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The logic of consequences and the logic of appropriateness have long been central to understanding behavior in organizations. However, scholarly work on the logic of appropriateness has consisted mostly of conceptual clarification and ex post explanation of observed behavior. In an effort to facilitate the study of the logic of appropriateness through experimental methods, this paper introduces an experimental paradigm that allows for the manipulation of decision logic as an independent variable. Using this paradigm, 710 participants played four iconic behavioral games in which profitability and ethics are both at play and, sometimes, at odds: Prisoners’ Dilemma, Dictator Game, Ultimatum Game, and Trust Game. The manipulation generated behavioral data, as well as qualitative data about participants’ considerations while deciding according to each logic. The behavioral data show that, compared to participants employing a logic of consequences, participants employing a logic of appropriateness rejected more unfair offers in an Ultimatum Game and were more generous when reciprocating trusting behavior in a Trust Game. In all other cases, behavior between the two logics was not significantly different. An analysis of the qualitative data suggests that a logic of consequences increased participants’ focus on monetary concerns, whereas a logic of appropriateness increased participants’ focus on moral concerns. Taken together, these data provide new insights into when, how, and why the two logics result in behavioral and cognitive differences. The authors conclude by considering directions for future research that they see as particularly amenable to study using the experimental manipulation presented here.

This study aims to explore the effects of political information and anger on the public's cognitive processing and foreign policy preferences concerning third‐party interventions in ethnic conflict.

The study employs an experimental design, wherein the authors manipulate policy‐specific information by generating ad hoc political information related to ethnic conflict. The statistical methods of analysis are logistic regression and analysis of covariance.

The results demonstrate that both political information and anger have a significant impact on an individual's cognitive processing and policy preferences regarding ethnic conflict interventions. Specifically, political information increases one's proclivity to choose non‐military policy options, whereas anger instigates support for aggressive policies. Both factors result in faster decision making with lower amounts of information accessed. However, the interaction of political information and anger is not significant. The study also finds that policy‐specific information – rather than general political information – influences the public's policy preferences.

This study confronts and advances the debate over whether political information is significant in influencing the public's foreign policy preferences and, if so, whether such an effect is the product of general or domain‐specific information. It also addresses an under‐studied topic – the emotive repercussions of ethnic conflicts among potential third‐party interveners. In addition, it tackles the argument over whether political information immunizes people against (or sensitizes them to) the effects of anger on their cognitive processing and foreign policy preferences. The study also introduces a novel approach for examining political information through an experimental manipulation of policy‐specific information.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the influence of shared cognitive frames, in particular, that of institutional logics, on the deployment and use of performance measurement systems (PMSs) in the public sector.

Using novel priming techniques derived from behavioral and social psychology, three institutional logics – the public, market-managerial and professional logics – are differentially surfaced in three independent experimental groups. The influence of these primed institutional logics on performance measurement use preferences are then empirically assessed using appropriate analysis of variance techniques.

Contrary to theoretical predictions, the paper reveals logic congruence regarding some uses of PMSs in the public sector, and divergence regarding others. Individuals applying a public logic were more likely to propose performance measurement use for strategic planning or strategic alignment; while those applying a professional logic were more likely to propose performance measurement use for learning, compared to otherwise primed individuals.

Considering the sample size and the novelty of the priming tools, it is feasible that other potentially significant effects may have been missed.

The paper addresses a gap in literature regarding the influence of shared cognitive frames on performance measurement use in public sector organizations. The paper further presents priming techniques embedded within an experimental design as an appropriate method for the micro-level study of attitudes, preferences and judgments in the public sector.

Although scholars increasingly use institutional logics to explain macro-level phenomena, we still know little about the micro-level psychological mechanisms by which institutional logics shape individual action. In this paper, we propose that individuals internalize institutional logics as an associative network of schemas that shapes individual actions through a process we call institutional frame switching. Specifically, we conduct two novel experiments that demonstrate how one particularly important schema associated with institutional logics – the implicit theory – can drive individual action. This work further develops the psychological underpinnings of the institutional logics perspective by connecting macro-level cultural understandings with micro-level situational behavior.

Presents the thoughts on decision processes of Chester I. Barnard, one of the century’s greatest management theorists. Includes his classic article, “Mind in everyday affairs”; his unpublished book, “The Significance of Decisive Behaviour in Social Action”; his correspondence with Herbert Simon, and significant comments found in his personal papers.

This paper introduces a method by which researchers can assess the strength of their status manipulations in experimental research by comparing them against Monte Carlo simulated distributions that use aggregate Status Characteristics Theory (SCT) data.

This paper uses Monte Carlo methods to simulate the m and q parameter distributions and the proportion of stay (P(s)) score distributions for four commonly used status situations. It also presents findings from an experiment that highlight the processes by which researchers can utilize these simulated distributions in their assessment of novel status manipulations.

Findings indicate that implicitly relevant status manipulations have considerably more overlapping P(s) scores in the simulated distributions of high and low states of a status characteristic than explicitly relevant status manipulations. Findings also show that a novel status manipulation, the handedness manipulation, sufficiently creates high- and low-status differences in P(s) scores.

Future researchers can use these simulated distributions to plot the mean P(s) scores of each of their experimental conditions on the overlapping distribution for the corresponding status manipulation. Manipulations that produce scores that fall outside of the range of overlapping values are also likely to create status differences between conditions in other settings or populations.

We take Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT) seriously by rigorously estimating structural models using the full set of CPT parameters. Much of the literature only estimates a subset of CPT parameters, or more simply assumes CPT parameter values from prior studies. Our data are from laboratory experiments with undergraduate students and MBA students facing substantial real incentives and losses. We also estimate structural models from Expected Utility Theory (EUT), Dual Theory (DT), Rank-Dependent Utility (RDU), and Disappointment Aversion (DA) for comparison. Our major finding is that a majority of individuals in our sample locally asset integrate. That is, they see a loss frame for what it is, a frame, and behave as if they evaluate the net payment rather than the gross loss when one is presented to them. This finding is devastating to the direct application of CPT to these data for those subjects. Support for CPT is greater when losses are covered out of an earned endowment rather than house money, but RDU is still the best single characterization of individual and pooled choices. Defenders of the CPT model claim, correctly, that the CPT model exists “because the data says it should.” In other words, the CPT model was borne from a wide range of stylized facts culled from parts of the cognitive psychology literature. If one is to take the CPT model seriously and rigorously then it needs to do a much better job of explaining the data than we see here.

X = multiple interpretations

The present study extends recently‐acquired knowledge about the affective aspects of negotiations by examining the effects of defining negotiation outcomes in affective terms rather than numeric terms. Using a 2 x 2 experimental design, the researchers represented the negotiation outcomes in four different ways: happy faces, unhappy faces, positive numbers, and negative numbers. The results indicate that representing outcomes in affective terms leads to longer negotiation times and higher impasse rates. In addition, participants whose outcomes were represented as happy faces reported the highest levels of emotional involvement, the lowest levels of cooperation and trust, and most frequently experienced negative emotions. Emotional involvement and negative emotions also helped explain differences in negotiation time and individual outcomes over and above the effects of the experimental manipulations. The implications of these results for negotiation research are discussed.