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1 – 10 of over 35000Zahid Iqbal, Shekar Shetty, Joseph Haley and Maliyakkal Jayakumar
Terminations of overfunded pension plans may strengthen a financially‐weak firm. When manager's interests are aligned with shareholder's, either through high levels of stock…
Abstract
Terminations of overfunded pension plans may strengthen a financially‐weak firm. When manager's interests are aligned with shareholder's, either through high levels of stock ownership, or through labor and takeover market discipline at low levels of ownership, termination strengthens the firm and the stock price should react positively. In contrast, managers at middle levels of ownership hold enough stock to be entrenched, but not enough to be aligned with shareholder interests. Terminations may then be for reasons other than strengthening a financially‐weak firm and may not generate a positive stock price reaction. We find that the financial incentives for terminations differ significantly between terminators and nonterminators at high and low levels of managerial ownership, but not at intermediate levels. Our stock return analysis indicates that terminations by high and low ownership firms are consistent with shareholder welfare. Concern has been expressed that terminations of defined benefit pension plans transfer wealth from plan participants to plan sponsors. Plan terminations can have a value‐maximizing motive when the reversions are used as a source of financing, thereby helping firms avoid bankruptcy and liquidation. The empirical evidence (e.g., Alderson and VanDerhei (1992), VanDerhei (1987), and Hsieh, Ferris, and Chen (1990)) showing favorable stock price reactions to terminations by financially‐weak firms are consistent with the value‐maximizing justification for plan terminations. Prior studies (e.g., Agrawal and Mandelker (1987), Kim and Sorensen (1986), Sicherman and Pettway (1987), Hill and Snell (1989), Benston (1985), Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988), Carter and Stover (1991) and Hermalin and Weisbach (1991)) have also documented that management's ownership interest in the firm has an important effect on the incentive to maximize firm value. This paper examines the effect of managerial ownership on financial termination. Specifically, we address whether or not financial motivation to terminate plans exists at all levels of managerial ownership. Our results suggest that the terminating firms, when compared to the nonterminating firms, are financially weak at high and low levels of managerial ownership. In contrast, there is no significant difference in financial weakness between the terminators and the nonterminators at the middle ownership levels. Also, stockholders reactions to terminations are higher at high and low levels of managerial ownership.
Nurleni Nurleni, Agus Bandang, Darmawati and Amiruddin
This study aims to analyze the effect of ownership structure that consists of managerial ownership and institutional ownership of the extensive of corporate social responsibility…
Abstract
Purpose
This study aims to analyze the effect of ownership structure that consists of managerial ownership and institutional ownership of the extensive of corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosure.
Design/methodology/approach
The population in this study is manufacturing companies listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange (BEI), as the manufacturing companies are considered to have great potential on environmental damage (Mathews, 2000). The selected sample were the companies which meet certain criteria (purposive sampling) which published the complete annual financial statements from 2011 to 2015. This study used an analysis method using partial least square (WarpPLS) to assess the effect of the structure of ownership consists of managerial ownership and institutional ownership on the extent of the CSR disclosure.
Findings
The results showed that there is a direct effect of a negative and significant correlation between managerial ownership on CSR disclosure, and there is a direct effect of a positive and significant correlation between institutional ownership on CSR disclosure.
Originality/value
Originality of this paper shows PLS (WarpPLS) that applied to determine the effect between variables managerial and institutional ownership on CSR disclosure. This research is collected data financial statements and annual reports of manufacturing companies obtained from the Indonesia Capital Market Reference Center (PRPM), which is located in the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX), which there has not been research by the methods and the same location.
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Yuan George Shan, Indrit Troshani, Jimin Wang and Lu Zhang
This study investigates the convergence-of-interest and entrenchment effects on the relationship between managerial ownership and financial distress using evidence from the…
Abstract
Purpose
This study investigates the convergence-of-interest and entrenchment effects on the relationship between managerial ownership and financial distress using evidence from the Chinese stock market. It also analyzes whether the relationship is mediated by research and development (R&D) investment.
Design/methodology/approach
Using a dataset consisting of 19,059 firm-year observations of Chinese listed companies in the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges between 2010 and 2020, this study employs both piecewise and curvilinear models.
Findings
The results indicate that managerial ownership has a negative association with firm financial distress in both the low (below 12%) and high (above 18%) convergence-of-interest regions of managerial ownership, suggesting that managerial ownership in this region may contribute to improve firm financial status. Meanwhile, managerial ownership has a positive association with firm financial distress in the entrenchment region (12–18%), implying that managerial ownership in the entrenchment region may contribute to impair firm financial status. Furthermore, the results show that R&D investment mediates the association between managerial ownership and financial distress.
Originality/value
This study is the first to provide evidence of a nonlinear relationship between managerial ownership and financial distress, and identify the entrenchment region in the Chinese setting.
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Pattanaporn Chatjuthamard, Ploypailin Kijkasiwat, Pornsit Jiraporn and Ali Uyar
Capitalizing on a unique measure of takeover susceptibility principally based on the staggered implementation of state laws, this study aims to explore the takeover market’s…
Abstract
Purpose
Capitalizing on a unique measure of takeover susceptibility principally based on the staggered implementation of state laws, this study aims to explore the takeover market’s effect on managerial ownership. The market for corporate control, often known as the takeover market, is an important external governance mechanism, whereas managerial ownership is a vital internal governance instrument. Managerial ownership brings into convergence the interests of shareholders and managers. The originality of this study arises from the usage of state-level anti-takeover legislations as a measure which is beyond the control of firms and plausibly exogenous to firm-specific characteristics.
Design/methodology/approach
In addition to the standard regression analysis, this study also executes a variety of robustness checks to minimize endogeneity, i.e. propensity score matching, entropy balancing, instrumental–variable analysis, Lewbel’s (2012) heteroscedastic identification and Oster’s (2019) testing for coefficient stability.
Findings
Based on a large sample of US firms, the results show that more hostile takeover threats bring about significantly lower managerial ownership. The results reinforce the prediction of the substitution hypothesis. The disciplinary function of the takeover market reduces agency conflict to the point where managerial ownership is less necessary as a governance mechanism. Specifically, a rise in takeover susceptibility by one standard deviation diminishes managerial ownership by 7.22%.
Originality/value
`To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is the first to shed light on the impact of the takeover market on managerial ownership using a novel measure mainly based on the staggered adoption of state laws, which are plausibly exogenous to individual firms’ characteristics. Consequently, unlike prior research, this study is more likely to indicate a causal effect, rather than merely a correlation.
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Saad Faysal, Mahdi Salehi and Mahdi Moradi
The purpose of this study is to cover the ownership structure as (institutional ownership and managerial ownership) influencing the cost of equity in emerging markets.
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this study is to cover the ownership structure as (institutional ownership and managerial ownership) influencing the cost of equity in emerging markets.
Design/methodology/approach
The authors applied the regression model with the fixed-effect model in the data. Data collected from listed companies in the Iraq-Iran Stock Exchange during 2012-2017.
Findings
The authors found a significant positive associated between institutional ownership and the cost of equity in the Iranian and Iraqi contexts. The results also reveal a significant negative associated between managerial ownership with the cost of equity in the Iranian and Iraqi contexts. This means that when managerial ownership is increased, the cost of equity will be reduced. These results support the role of inside ownership to enhance fixed performance by reducing the cost of equity. So, managerial ownership can be a substitute for all shareholders. Moreover, the results indicate a similarity in the impact of the ownership structure on the cost of equity in the Iraqi and Iranian context, this means the similar elements among west Asian countries.
Research limitations/implications
Financial companies such as banks and investment companies were not listed due to the difference in the nature of their work with the other sectors in the Iranian and Iraqi stock exchanges. Moreover, the authors are heavily constrained as listed companies must continue during the study period to calculate the cost of equity. Therefore, the results are difficult to generalize widely.
Practical implications
This international study will enable investors in, as well as local and international investors to take the appropriate investment decision-making in the capital markets in these countries (Iraq and Iran). Moreover, it contributes significantly to helping corporate governance bloggers in Iraq and Iran understand the role of the ownership structure in corporate governance.
Originality/value
This is the first study of the interaction between institutional ownership, managerial ownership with the cost of equity in Iraq, the study will help complete the knowledge gap with developed markets. The results are important in future research because the authors believe that it is very important for the future to look at better for percentage levels of institutional and managerial ownership in the company ownership. Although the contribution is limited, it will provide a useful guide for more papers in other west Asian countries.
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Ahmed Hassanein, Mahmoud Marzouk and Mohsen Ebied A.Y. Azzam
This paper tests for a positive, a negative and a nonlinear relationship between the share of ownership controlled by firm managers and the management decision to invest in…
Abstract
Purpose
This paper tests for a positive, a negative and a nonlinear relationship between the share of ownership controlled by firm managers and the management decision to invest in research and development (R&D). Likewise, it examines whether or not institutional investors induce corporate managers with ownership stakes to spend on R&D.
Design/methodology/approach
It examines a sample of the United Kingdom (UK) Financial Times Stock Exchange (FTSE) all-shares firms over a longitudinal period from 2009 to 2018. The R&D is measured by the natural logarithm of a firm's R&D spending and a firm's R&D expenditure scaled by its total assets at the end of the year. The results are estimated using the year/industry fixed effects as well as the firm fixed effects.
Findings
The results show a positive effect on R&D spending at a lower level of managerial ownership, and a negative impact at a higher managerial ownership level. The findings jointly suggest an inverse U-shaped nonlinear relationship between ownership by firm managers and management decisions on R&D spending. The results also demonstrate that the effect of institutional investors' ownership on R&D spending decisions is observable only at a lower level of managerial ownership and disappears at a higher level.
Practical implications
The results shed the light on the role of managerial ownership in promoting firm innovation. They suggest an optimal level of equity ownership by corporate managers that maximizes R&D spending, implying that firms can effectively manage their R&D spending by restructuring their managerial ownership to maintain an appropriate level of managerial ownership to align managerial interests with shareholder interests by either increasing it to the optimal level or decreasing it when it becomes above this level. The findings also support the limited degree of monitoring and the long-term perspective offered by institutional investors in the UK
Originality/value
The study provides new evidence on the non-monotonic effect of the share of ownership controlled by firm managers on R&D spending decisions. It also expands the growing body of literature and contributes to the debate on the effectiveness of institutional investors in the UK.
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The main purpose of the study is to examine the influence of family directors on the firm performance of public listed companies (PLCs) in Malaysia. This study provides empirical…
Abstract
Purpose
The main purpose of the study is to examine the influence of family directors on the firm performance of public listed companies (PLCs) in Malaysia. This study provides empirical evidence on the agency problems between controlling shareholders and minority interests in the concentrated ownership setting.
Design/methodology/approach
Samples of the study are 112 PLCs in year 2006. Two measures of firm performance are used: return on assets (ROA) and Tobin’s Q. Managerial ownership refers to the percentage shareholdings of executive directors with direct and indirect holdings. It was further categorized into family ownership and non-family ownership.
Findings
In relation to ROA, managerial ownership is found positively significant. The results also show that the positive relationship between managerial ownership is contributed by the managerial-non-family ownership. In relation to Tobin’s Q, the results show a U-shape with turning point at 31.38% for managerial ownership and 28.29% for the managerial-family ownership. The results found significant and positive relationships between managerial ownership and both measures of firm performance which indicates that managerial ownership and family ownership yield greater efficiency.
Research implications
The study highlights the effects of corporate governance on ROA and Tobin’s Q are somewhat different. It provides some evidence on the need to use appropriate measure of firm performance. The significant relationship supports the argument of Chami (1999), Fama and Jensen (1983), and DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1985) and empirical evidence of Lee (2004) that family ownership enhances monitoring activities.
Originality/value
Differentiating the types of managerial ownership into family and non-family categories enriches our knowledge about who actually contributes to the improved performance.
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Zukaa Mardnly, Zinab Badran and Sulaiman Mouselli
The purpose of this study is to examine the individual and combined effect of managerial ownership and external audit quality, as two control mechanisms, on earnings management.
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this study is to examine the individual and combined effect of managerial ownership and external audit quality, as two control mechanisms, on earnings management.
Design/methodology/approach
This study applies ordinary least squares estimates on fixed-time effects panel regression model to test the impact of the investigated variables on earnings management for the whole population of banks and insurance companies listed at Damascus Securities Exchange (DSE) during the period from 2011 to 2018.
Findings
The empirical evidence suggests a negative non-linear relationship between managerial ownership (as proxied by board of directors’ ownership) on earnings management. However, neither audit quality nor the simultaneous effect of the managerial ownership and audit quality (Big 4) affects earnings management.
Research limitations/implications
DSE is dominated by the financial sector and the number of observations is constrained by the recent establishment of DSE and the small number of firms listed at DSE. In addition, the non-availability of data on executive directors’ and foreign ownerships restrict our ability to uncover the impact of different dimensions of ownership structure on earnings management.
Practical implications
First, it stimulates investors to purchase stocks in financial firms that enjoy both high managerial ownership, as they seem enjoying higher earnings quality. Second, the findings encourage external auditors to consider the ownership structure when choosing their clients as the financial statements’ quality is affected by this structure. Third, researchers may need to consider the role of managerial ownership when analyzing the determinants of earnings management.
Originality/value
It fills the gap in the literature, as it investigates the impact of both managerial ownership and audit quality on earnings management in a special conflict context and in an unexplored emerging market of DSE. It suggests that managerial ownership exerts a significant role in controlling earnings management practices when loose regulatory environment combines conflict conditions. However, external audit quality fails to counter earnings management practices when conditions are fierce.
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The extant literature reports mixed and inconclusive findings concerning the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and firm performance. To provide incremental…
Abstract
Purpose
The extant literature reports mixed and inconclusive findings concerning the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and firm performance. To provide incremental insight, this paper aims to investigate whether the bi-directional relationships among managerial ownership, board independence and firm performance are determined.
Design/methodology/approach
This paper uses a data set consisting of 9,302 firm-year observations of Australian listed companies during 2005-2015 and a three-stage least squares simultaneous equation model to test the bi-directional relationships.
Findings
The results indicate that both managerial ownership and board independence inversely affect firm performance and vice versa. In addition, board independence is negatively correlated with managerial ownership and vice versa.
Practical implications
The convergence-of-interests hypothesis can be achieved by manipulating managerial ownership through making contingent payments. Board independence, as a voluntary regime in Australia, can provide additional flexibility to corporate decision makers.
Originality/value
This study provides additional evidence by using the convergence-of-interests hypothesis vis-à-vis the entrenchment hypothesis to examine the relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance, and tests the association of board independence and firm performance using the explanation of agency theory vis-à-vis stewardship theory.
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Kate Jelinek and Pamela S. Stuerke
This paper aims to examine the impact of managerial equity ownership on return on assets as a measure of profitability and two financial statement‐based agency cost measures, i.e…
Abstract
Purpose
This paper aims to examine the impact of managerial equity ownership on return on assets as a measure of profitability and two financial statement‐based agency cost measures, i.e. asset utilization and an expense ratio, which proxy for management's efficiency in use of assets and perquisite consumption, respectively.
Design/methodology/approach
Multivariate tests are constructed to examine the nonlinear relation between managerial equity ownership and both profitability and agency costs, using interaction terms to capture the relation at various levels of managerial ownership.
Findings
The paper documents that managerial equity ownership is nonlinearly and positively associated with return on assets and asset utilization, and nonlinearly and negatively associated with the expense ratio, after controlling for firm size, leverage, corporate diversification, institutional ownership, research intensity, firm age, and executive stock options.
Research limitations/implications
The results imply that the ability of managerial equity ownership to reduce agency costs decreases as levels of ownership increase. Further, the results indicate that, in some industries, high levels of ownership lead to increased expense ratios, suggesting increased perquisite consumption. Finally, these results suggest that, above a certain level in some industries, managerial equity ownership only marginally encourages efficient asset utilization but does not significantly deter excessive spending.
Originality/value
The paper provides a link between research that demonstrates a linear relation between managerial equity ownership and financial‐statement based profitability and agency cost measures and research that finds a nonlinear relation between managerial equity ownership and Tobin's Q, a proxy for firm performance.
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