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Book part
Publication date: 13 October 2017

Anne Lafarre

Abstract

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The AGM in Europe
Type: Book
ISBN: 978-1-78743-533-9

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Article
Publication date: 17 December 2021

Oyindamola Abiola Ajayi and Tsietsi Mmutle

The purpose of this paper is to explore how the communication of corporate social responsibility (CSR) contributes towards a favourable corporate reputation. It explores…

Abstract

Purpose

The purpose of this paper is to explore how the communication of corporate social responsibility (CSR) contributes towards a favourable corporate reputation. It explores the communication strategies and channels organisations deemed reputable by stakeholders use to achieve an effective CSR communication.

Design/methodology/approach

To achieve this, a qualitative content analysis using the directed approach was conducted on the textual CSR communication materials of ten reputable organisations in South Africa based on the 2018 South Africa Reptrak survey.

Findings

Result showed that seven out of ten organisations use both self-serving and society-serving motive in their CSR communication, while the other 3 use only the society serving motive. The informing strategy was also more evident in the CSR communication materials than the interactive strategy. In terms of the communication channels, the study found that organisations mainly utilise controlled channels for CSR communication.

Originality/value

The literature reviewed and the findings of this study reveal a gap between the theory and practice of CSR communication. This drives the need for organisations to research and tailor CSR communication based on stakeholders' unique characteristics and preferences. The paper also contributes to improving the knowledge on the role different CSR communication strategies and channels play in CSR communication.

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Corporate Communications: An International Journal, vol. 26 no. 5
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 1356-3289

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Article
Publication date: 26 May 2021

Li Gao, Jinnan Song, Jiajuan Liang and Jianxiao Guo

This paper aims to explore the influence of founder shareholders’ resources on the allocation of control rights from the perspective of incomplete contract theory and…

Abstract

Purpose

This paper aims to explore the influence of founder shareholders’ resources on the allocation of control rights from the perspective of incomplete contract theory and resource-based theory.

Design/methodology/approach

This paper analyzes newspaper materials with NVivo11on a case of battle for corporate control in Chinese top-listed company-Vanke Group.

Findings

The research shows that human capital is the key resource and the holding proportion of financial resources directly affects the allocation of control rights. At the same time, social capital is unstable and easily broken. At last, institutional environment also affects the degree between the relationship of founder shareholders’ resources and the allocation of control rights. The influence of founder-shareholder resources on the allocation of control rights follows the path of “crisis – founder-shareholder’s resources – founder’s ability - allocation of control rights.”

Research limitations/implications

This study only selects the financial capital, human capital and social capital of Shi Wang, the founder of Vanke, as the analysis object. The study can expand the types of founder shareholder resources to verify and enrich the conclusions.

Originality/value

The current theoretical research in the literature focuses on the necessity of equity and shareholder’s resources versus the control rights. Some key factors and mechanism on the relationship have not been fully clarified. The results of this paper not only extend the combination research of social network and corporate governance, but also provide enterprise founders with references for making reasonable decisions during control battle.

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Chinese Management Studies, vol. ahead-of-print no. ahead-of-print
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 1750-614X

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Article
Publication date: 17 May 2021

Eswaran Velayutham and Vijayakumaran Ratnam

This paper aims to examine the relationship between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and shareholder wealth arising from announcement returns of security issuance…

Abstract

Purpose

This paper aims to examine the relationship between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and shareholder wealth arising from announcement returns of security issuance from a frontier market. It also explores the role of business group affiliation (BGA) on this relationship.

Design/methodology/approach

The study uses short-term scenarios to examine the link between CSR and shareholder wealth using the event study methodology which helps us mitigate the reverse causality problems related to studies of the relationship between CSR and firm value. Abnormal returns surrounding the security issue announcements were generated using the market model.

Findings

This paper finds that security issuers with high CSR scores are associated with higher shareholder value. However, this paper finds that CSR activities of security issuers with BGA are value-destroying which is consistent with the agency perspective of CSR.

Research limitations/implications

This study is limited to only one nascent market, namely the Colombo Stock Exchange.

Originality/value

This study documents that CSR and BGA are important determinants, among others, of stock price reactions to security offerings in emerging markets.

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Social Responsibility Journal, vol. ahead-of-print no. ahead-of-print
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 1747-1117

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Article
Publication date: 28 May 2021

Xi Zhong, He Wan and Qiuping Peng

The authors analyze the effects of controlling shareholders' stock pledging on firms' strategic change behavior, and investigate how the balance of power between…

Abstract

Purpose

The authors analyze the effects of controlling shareholders' stock pledging on firms' strategic change behavior, and investigate how the balance of power between shareholders and analyst coverage moderates those effects.

Design/methodology/approach

Employing fixed effects models, the authors test hypotheses based on Chinese listed company data from 2011 to 2017.

Findings

Controlling shareholders' stock pledges has a negative effect on strategic change. As the balance of power among shareholders and/or analyst coverage increases, it mitigates the effect of controlling shareholder stock pledges on strategic change. In particular, the balance of power between shareholders and analyst coverage weakened the relationship between controlling shareholder stock pledges and strategic change. Lastly, after distinguishing family from nonfamily firms, the authors discovered that these findings only held for family firms.

Originality/value

This study makes important contributions to strategic change, stock pledge and family firm literature, and also provides guidance on firms' strategic change practices.

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Baltic Journal of Management, vol. ahead-of-print no. ahead-of-print
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 1746-5265

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Article
Publication date: 29 November 2011

David B.H. Martin and Keir D. Gumbs

The purpose of this paper is to consider the consequences of the July 22, 2011 decision of the US Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit in the case of Business Roundtable

Abstract

Purpose

The purpose of this paper is to consider the consequences of the July 22, 2011 decision of the US Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit in the case of Business Roundtable and Chamber of Commerce v. Securities and Exchange Commission (BRT v. SEC) on current and future SEC rulemakings. The case involved the vacating of the SEC's shareholder proxy access rule.

Design/methodology/approach

The paper reviews the court's findings regarding the SEC's rulemaking procedures and analyzes how those findings will inform the SEC's future actions to adopt rules in the proxy access area, as well as future SEC rulemaking in other areas.

Findings

The paper finds that the SEC is unlikely, at this time, to undertake future rulemaking involving shareholder access to the proxy statement. At the same time, the SEC may well lift the stay that it voluntarily placed on related amendments to its shareholder proposal rule. These amendments would permit shareholder proposals to companies regarding access to the proxy statement.

Practical implications

Companies should consider how they will respond to shareholder proposals to adopt proxy access regimes. Shareholders should consider what kinds of proposals they may wish to submit to companies regarding proxy access.

Originality/value

This paper should be of interest to public companies, including investment companies, and shareholders of such companies, and their advisers, in terms of corporate governance mechanisms and engagement with shareholder concerns and inputs.

Details

Journal of Investment Compliance, vol. 12 no. 4
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 1528-5812

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Article
Publication date: 4 July 2016

John Newell, Arthur McGivern and David Roberts

To explain SEC Division of Corporation Finance Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14H (SLB 14H), which provides interpretive advice on how the Staff will treat shareholder proposals…

Abstract

Purpose

To explain SEC Division of Corporation Finance Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14H (SLB 14H), which provides interpretive advice on how the Staff will treat shareholder proposals under the “directly conflicts” and “ordinary business” exclusions under Rule 14a-8.

Design/methodology/approach

Explains Rule 14-8 concerning the inclusion of shareholder proposals in a company’s proxy materials, Rule 14a-8(i)(9) on substantive bases for exclusion of shareholder proposals, guidance from SLB 14H on shareholder proposals that do and do not directly conflict with company proposals, Staff guidance prior to SLB 14H, the “ordinary business” exclusion under Rule 14a-8(i)(7), and how SEC staff guidance differs from the majority opinion in Trinity Wall Street v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. on the ordinary business exclusion.

Findings

The SEC Staff’s new standard for conflicting proposals is likely to make it more difficult for companies to exclude a shareholder proposal that is different from a management proposal if the two proposals are not “mutually exclusive”. Staff guidance also states that companies may not exclude proposals focusing on a significant policy issue under the ordinary business exclusion if “the proposals would transcend the day-to-day business matters and raise policy issues so significant that it would be appropriate for a shareholder vote”.

Originality/value

Expert guidance from experienced securities and financial services lawyers.

Details

Journal of Investment Compliance, vol. 17 no. 2
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 1528-5812

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Article
Publication date: 2 January 2009

Michael E. Raynor

Many investors view maximizing shareholder wealth as the only obvious and defensible, corporate objective function. But to contradict this view, the paper aims to consider

Abstract

Purpose

Many investors view maximizing shareholder wealth as the only obvious and defensible, corporate objective function. But to contradict this view, the paper aims to consider the shortcomings of the “shareholder first” view and offer an alternative.

Design/methodology/approach

To make strategic tradeoffs effectively the whole organization needs a clear sense of what it is trying to achieve, and how choosing between specified alternatives serves its highest goal. Organizations need a “best metric” for the corporate strategy. The paper considers what ultimate end should corporations – that is, the managers who run them – refer to when making these difficult and sometimes painful tradeoffs?

Findings

The widely held shareholder‐value view holds that every choice should be made with an eye to creating as much financial wealth as possible for the providers of equity capital. But none of the familiar justifications for this view stand up to scrutiny. It is not true that: shareholders are owners; shareholders bear the most risk; maximizing shareholder value is a clear goal; and maximizing shareholder value is a legal requirement.

Practical implications

The corporation‐first view is a better alternative principle. It is that the ultimate purpose of the corporation is the survival of corporation itself. The corporation should not seek to maximize the interests of shareholders, or employees, or suppliers, or the environment, or anyone or anything else. The Costco model is examined.

Originality/value

This paper provokes some serious soul‐searching about the largely unquestioned primacy of shareholder interests as the objective function of the corporation and makes the case for a better alternative.

Details

Strategy & Leadership, vol. 37 no. 1
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 1087-8572

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Article
Publication date: 19 April 2011

Aiwu Zhao and Alexander J. Brehm

The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether cumulative voting can help ease the conflicts between board of directors and minority shareholders.

Abstract

Purpose

The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether cumulative voting can help ease the conflicts between board of directors and minority shareholders.

Design/methodology/approach

The authors use voting result of shareholder proposals as an indicator of the level of conflicts between board and minority shareholders. OLS regression and non‐parametric Kruskal‐Wallis tests have been applied in the analysis.

Findings

It was found that cumulative voting can help ease the conflicts between board of directors and minority shareholders. Also, the tension between board and minority shareholders is affected by both corporate governance factors and a company's stock performance.

Research limitations/implications

In general, the research result indicates that cumulative voting is still an effective mechanism that can lower investors' costs on monitoring boards of directors.

Practical implications

Considering the huge amount of resources used in shareholder campaigns, the research result indicates that cumulative voting can be an efficient choice to alleviate the confrontation between dissenting shareholders and board of directors.

Social implications

With the change of minority shareholder structure, it is necessary to examine whether the corporate world needs to reconsider the adoption of cumulative voting.

Originality/value

The authors use a novel proxy, voting results of investor proposals, to measure the conflicts between board of directors and minority shareholders. This is also one of the few papers focusing on the monitoring cost side of the agency cost problem in corporate governance literature.

Details

Managerial Finance, vol. 37 no. 5
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 0307-4358

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Article
Publication date: 29 April 2021

Rim Boussaada

This study aims to investigate how multiple large shareholders individually and interactively influence Middle East and North Africa (MENA) bank stability.

Abstract

Purpose

This study aims to investigate how multiple large shareholders individually and interactively influence Middle East and North Africa (MENA) bank stability.

Design/methodology/approach

The empirical framework is based on a generalized dynamic two-step system and utilizes the method of moments estimation to analyze a panel dataset of 532 bank-year observations over the 2004–2017 period.

Findings

The estimation results show that large shareholders are crucial in explaining the differences in bank stability among MENA banks. Specifically, the first- and second-largest shareholders exacerbate bank instability. However, we found that the third-largest shareholder enhances bank stability. Additionally, the coalition between the two largest shareholders increases the moral hazard problem in MENA banks and significantly decreases stability. Meanwhile, the interaction between the three largest shareholders is associated with a control contestability problem, which impels better bank stability. The results support the dispersion effect of multiple large shareholders in MENA countries.

Originality/value

The role of large shareholders in corporate governance is widely recognized. However, very little is known about the role and the real impact that multiple large shareholders may have on the banking sector. To the best of the authors' knowledge, this work is the first to analyze the relationship between multiple large shareholders and bank stability in the MENA region.

Details

Managerial Finance, vol. ahead-of-print no. ahead-of-print
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 0307-4358

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