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It is widely accepted among critical human–animal scholars that an absolute ontological distinction between humans and animals, the human–animal dualism, is an ideological construction. However, even some of the most radical animalists make use of a softer version of it when they explain animal exploitation and domination in capitalism. By criticizing the reintroduction of the human–animal dualism through the back door, I reopen the terrain for a historical–materialist explanation of bourgeois animal exploitation and domination that does not conceptualize them as a matter of species in the first place. Rather, with reference and in analogy to ecosocialist arguments on the greenhouse effect, it is demonstrated that a specific faction of capital – animal capital – which uses animals and animal products as means of production, is the root cause, key agent, and main profiteer of animal exploitation and domination in the current mode of production. Thus, the reworked concept of animal capital presented here differs from the original, postoperaist notion introduced by Nicole Shukin since it is based on a classic sociorelational and value theoretical understanding of capitalism. According to this approach, animals are integrated socioeconomically into the capitalist class society via a relation of superexploitation to capital, which can be called the capital–animal relation.

In recent decades, our knowledge and perceptions of animals have changed considerably. An increasing number of scholars are interested in exploring animals and their roles in the context of tourism, hospitality and leisure. Recent studies have covered both practical and theoretical aspects of this topic, sometimes including considerations of animal ethics. This chapter argues that it is time to reflect on the research ethics and methodological implications of such emerging perspectives. The chapter presents a literature review addressing the shift in tourism, hospitality and leisure studies from a human/animal dualism and anthropocentrism focus to a recognition and inclusion of animals' perspectives. It develops a set of guidelines for a methodology intended to underpin research about and involving animals, inspired by the ecofeminist care tradition and elaborated on in light of the reviewed literature and the author's personal experience. Three main approaches are identified: fictional, multispecies ethnography, and multispecies technology-based approaches.

The current study sheds light on non-human object agency by drawing illustrative examples from a case of horse/horsemeat, and thereby captures the ways in which living and non-living animal entities have shifting effects and/or intentions in relation to human entities within heterogeneous networks of cultural resources and practices.

Leaning on the post-human approach, the case of horse/horsemeat provides an illustrative empirical entry point into exploring how by looking through the lenses of object agency one can deconstruct the prevailing anthropomorphism-based dualistic views of living and non-living domestic animals as subjects or objects.

The paper argues that by contemplating both the living horse and non-living horsemeat as ontologically shifting and co-constructive entities in relation to human subjects, we are able to elaborate the contradictions and convergences of object agency that appear in living and/or non-living co-consuming units.

The study showcases important aspects of animal welfare, addressing the effects of shifting from a human-centred perspective to a post-human view on equality between various kinds of entities.

This paper contributes to the discussions of non-human object agency, addressing the issue from the perspective of an animal entity, which enables participating in deconstructing dualisms such as subject and object as well as living and non-living. In particular, it highlights how in the case of an animal entity, agency may emerge in terms of effects and (some capacity of) intentions both within living and non-living entities.

This chapter focuses on ecofeminism that primarily refers to feminist theory and activism informed by ecology. Ecofeminism is concerned with real connections between humans and Nature, as also by the domination of Nature by man and, specifically, by women's subservience to men. The foundational ecofeminist assumption is that environmental issues are basically feminist issues, and vice versa. It believes that ecofeminism, best understood and operationalized, can restore Mother Nature (endangered by industrial extraction and exploitation) and reassure rights to animals (deanimalized and threatened by factory farming). Although ecofeminism is a diverse movement, ecofeminist theorists share the presupposition that social transformation is necessary for ecological survival, that intellectual transformation of dominant modes of thought must accompany social transformation, that Nature teaches and reveals nondualistic, nonhierarchical systems of relations that are models for social transformation of values, and that human and cultural diversity are values in social transformation; some of these values and movements even influenced the world via the UN. Accordingly, this chapter highlights major positive contributions of ecofeminism.

Hayek favored both classical hermeneutics and science. His scientific reasoning shows the logical necessity of methodological dualism. Bruce Caldwell and Viktor Vanberg oppose hermeneutics and methodological dualism in favor of science. Their arguments depend on inappropriate interpretations of the doctrine of methodological dualism and an impoverished understanding of hermeneutics that fails to distinguish classical hermeneutics from universal hermeneutics. Hayek showed that “scientific” and “humanistic” approaches to social science can and should be compatible and complementary. Opposing (classical) hermeneutics in favor of science may cause a loss of knowledge by tending to deprive “scientific” social science of insights arising from more “humanistic” traditions.

In much of philosophy and social theory since classical antiquity, human belief and reason have been placed in the driving seat of individual action. In particular, social theory has often taken it for granted, or even by definition, that action is motivated by reasons based on beliefs. In contrast, a minority has criticized the adoption of this ‘folk psychology’ that explains human action wholly in such ‘mind first’ terms. Critics point out that such explanations are a mere gloss on a much more complex neurophysiological reality. These dualistic and ‘mind-first’ explanations of human behavior are unable to explain adequately such phenomena as sleep, memory, learning, mental illness, or the effects of chemicals or drugs on our perceptions or actions (Bunge, 1980; Churchland, 1984, 1989; Churchland, 1986; Rosenberg, 1995, 1998; Kilpinen, 2000).