Search results

Examines the involvement of the banking sector in money laundering over the last two decades, in particular the relationship between banks and money laundering when governments’ attitudes vary and change. Describes the design of the research, which uses multiple regression, Chow and dummy variable correlation, and partial correlation to compare countries before and after membership of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). Lists the countries covered in the analysis: nine are in the FATF and nine are outside it. Lists the countries of the FATF according to whether they have a strong or weak bank/money laundering relationship: Australia, Denmark, Japan, Netherlands, and the United Kingdom have a weaker relationship (with Australia giving the best result in terms of successful governmental enforcement of the law), while Germany, Italy, Singapore and the USA have a stronger relationship. Concludes that FATF does make a difference: most member countries have weaker bank/money laundering relationships in their post‐FATF period.

To examine if recent changes to the law and practice of certain offshore financial centres (OFCs) means that some OFCs now have more stringent anti‐money laundering measures in place compared to their “onshore” counterparts. To further explore the allegation by some that there is a dual standard in terms of the pressure applied to OFCs on the one hand and “onshore” jurisdictions on the other.

The analysis will focus on the Crown Dependencies and the British Overseas Territories of Bermuda and the Cayman Islands. The “onshore” jurisdictions include the UK, the USA and Australia. Comparison of the implementation of the FATF 40 Recommendations (using the most recent IMF Assessments), trust and company services legislation, and the “Know Your Customer” requirements.

The results show that the Crown Dependencies and the selected Overseas Territories are not only keeping up with the USA, the UK and Australia but in many cases “outdoing” the AML/CFT regimes of these onshore jurisdictions.

Comparison limited to only certain OFCs and “onshore” jurisdictions. There is a two year difference between the IMF assessments for the OFCs and for the onshore jurisdictions. Future research would include the results of the second phase of the OFC Assessment Program and IMF assessments due in the next few years.

This paper examines a very topical area of financial crime based on the most recent data available.

The purpose of this paper is to exemplify how money launderers in European German-speaking countries use deposit boxes to place incriminated funds.

During a qualitative content analysis of 60 semi-standardized expert interviews with both criminals and prevention experts and a quantitative survey of 200 compliance officers, concrete money laundering techniques using deposit boxes were identified.

Deposit boxes may be used to place incriminated funds or prepare for their subsequent placement. Thus, the method is highly suitable to the demands of small-scale money laundering.

The study’s qualitative findings are limited to the perspectives of the 60 interview partners. The interviews were conducted in a semi-standardized fashion.

The present paper aims at identifying gaps in existing anti-money laundering mechanisms to provide compliance officers, law enforcement agencies and legislators with worthwhile insights into the minds of criminals.

The present paper illustrates how money launderers operate to avoid detection, capturing the perspective of the launderer. Thus, the reader is granted access to highly valuable information that is supposed to facilitate the introduction of new anti-money laundering measures. Moreover, it shows how compliance officers view the issue and what they consider to be important to the successful implementation of compliance mechanisms. Moreover, the officers’ statements will exhibit which methods they do and do not engage with on a daily basis.

The purpose of this paper is to illustrate how illegally obtained funds are laundered by employment of consulting companies in Austria, Germany, Liechtenstein and Switzerland.

A qualitative content analysis of 28 semi-standardized expert interviews with both criminals and prevention experts, and a quantitative survey of 200 compliance officers led to the identification of concrete money-laundering techniques involving the employment of consulting companies.

Consulting companies continue to be used for money laundering in European German-speaking countries, especially in the layering and integration stages of the money laundering process, during which the origins of funds are concealed, and the money is integrated into the legal economy.

Qualitative findings from the analysis of semi-standardized interviews are limited to the 28 interviewees’ perspectives.

Identification of gaps in existing anti-money-laundering mechanisms provides compliance officers, law enforcement agencies and legislators with valuable insights into how criminals operate.

The existing literature focuses on organizations that combat money laundering and the improvement of anti-money-laundering measures. This paper outlines how money launderers avoid detection. Both preventative and criminal perspectives are considered.

The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate how illicit funds are laundered by using the gold method in German-speaking European countries.

To identify approaches to money laundering via gold, 60 semi-standardized interviews with money launderers and compliance officers were conducted. Further, a quantitative survey of 200 compliance officers was administered.

The gold trade in European German-speaking countries remains extraordinarily suitable for money laundering. In particular, it may be used for placement and layering.

The implications are based on the statements of 60 interviewees, including both money launderers and compliance officers. Thus, the derived results are limited to the perspectives of these 60 persons.

Based on this study’s findings, gaps in the existing anti-money laundering measures are identified. Documenting these inconsistencies should provide compliance officers, law enforcement agencies and legislators with valuable insights into the minds of money launderers.

As this study explores the perspectives of both compliance officers and money launderers, it provides a broad overview of the issues. Most existing literature fails to observe money laundering from the launderers’ perspective, focusing instead on methods to prevent money laundering. Effective prevention requires profound knowledge of how criminals operate. Only by adopting criminals’ perspective can compliance officers effectively spot money-laundering methods.

The purpose of this paper is to illustrate how money launderers circumvent compliance measures by using exchange offices to launder incriminated funds.

The three-step process entailed carrying out unofficial interviews with money launderers, which gave first insight into the issue, followed by expert interviews that were reviewed by means of a qualitative study. The findings of the qualitative study were processed during the subsequent quantitative research.

Although exchange offices are a known threat to anti-money laundering efforts, they continue to be highly applicable. As exchange offices are responsible for their own compliance measures, compliance officers employed by other institutions do not encounter money laundering through exchange offices regularly.

The findings of the study are limited to the experiences of the interviewed experts, which, naturally, are highly subjective. Further, they are geographically limited, as certain areas were not represented in the study.

During the literature review, a research gap was identified. The present study attempts to partially fill the same. The illustrated findings aimed at facilitating an improvement of anti-money laundering measures. The insights into the minds of money launderers provide valuable information for legislators, compliance officers and authorities.

Presently, the majority of the literature focuses on the issue of money laundering from a compliance perspective. However, accurately understanding how money launderers circumvent the existing prevention measures requires an exploration of their approaches. To effectively inhibit money laundering, it is necessary to gain a holistic overview of the issue, which entails the observation of both perspectives.

The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate how criminals commit financial crimes in the real estate business in Austria, Germany, Liechtenstein and Switzerland.

A qualitative content analysis of 100 semi-standardized expert interviews with both criminals and prevention experts and a quantitative survey of 200 compliance officers led to the identification of specific money laundering techniques in the real estate sector.

Real estate companies in German-speaking countries in Europe continue to be extraordinarily suitable for money laundering and other financial crimes. In particular, they can be used for placement, layering and integration, as well as for violations of the tax code. Most importantly, however, they are vehicles for one of the very few profitable methods of laundering money.

As the qualitative findings are based on semi-standardized interviews, they are limited to the perspectives of 100 interviewees.

The identification of gaps in existing anti-money laundering mechanisms is intended to provide compliance officers, law enforcement agencies and legislators with valuable insights into how criminals operate.

While the existing literature focuses on organizations combating money laundering and on improving anti-money laundering measures, this paper describes how money launderers operate to avoid getting caught. Both prevention and criminal perspectives are taken into account.

This paper aims to illustrate how illegally obtained funds are laundered through raw diamonds in Austria, Germany, Liechtenstein and Switzerland.

To identify specific money laundering techniques involving raw diamonds, this study used a qualitative content analysis of data collected from 60 semi-standardized interviews with both criminals and prevention experts and a quantitative survey of 200 compliance officers.

Raw diamonds are extraordinarily suitable for money laundering in European German-speaking countries. In particular, they may be used in all three stages of the laundering process, namely, placement, layering and integration.

Because the qualitative findings are based on semi-standardized interviews, their insights are limited to the perspectives of the 60 interviewees.

Identifying gaps in existing anti-money laundering mechanisms should provide compliance officers, law enforcement agencies and legislators with valuable insights into how criminals operate.

While prior studies focus on the methods used by organizations to combat money laundering and how to improve anti-money laundering measures, this paper investigates how money launderers operate to avoid detection, thereby illustrating authentic experiences. Its findings provide valuable insights into the minds of money launderers and combines criminal perspective with that of prevention experts.

Whilst the existing literature focuses on developing prevention mechanisms for banks, this paper aims to demonstrate the ongoing feasibility of money laundering and financing terrorism undetected. This study thereby reveals that the current anti-money-laundering and anti-terrorism-financing mechanisms can easily be circumvented.

A three-stage research process was used, including both qualitative and quantitative methods. The empirical findings are based on a qualitative content analysis of 50 informal interviews with illegal financial services providers and 50 formal interviews with compliance experts and law enforcement officers.

During these interviews, specific methods of financing terrorism and limiting the risks of being prosecuted were discussed. Hence, specific methods of money laundering and terrorism financing have been analyzed.

The findings thus convey only the perspectives of the 100 interviewees, such that generalizability is limited.

The practical implications include suggestions for financial regulators, financial institutions and compliance officers on how to more effectively combat money laundering and terrorism financing. Although the empirical findings are limited to Europe, the results could be applied globally.

This paper reveals new insights about criminals’ actions, which help to develop more effective compliance mechanisms.