are preferred.

This paper attempts to develop a simple, static model of tax administration that is capable of explaining the widespread collusive petty tax administration corruption observed in developing countries.

This paper utilizes a positivist research framework and adopts a theoretical method of analysis, although secondary data will also be mentioned to support theoretical arguments whenever it is appropriate to do so.

A high rate of collusive tax corruption is inevitable in developing countries.

The model is static and needs to be extended into a dynamic model.

Traditional enforcement tools such as higher audits or a higher penalty regime against tax evasion do not work. Tax simplification can lessen the incidence of tax corruption.

Fighting tax corruption requires significant changes in the attitudes of taxpayers and tax auditors.

This paper combines the literature on Kantian economics and tax compliance in an innovative fashion.

In 1951, Kenneth Arrow proved that it is not possible to have a group decision-making procedure that satisfies reasonable requirements like fairness. From the theoretical viewpoint, this is a great result – well-deserving the Nobel Prize that was awarded to Professor Arrow. However, from the practical viewpoint, the question remains – so how should we make group decisions? A usual way to solve this problem is to provide some reasonable heuristic ideas, but the problem is that different seemingly reasonable idea often lead to different group decision – this is known, e.g. for different voting schemes.

In this paper we analyze this problem from the viewpoint of decision theory, the basic theory underlying all our activities – including economic ones.

We show how from the first-principles decision theory, we can extract explicit recommendations for group decision making.

Most of the resulting recommendations have been proposed earlier. The main novelty of this paper is that it provides a unified coherent narrative that leads from the fundamental first principles to practical recommendations.

Project-driven supply chain risks pose a significant threat to the success of complex development projects, in terms of achieving key performances such as quality, time and efficiency. The purpose of this paper is to adopt a supply chain quality perspective in order to explore and better understand the unique attributes of risks associated with project-driven supply chains for continuously improving the quality of both processes and products.

Theoretically grounded in the framework of Bayesian Belief Networks and Game theory, this paper develops a structured process for assessing and managing risks in project-driven supply chains. The application of the proposed approach is demonstrated through a simulation case study conducted on the development project of Boeing 787 aircraft.

The conflicting incentives amongst stakeholders in a supply chain can jeopardise the success of a project and therefore, assessment of this category of risks classified as “Game theoretic risks” needs special consideration. Project-driven supply chain risks pose a significant threat to the success of complex projects. The results of the study clearly revealed that without mitigating the game theoretic risks, the main objective of timely completion of the Boeing 787 project was not materialised. Further, the lack of management expertise was the major factor contributing to the overall project costs including cost of quality.

The proposed process and analyses present a significant and original insight in terms of capturing the key determinants of both product and service quality such as product performance, convenience and reliability of service, timeliness, ease of maintenance, flexibility, and customer satisfaction and comfort. Propositions are developed for ascertaining the significance of information sharing in a project-driven supply chain, and a fair sharing partnership is introduced to help supply chain managers in managing game theoretic risks in order to achieve the goals of quality, time and efficiency.

The purpose of this paper is to review the utilization of game theory in the entrepreneurship literature. Game theory can potentially be employed to assess strategies incentivizing productive entrepreneurial activities and subsequent economic development. Therefore, the author reviews entrepreneurship articles and explores the application of game-theoretic models and concepts in the literature.

First, the author provides an overview of the entrepreneurship ecosystem concept, highlighting key challenges in its study. The author also briefly highlights successful applications of game theory in the innovation literature. Second, the author systematically reviews and synthesizes entrepreneurship research employing game-theoretic models and concepts. The author's objective is to provide a state-of-the-art overview of the use of game theory in entrepreneurship.

Broadly, the author categorizes entrepreneurship-game theory articles into three groups based on their scope and purpose: entrepreneurial policy applications, inter-firm applications and entrepreneurship theory applications. Entrepreneurial policy applications include entrepreneurs and the government or policy as the main players in a game. Inter-firm applications encompass games between entrepreneurs and other private entities. Entrepreneurship theory applications include articles that utilize game theory to advance the author's understanding of entrepreneurial behavior and/or mechanisms in the market.

To the best of the author's knowledge, no previous paper has reviewed the use of game-theoretic approaches and models in entrepreneurship literature. This study addresses this research gap.

From the quantum game perspective, this paper aims to study a green product optimal pricing problem of the dual-channel supply chain under the cooperation of the retailer and manufacturer to reduce carbon emissions.

The decentralized and centralized decision-making optimal prices and profits are obtained by establishing the classical and quantum game models. Then the classical game and quantum game are compared.

When the quantum entanglement is greater than 0, the selling prices of the quantum model are higher than the classical model. Through theoretical research and numerical analysis results, centralized decision-making is more economical and efficient than decentralized decision-making. Publicity and education on carbon emission reduction for consumers will help consumers accept carbon emission reduction products with slightly higher prices. When the emission reduction increases too fast, the cost of emission reduction will form a significant burden and affect the profits of manufacturers and supply chain systems.

From the perspective of the quantum game, the author explores the optimal prices of green product and compares them with the classical game.