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Considers and defends the realist understanding of the notion of fuzzy system, that is, the view that fuzzy functions are ontologically respectable for scientific explanations of fuzzy controllers. Looks at the arguments concerned with the revival of fuzzy set theories based on the idea of representation.

The traditional approach to AI is limited because it fails to exploit continuity. The reliance on discrete logic has allowed the rapid initial advance of the subject, but constitutes an inherent deficiency. The limitations have become apparent, and are generally acknowledged by a revival of interest in neural‐net, or connectionist, techniques. This approach has become feasible because of technical developments allowing large‐scale parallel operation. Lessons can be learned by considering the evolution of natural intelligence. Recent studies from a biological viewpoint suggest that this has some unexpected features. The idea of concept formation should be extended to include quantifiable concepts, similar to the semantic variables of fuzzy set theory.

Examines the claim that we need to change the organization’s culture if we want to bring about organizational change. Concerns itself with the mainstream conception of (organizational) culture, especially in relation to what is called “the paradox of culture”, its twin tendencies towards stability and variability. In the process, the role of the leader and organizational learning are reassessed in their purported causal interrelation. Develops the notion of culture as cognitive process based on recent research in both cultural anthropology and the new cognitive science.

Communication systems are structured by economic forces which use them to optimise sales, and politicians who increasingly live by slogans and repeated sound bites. Both want people to act without much reflection, and may threaten to turn human beings into imitiations of the computers they use. Theorists first noticed that communication systems channeled goods and services, structured political geography, and created their own pictures of the world. They went on to describe communications devices which act as extensions of human senses. Now communication systems try to structure our inner lives. This paper examines reflective consciousness and its relation to civilisation. It suggests countervailing forces which make for thought and turn the ordinary aspects of life into art.

Summarizes some of the important concepts and developments in cybernetics and general systems theory, especially during the last two decades. Shows how they can indeed be a challenge to sociological thinking. Cybernetics is used here as an umbrella term for a great variety of related disciplines: general systems theory, information theory, system dynamics, dynamic systems theory, including catastrophe theory, chaos theory. Also considers the emerging “science of complexity”, which includes neural networks, artificial intelligence and artificial life, and discusses the methodological drawbacks of second‐order cybernetics.

Any fuzzy system is a knowledge‐based system which implies an inference engine. Proposes neural networks as a means of performing the inference. Using the Theorem of Representation proposes an encoding scheme that allows the neural network to be trained to perform modus ponens.

The complexity of any given cognitive phenomenon, such as “scientific discovery”, “technical expertise”, or “natural language understanding”, requires a multidisciplinary approach. Presents, within the framework of such an approach, some visible evidences of how these very different phenomena are closely rooted in the same highly inventive cognitive process, abduction. These evidences will be provided out of examples from both everyday language interpretation and law making expertise.

While in agreement with the broad coherentist approach of Evers and Lakomski, the position taken here is that coherentism, in itself, does not provide a sufficiently developed normative framework to underpin an ethics of educational administration. The coherentist approach to ethics is that the requirements of survival and social problem solving ensure the development of neurally‐based moral prototypes. Following writers such as Clark and Flanagan, argues that the normative resources of coherentism should be enriched by sententially expressed normative standards, and that the approach to such standards taken by virtue ethicists is fruitful. Virtue ethicists reject a rule‐based approach to morality and embrace the idea of moral prototypes. This is consistent with a naturalised epistemology, including the learning of ethical administrative practice.

The paper argues that the IBM statistical approach to machine translation has done rather better after a few years than many sceptics believed it could. However, it is neither as novel as its proponents suggest nor is it making claims as clear and simple as they would have us believe. The performance of the purely statistical system (and we discuss what that phrase could mean) has not equalled the performance of SYSTRAN. More importantly, the system is now being shifted to a hybrid that incorporates much of the linguistic information that it was initially claimed by IBM would not be needed for MT. Hence, one might infer that its own proponents do not believe ‘pure’ statistics sufficient for MT of a usable quality. In addition to real limits on the statistical method, there are also strong economic limits imposed by their methodology of data gathering. However, the paper concludes that the IBM group have done the field a great service in pushing these methods far further than before, and by reminding everyone of the virtues of empiricism in the field and the need for large scale gathering of data.

The purpose of this paper is to explore artificial moral agency by reflecting upon the possibility of a Moral Turing Test (MTT) and whether its lack of focus on interiority, i.e. its behaviouristic foundation, counts as an obstacle to establishing such a test to judge the performance of an Artificial Moral Agent (AMA). Subsequently, to investigate whether an MTT could serve as a useful framework for the understanding, designing and engineering of AMAs, we set out to address fundamental challenges within the field of robot ethics regarding the formal representation of moral theories and standards. Here, typically three design approaches to AMAs are available: top-down theory-driven models and bottom-up approaches which set out to model moral behaviour by means of models for adaptive learning, such as neural networks, and finally, hybrid models, which involve components from both top-down and bottom-up approaches to the modelling of moral agency. With inspiration from Allen and Wallace (2009, 2000) as well as Prior (1949, 2003), we elaborate on theoretically driven approaches to machine ethics by introducing deontic tense logic. Finally, within this framework, we explore the character of human interaction with a robot which has successfully passed an MTT.

The ideas in this paper reflect preliminary theoretical considerations regarding the possibility of establishing a MTT based on the evaluation of moral behaviour, which focusses on moral reasoning regarding possible actions. The thoughts reflected fall within the field of normative ethics and apply deontic tense logic to discuss the possibilities and limitations of artificial moral agency.

The authors stipulate a formalisation of logic of obligation, time and modality, which may serve as a candidate for implementing a system corresponding to an MTT in a restricted sense. Hence, the authors argue that to establish a present moral obligation, we need to be able to make a description of the actual situation and the relevant general moral rules. Such a description can never be complete, as the combination of exhaustive knowledge about both situations and rules would involve a God eye’s view, enabling one to know all there is to know and take everything relevant into consideration before making a perfect moral decision to act upon. Consequently, due to this frame problem, from an engineering point of view, we can only strive for designing a robot supposed to operate within a restricted domain and within a limited space-time region. Given such a setup, the robot has to be able to perform moral reasoning based on a formal description of the situation and any possible future developments. Although a system of this kind may be useful, it is clearly also limited to a particular context. It seems that it will always be possible to find special cases (outside the context for which it was designed) in which a given system does not pass the MTT. This calls for a new design of moral systems with trust-related components which will make it possible for the system to learn from experience.

It is without doubt that in the near future we are going to be faced with advanced social robots with increasing autonomy, and our growing engagement with these robots calls for the exploration of ethical issues and stresses the importance of informing the process of engineering ethical robots. Our contribution can be seen as an early step in this direction.