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The premise of this discussion is that private equity players intend to create real options that maximize the value derived from potential movement in the worth of the underlying business platform. This intended maximization occurs when the current value of the exercise instrument equals the current value of the underlying asset (so the option is at the money). It is also clear that when the time horizons of different arrangements tend to be consistent (as tends to happen in private equity arrangements) the attraction will be for higher volatility. The actions often criticized in the media are readily understandable in this context. For example, private equity partnerships are criticized for “borrowing heavily to buy companies, breaking them up, and selling off the pieces at huge profits.” Even before exiting, the private equity players separate the acquisitions into business units and asset pools. This changes an option on a portfolio into a portfolio of options, and we know from option pricing theory that the resulting position is worth more than the starting point.

Private equity partnerships also have been criticized for putting acquisitions into debt to receive dividends. Upon acquisition of a new business platform (perhaps composed of multiple business units) the private equity firm has paid a substantial premium for an option on a portfolio. After separating it into multiple options on different business units, the private equity firm might understandably want to sell assets that do not need to be owned (but could be leased instead), thereby reducing their equity investment and bringing the options closer to the money. Then additional borrowing (and withdrawal of dividends) again brings the options closer to the money.

In order to illustrate the nuances of private equity as real options, we include discussion of three recent cases, each illustrating one of the common paths followed in private equity.

We investigate the impact of the creation of a new incentive structure for CEOs resulting from firms introducing equity-based compensation (EBC) as a means of paying top executives on policy decisions. Contrasting a firm’s stock and operating performance in the period the CEO is compensated with EBC (EBC period) and the period when EBC is not a component of the same executive’s pay (No EBC period) leads us to conclude that awarding stock options and restricted shares to executives is not associated with improved firm performance. However, firms initiate EBC after superior performance suggesting that CEOs are awarded compensation in this form as a reward for past performance. Firms have higher unsystematic and total risk levels in the EBC period suggesting EBC influences CEOs’ risk-taking behavior and reduces agency costs arising from managerial risk aversion. While there is no change in R&D expenses and cash ratios there is a decrease in capital expenditures in the EBC period, which is consistent with reduced overinvestment agency costs. Finally, leverage and payout ratios are similar in both periods implying that firms’ financing policy is not influenced by changes in CEOs’ compensation structure.

The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the potential contribution of the option applications to economic instability. To this end, the chapter briefly reviews the extant literature on financial option pricing and its applications to corporate assets and liabilities. It focuses on the direct relationship between the volatility of the underlying asset and the value of the option. It shows that the theory of option applications by its one-sided emphasis on the value-creating role of volatility promotes excessive risk-taking. Then the chapter discusses how the theory of option applications through the educational system encourages economic agents to make excessively risky decisions. Furthermore, the interactions among these risk-welcoming agents lead to an economic system which becomes increasingly risky. This risky economy, combined with the fact that more than half of the value of the option applications is constituted by the highly volatile value of the options embedded in such applications, translates into wide variations in real investments and the economy.

The purpose of this chapter is to outline new methodological developments in business valuation, with particular attention to how those developments are being used in litigation involving lost profits and the value of operating businesses. In addition to methodological developments, the chapter also includes a discussion of recent legal developments, particularly selected cases that affect the use and standards for business valuation techniques within litigation settings. Finally, the chapter includes a mathematical appendix.

The current and widespread view in option trading is that early exercise of call options is suboptimal unless there are large dividend payments on the underlying stock (e.g., Finucane, 1997; Hull, J. C. (2008). Options, futures and other derivatives (7th ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall; Poteshman & Serbin (2003)). Our study substantially refines this view by demonstrating that U.S. tax rules governing capital gain holding periods can create incentives for early exercise under certain conditions. Hence, this study adds to the factors that investors likely consider when making option exercise decisions. We further note that recent research documents early exercises in the absence of large dividends, and refers to these option exercises as “clearly irrational.” Predictions of early exercise from our tax-based model are consistent with the observed patterns of early exercise, suggesting that the criteria for denoting an option exercise as “irrational” should be refined to incorporate capital gain holding periods.

Investors often have much of their portfolios invested in equities that are exposed to interest rate risk. Hedging underlying exposures are not easy; whereas fixed income investors have duration to immunize bond portfolios from small fluctuations in interest rates. US equity duration estimates from dividend discount models result in long durations – often in excess of 50 years. Based on the UK data, we develop an alternative approach to generate equity duration as a by-product of asset pricing. Our analysis suggests that the equity premium puzzle may comprise an important element in reconciling this approach to equity duration, with traditional DDM alternatives.

The objectives of this study are to reveal the relationship between strategic options and competence building processes and to investigate the effect of environmental and firm-related factors on competence building. Competence building is defined as the qualitative change in firms' existing assets and capabilities; exercising strategic options may trigger this process. In this study an empirical model is developed and tested using structural equation modeling techniques. Many researchers have examined the relationship between strategic options and competence building theoretically, and this study aims to support these theoretical efforts with empirical research.

To determine what role overconfidence plays in the forced removal of CEOs internationally.

The study makes use of the Fortune Global 500 list.

We find that overconfident CEOs face significantly greater hazards of forced turnovers than their non-overconfident peers. Regardless of important differences in culture, law, and corporate governance across countries, overconfidence has a separate and distinct effect on CEO turnover. Overconfident CEOs appear to be at greater risk of dismissal regardless of where in the world they are located. We also discover that overconfident CEOs are disproportionately succeeded by other overconfident CEOs, regardless of whether they are forcibly removed or voluntarily leave office. Finally, we determine that the dismissal of overconfident CEOs is associated with improved market performance, but only limited enhancement in accounting returns.

This study is unique with its examination of overconfidence among global CEOs rather than being limited to U.S. chief executives. It also provides insight into how overconfidence is related to national cultures, legal systems and corporate governance mechanisms.

The level of financial development is a key factor influencing long-term economic growth. A high level of financial development allows for the effective diversification of risk and allocation of capital, which, in the long run, improves the growth prospects of an economy. Schumpeter (1911) was one of the first to highlight the importance of financial development as a determinant of economic growth. Recent empirical work supports this relationship (see Beck & Levine, 2002; Levine, 2004; Mishkin, 2007). For example, Levine (2004) summarizes the empirical evidence on financial development and economic growth and states that “the level of financial development is a good predictor of future rates of economic growth, capital accumulation and technological change” (Levine, 1997, p. 689).² Thus, stock and forward markets spread knowledge about market expectations of factors and changes that are important for economic development (Lachmann, 1978).