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The object of this research is the reconstruction of the existing legal response by European Union states to the phenomenon of immigration. It seeks to analyse the process of conferral of protection.

One main dimension is selected and discussed: the case law of the national courts. The study focuses on the legal status of immigrants resulting from the intervention of these national courts.

The research shows that although the courts have conferred an increasing protection on immigrants, this has not challenged the fundamental principle of the sovereignty of the states to decide, according to their discretionary prerogatives, which immigrants are allowed to enter and stay in their territories. Notwithstanding the differences in the general constitutional and legal structures, the research also shows that the courts of the three countries considered – France, Germany and Spain – have progressively moved towards converging solutions in protecting immigrants.

The research contributes to a better understanding of the different legal orders analysed.

A longstanding question of American constitutionalism emerges out of the fact that constitutions demand fidelity. By virtue of what is the American Constitution binding? Zevit contends that many of the explanations of constitutional fidelity offered today fail to reconcile Americans’ submission to a Constitution written and ratified by generations of long ago with their claim (or aspiration) to be self-governing as a People today. Zevit introduces one type of explanation (the aptness explanation) that does not contain this flaw, and, drawing on an expansive definition of culture as a notion that encompasses the legal-political, offers the concepts of legal-political culture and baseline community as a framework for assessing the Constitution’s aptness while maintaining the People’s self-rule. She argues that constitutional aptness secures the foundations of constitutional legitimacy.

The author argues that the familiar distinction between interpretive and non-interpretive theories of constitutional interpretation obscures another important distinction: that between hermeneutically open and hermeneutically closed theories. Closed theories seek resolution to constitutional conflict by employing methods of interpretation that are intuitively persuasive. Open theories deny that such methods are always available, and seek resolution of conflict through a combination of legal, political, and social means. The author argues that closed theories have failed to live up to their implicit promise of self-justification, and examines the practice of constitutional interpretation in Canada and Australia to support this view.

Chapter 1 is entitled “Normative Scripture – Christian and American.” Here Pelikan considers the normative status of the two documents. Though their texts were “originally composed under very specific circumstances,” illumined by later scholarship, they have been “adopted by a community as its normative Great Code…occupying a position that in some profound sense stands beyond its own history” (pp. 4–5).That normative status is based on the assumption that it can be applied to any and all of the radically changed situations of later times, many of which the writers who originally framed it could not themselves conceivable have foreseen…. Therefore its words and phrases have for centuries called forth meticulous and sophisticated – and sometimes painfully convoluted – interpretation, as well as continual reinterpretation.…a massive corpus of authoritative, if often controversial, commentary. (p. 5)

This chapter examines changes in the kinds of American legal issues that have attracted international attention since the end of the Cold War and looks at the extent to which they have resulted in higher levels or new forms of foreign participation and interest in Supreme Court cases. Suggesting that these changes may have an impact, at least indirectly, on the Court in ways not adequately explored in the existing literature, it considers their possible effects on its decisions and the way that the justices consider their role within increasingly globalized legal networks.

The purpose of this paper is to assess the likelihood of successfully introducing constitutional changes to the definition of marriage in Germany.

The paper examines the values underpinning the German constitution through academic writing and case law.

Fundamental change is unlikely to occur in the foreseeable future, despite EU case law.

Incremental changes have taken place in all countries. These have begun in the workplace and spread to more fundamental areas such as challenges to marriage definitions in many countries. In a conservative country such as Germany the fact that even the highest constitutional court has come close to opening the door to change can be interpreted to mean the wait will not be too long.

The paper provides a comparative analysis that will highlight the types of arguments that have been successfully pushed through the courts as well as persuading political actors to enact positive legislation.

This study examines the way in which our judiciary approach the interpretation of fiscal legislation. It traces the roots of the historical approach (the strict and literal approach), its shortcomings and the modifications to such an approach when it leads to an absurdity. It then analyses whether the advent of the Constitution (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996) has been a catalyst for a change from the strict and literal approach. The conclusion reached is that the Constitution has been a catalyst for a change in approach ‐ to a purposive approach. One of the results of the change in approach means that the taxpayer now has a realistic opportunity to question and even have unjust and unfair interpretation decisions of the past reversed in the appropriate circumstances.

This chapter is intended to elaborate on the existing academic literature addressing the migration of constitutional ideas. Through an examination of ongoing efforts to enshrine “defamation of religion” as a violation of international human rights, the author confirms that the phenomenon of migration is not restricted to positive constitutional norms, but rather also encompasses negative ideas that ultimately may serve to undermine international and domestic constitutionalism. More specifically, the case study demonstrates that the movement of anti-constitutional ideas is not restricted to the domain of “international security” law, and further, that the vertical axis linking international and domestic law is in fact a two-way channel that permits the transmission of domestic anti-constitutional ideas up to the international level.

In reaching the findings presented herein, the chapter also adds to the universalism–relativism debate by demonstrating that allowances for “plurality consciousness” on the international level may in certain instances undermine fundamental norms previously negotiated and accepted as authoritative by the international community. From this perspective, the movement in favor of prohibiting “defamation of religion” is not merely a case study that helps to expand our understanding of how anti-constitutional ideas migrate, but also indicative of a reenergized campaign to challenge the status, content, and stability of universal human rights norms.