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A highly relevant issue for management is the measurement and appropriation of jointly created value. The existence of relationships is challenging for accounting and for the sharing and appropriation of values. Interdependences that characterise business relationships make value measurement and appropriation problematic. Yet, measuring value is important for orienting managers’ behaviours, and it affects the solutions implemented in business relationships on which value creation and appropriation depend. Values are created in relationships because resources are combined through relationships. Defining clear boundaries is important to produce measurements, but setting boundaries in interdependent relationships and networks is always problematic, and to some extent, arbitrary.

Business relationships have a number of soft and multiple effects that are difficult to measure and consequently difficult to divide among the involved business actors creating specific appropriation problems. An interesting development is underway as companies attempt to develop special tools for handling these problems.

With the help of financial engineering – and equipped with the modern technique of risk management – securitisation was supposed to identify and evaluate risks and parcel them out to informed parties who could bear them. In hindsight, we can see that this somewhat simplistic thesis – espoused by market participants as well as the academic promoters of modern techniques of risk management – seemed to promise a great deal more than it could ultimately deliver. At this juncture, however, the danger of regulatory over-reaction – which might be throwing the baby (financial innovation) out with the bath-water (overlooking/under-pricing of risk) – is very real and (in my view) calls for policy measures of this sort should be resisted firmly not only by market participants but also by regulators. This is not to say that regulation should be seen as immune from responsibility in the unfolding of the current credit crisis (quite the opposite would more likely be closer to the truth). As we shall see below (Section “Financial Crisis and Credit Ratings Debacle in SF”), the best risk-management practices – and related tools available before the crisis – provided enough ammunition to caution against the uncertainty surrounding risk assessment for some categories of SF products. However, the increasing complexity embedded in an increasing number of deals did provide genuine new challenges even to best risk-management practices.

This chapter investigates the effectiveness and the motivation behind the choice of different types of distress resolution strategies in the banking sector. This is a global study that analyzes key financial characteristics of distressed banks that were either acquired by other banks, divested assets, or were subject to government intervention, as well as the change in the financial profile of those distressed institutions from one year pre-deal to three years post-deal. The results show that governments intervene in the (relatively) best performers that only underperform in liquidity ratios, an indication of critical short-term flow problems. Distressed sellers, the underperformers of the three groups, enjoy much improved performance, in particular in cross-border deals. There is some evidence of foreign acquirers “cherry picking” the least distressed banks, though no significant differences in target performance remain post-deal between cross-border and domestic deals. These findings provide some useful guidance for policy makers globally and for future financial crises that impact the banking sector.

This paper examines the use of signaling theory in the M&A context. We review some of the most important developments in applications and extensions of this theory to the realm of M&A, indicating how this theory has been used to explain many M&A decisions and outcomes and has offered fresh perspectives in the mature literature on acquisitions. For example, we show how signaling theory provides a new view of the determinants of acquisition premiums, and it can contribute to an improved understanding of firms’ search for acquisition opportunities as well as target selection. We also provide a critique of existing research to identify gaps in understanding on the roles played by signals. For instance, we discuss how signals can create contracting problems during M&A negotiations, how the value of signals might vary across deals, and how bidder heterogeneity and bidders’ own signals matter for certain transactions. Finally, in addition to taking stock of this stream of research, we identify some of the most important areas that deserve research attention. Signaling theory can contribute to an improved understanding of acquisition performance outcomes, and signals need to be investigated along with other solutions to enhance M&A deal making and execution. We identify new research methods that would help to advance signaling theory in the acquisitions literature.

This chapter will describe and analyze the evolution of the structure, content, and other key parameters of business plans in international business plan competitions from the beginnings of such competitions in 1991 through the current time. In particular, the chapter will describe how these competitions have evolved through the current time, the standardization of the structure and content of the plans submitted to these competitions, and the changes that have occurred in their structure and content over time. Then it will explain why these changes have occurred. Specifically, that most of the changes that have occurred in these various areas is a direct or indirect result of pressures on the competitions from the major judges used in them – namely U.S. venture capitalists. Appendices A and B will describe the evaluation criteria used in two of the major competitions – Moot Corp/Venture Labs^® and the Georgia Bowl^® – in more detail, while Appendices C and D will provide information on the Term Sheets and decision-making processes used by such venture capitalists. Appendix E contains four Exhibits that provide additional insights into U.S. venture capitalists’ thought processes. The chapter will conclude with a discussion of the additional changes that are likely to happen in the future.

Purpose – The purpose of this chapter is to explore the voluntary corporate governance role played by credit rating agencies, closing the ‘trust at a distance’ gap which might otherwise hinder fundraising in debt capital markets.

Methodology/approach – The chapter draws on Giddens’ system trust theory and Foucauldian perspectives of knowledge/power to unpack trust production as a discursive process in financial markets. Foucauldian discourse analytic techniques are used to examine texts deployed by or about Standard & Poor's, the global credit rating agency, leading up to the 2007 credit crunch.

Findings – The texts analysed illustrate the influence of rating agencies in producing trust as well as mistrust in debt instruments.

Research limitations/implications – Rating agencies produce trust by aligning with state regulatory systems, simplifying complex debt instruments with ‘AAA’ and other well-known mnemonics, as well as offering apparent transparency and guarantees.

Practical implications – While influential, rating agencies can only produce trust by proxy. Their contribution to the actual protection of investments is minimal.

Social implications – The analysis highlights the flawed nature of trust relations in debt capital markets as rating agencies’ primary customers are the arrangers and issuers of debt rather than the investors who seek protection from risk.

Originality/value – The chapter sheds light on the deliberate nature of trust production in financial markets. Five trust/mistrust production practices are introduced – protecting, guaranteeing, aligning, making visible and simplifying. Strategic trust production is established as part of corporate governance ideology in financial markets.

As global economic systems become increasingly more complex and dynamic and the universal language of historical accounting is being profoundly altered, the theory and tools we use in neo-classical economics, traditional finance, and valuation are beginning to prove inadequate to the tasks being required of them. Hence, there is a need to consider new avenues of thought and new tools. In this conceptual chapter, I explore the use of real options “in” engineering systems design as a means to achieve more rigorous and insightful results in the design and valuation of economic systems, particularly that of the firm. In the process, I gain further insight into the causes and cures for systemic disturbances generated by the presence and selection of real options in economic systems.

This paper reports the results of a three-year-long research on business relationships, relying on qualitative data gathered through multiple-case study research of four focal companies operating in Australia. The industry settings are as follows: steel construction, vegetable oils trading, aluminum and steel can manufacture, and imaging solutions. The research analyzes two main aspects of relationships: structure and process. This paper deals with structure describing it by the most desired features of intercompany relationships for each focal company. The primary research data have been coded drawing on extant research into business relationships. The main outcome of this part of the research is a five construct model composed by trust, commitment, bonds, distance, and information sharing that accounts for all informants’ utterances about relationship structure.