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This study aims to examine whether chief executive officer (CEO) pay-performance sensitivity to shareholder wealth is related to the use of non-financial performance measures in incentive contracts.

Using hand-collected performance measure data in a sample of S&P 500 firms across the period 1994–2010, this study investigates the sensitivity of CEO bonus and cash pay to shareholder wealth of firms that use non-financial performance (NFPM) measures of varying types and contractual weights in their bonus contracts along with financial measures (NFPM firms) in comparison to that of firms using financial measures only (FPM firms).

This study finds evidence that the pay-performance sensitivity is stronger in NFPM firms than in FPM firms. These results are driven by the use of CEO individual goals and operational efficiency. Furthermore, when using environmental, social and governance factors, the pay-performance sensitivity is stronger in terms of accounting performance only. This study also finds that using NFPM enhances pay-performance sensitivity more as their contractual weights increase and as financial risk increases.

These findings are important to stakeholders, and especially regulators in understanding incentive effects of alternative performance measures. This study also sheds light on what types of non-financial measures are better in helping firms align CEOs’ incentives to shareholders’ interests.

This study contributes to prior research on benefits of non-financial information within the context of executive compensation. This study presents original results about the effects of contractual weights of non-financial measures and financial risk on CEO pay-performance sensitivity. This study also presents new insights regarding how different types of non-financial measures affect CEO pay-performance sensitivity.

Both the academic literature and practitioners have long noted the need for an equity investment mechanism for worker-controlled firms that alleviates investor anxieties without undermining internal workplace democracy. The purpose of this paper is to outline one such possible mechanism.

The proposal locks together the interests of workers and external investors, via non-voting shares with dividends set by a pre-agreed value-added sharing formula. Each worker is paid a base wage, with the average across the firm being a pre-defined multiple of the national minimum wage. Any additional surplus is split into a number of equal “slices”, with each share receiving one slice as its dividend, and the average worker receiving a pre-agreed number of slices as a bonus.

Workers have an incentive to maximise their own incomes, and in so doing, will also automatically maximise the dividends received by investors, obviating the need for the shares to have normal voting rights. Working on this principle of aligned interests, the authors also discuss reinvestment, worker ownership of non-voting shares and possibilities for a secondary share market. The authors show how this proposal will be a significant step in aligning the interests of investors with owner-workers in a democratic, negotiated way that shares both risk and returns, thus making worker-controlled firms more attractive to equity investment.

In light of the recognised problem of underinvestment in worker-controlled firms and the risk of their degeneration, this paper will interest both academics and practitioners in employee ownership, co-operatives and various forms of workplace democracy.

The paper traces the development of employee ownership in the UK since the 1980s. It proposes that employee ownership is a function of macro-level contexts and micro-level decisions, with the latter framed and guided by the former. The macro context comprises the regulatory framework and the provision of incentives to adopt employee ownership. The paper shows how the evolution of these has led to a steep increase in employee ownership in the last eight years.

The paper draws on several sources of empirical data to chart the development of employee ownership in the UK since the 1980s and to identify the current features of employee ownership. Two firm-level surveys conducted in 2015 and 2020/21 are supplemented by qualitative case study data collected in the early 1990s. An annual census of all employee-owned firms facilitates a comprehensive overview of the current state of UK employee ownership.

It is found that there has been a steep increase in the number of UK employee-owned firms since 2014 after several decades of uneven growth. This is attributed to the introduction of new incentives and to refinements of the regulatory framework. Over the period, there has been a shift from hybrid employee ownership, combining direct and indirect forms, to indirect ownership associated with the employee ownership trust model.

The paper provides an original history of employee ownership in the UK using rich and unique data, along with the most comprehensive picture of current employee ownership to date.

On shield tunnel construction (STC) site, human error is widely recognized as essential to accident. It is necessary to explain which factors lead to human error and how these factors can influence human performance. Human reliability analysis supports such necessity through modeling the performance shaping factors (PSFs). The purpose of this paper is to establish and validate a PSF taxonomy for the STC context.

The approach taken in this study mainly consists of three steps. First, a description of the STC context is proposed through the analysis of the STC context. Second, the literature which stretch across the PSF methodologies, cognitive psychology and human factors of STC and other construction industries are reviewed to develop an initial set of PSFs. Finally, a final PSF set is modified and validated based on STC task analysis and STC accidents cases.

The PSF taxonomy constituted by 4 main components, 4 hierarchies and 85 PSFs is established for human behavior modeling and simulation under the STC context. Furthermore, by comparing and evaluating the performance of STC PSF and existing PSF studies, the proposed PSF taxonomy meets the requirement for qualitative and quantitative analysis.

The PSF taxonomy can provide a basis and support for human behavior modeling and simulation under the STC context. Integrating PSFs into a behavior simulation model provides a more realistic and integrated assessment of human error by manifesting the influence of each PSFs on the cognitive processes. The simulation results can suggest concrete points for the improvement of STC safety management.

This paper develops a taxonomy of PSFs that addresses the various unique influences of the STC context on human behaviors. The harsh underground working conditions and diverse resources of system information are identified as key characteristics of the STC context. Furthermore, the PSF taxonomy can be integrated into a human cognitive behavior model to predict the worker’s behavior on STC site in future work.

The purpose of this paper is to examine whether reputation element affects the decision relative performance of trust, bonus and incentive contracts using social laboratory experiments.

The study conducts the following lab experiments bonus–incentive treatment without reputation, bonus–incentive treatment with reputation and trust–incentive treatment with reputation.

The study finds that the reputation and fairness concerns, in contrast to self-interest, may have a decisive impact on the actual and optimal choices in the reciprocity-based contracts. The principal pays higher salaries in the bonus contract as compared to an incentive contract.

The study contributes to the behavioral economic literature in the following dimensions. The existing literature on lab experiments considers a bonus contract as better than the debt contract; however, it does not consider the trust contract better than the debt contract.

The aim of this paper is to show the ways of setting quality objectives, their attributes and the conditions under which they can perform a motivational function.

Collecting relevant data, the authors used the results of previous research and theoretical assumptions concerning quality objectives. Subsequently, they carried out a survey and exemplification research based on participatory observations, document content analysis and interviews.

Goals are set mainly by top management, but the communication process itself is insufficient; the needs of system users are not taken into account. In the opinion of the employees, quality objectives are measurable and objective, although not very ambitious. For quality objectives to fulfil a motivational function, they should be objective and measurable. Also, the allocation of tasks among employees needs to be fair. Furthermore, quality objectives have to play a greater role in remuneration systems.

This paper is one of the first publications on the role and function of quality objectives. Its advantage is that it defines the conditions under which such objectives can have a motivational effect and encourage employees to pursue the improvement of their products and services.

This paper aims to study the impact of audit quality on the components of executive cash compensation. It is predicted that as audit quality improves, greater emphasis will be placed on the incentive components of cash compensation, and lower emphasis on the salary (fixed) component. Specifically, it is predicted that as audit quality enhances, greater emphasis will be placed on earnings and sales revenues in determining executive cash compensation. Using auditor specialization as a proxy for audit quality, empirical support is provided for all of our predictions.

This paper provides empirical support with agency theoretic predictions.

This paper developed the following hypotheses: H1 – in executive cash compensation, more weight is being placed on earnings-based measures as auditor specialization improves; H2 – in executive cash compensation, more weight is also being placed on sales revenues as auditor specialization improves; H3 – in executive cash compensation, salary levels decrease as auditor specialization improves; and H4 – the impact of auditor specialization on the weight on earnings, sales and the salary levels is lower in the post-Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) period compared to pre-SOX period.

First, the article limits itself to cash compensation, while current executive compensation is largely made of equity. Second, the measure of audit quality used, ‘national level auditor specialization’, may not be as effective in the post-SOX era.

Compensation committees should pay attention to audit quality (in whatever way it may be proxied by) in determining executive compensation.

This is the first paper to show that audit quality not only improves the earnings response coefficient in firm valuation but also enhances the weight placed on earnings (and sales revenues) in executive compensation.