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This paper aims to propose a two-period model, including an original manufacturer, a retailer and a third-party remanufacturer, in which the products manufactured by the original manufacturer are patent-protected and the remanufacturing degree of remanufactured products influences the purchasing decisions of consumers.

This paper analyzes the decisions of the original manufacturer, the retailer and the third-party remanufacturer of two periods, using Stackelberg game and obtains the equilibrium solutions of the three parties.

The study finds that consumers’ focus degree to the remanufacturing degree has a negative correlation with the equilibrium unit patent-licensing fee, the retail price of remanufactured products, the remanufacturing degree of remanufactured products and the wholesale price of new products in the first period, but has a positive correlation with the retail price of new products in the second period.

(1) Consumers’ focus degree to the remanufacturing degree has a negative correlation with the equilibrium unit patent-licensing fee, the retail price of remanufactured products, the remanufacturing degree of remanufactured products and the wholesale price of new products in the first period, but has a positive correlation with the retail price of new products in the second period. (2) The remanufacturing action efficiency of the third-party remanufacturer has a positive correlation with the equilibrium unit patent-licensing fee, the retail price of remanufactured products, the remanufacturing degree of remanufactured products and the wholesale and retail prices of new products in the second period.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze and solve the problem of moral hazard in firms because of asymmetry information between firms and workers and to contract upon the workers' shiftless actions.

Based on principle‐agent theory and human resource management practice, an optimal dynamic wage contract model is designed. By applying simulation technology, the dynamic wage contract model is compared to the general static wage contract model and the affects made by the optimal dynamic wage contract to workers and firms are analyzed.

According to the consequences of simulation, the dynamic wage contract has better characteristics and is more practical than the static one. In the dynamic wage contract, the current action of a worker has a persistent effect on the future outcome. It is proved that the dynamic wage contract is optimal to the firm. The optimal dynamic wage contract is renegation‐proofness. It not only can incentive workers to work hard and help the firm achieve Pareto efficiency, but also can smooth the firm's incentive costs and reduce the risk born by workers.

The paper provides some reasonable conclusions for the human resource management in firms.

The purpose of this paper is to obtain risk indicators of water security of drought periods in which the indices of reliability, resiliency, and vulnerability are integrated.

It is not reasonable that weight coefficients of different risk indices are often determined subjectively in conventional procedures, so the entropy weight method is introduced and chosen to solve the problem. Entropy weight method can get the weight coefficients of different risk indices objectively and is valid from the case study.

The feasibility and validity of entropy weight methods to determine weight coefficients of different risk indices objectively are recognized.

Accessibility and availability of data are the main limitations.

The paper provides a more objective risk indicator of water security of drought periods for water resources managers.

This paper determines the weight coefficients of different risk indices for risk assessment of water security of drought periods based on hazard entropy. The paper is aimed at water resources managers and relative researchers, especially those who deal with risk assessment of water security of drought periods.