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The Bureau of Economics in the Federal Trade Commission has a three-part role in the Agency and the strength of its functions changed over time depending on the preferences and ideology of the FTC’s leaders, developments in the field of economics, and the tenor of the times. The over-riding current role is to provide well considered, unbiased economic advice regarding antitrust and consumer protection law enforcement cases to the legal staff and the Commission. The second role, which long ago was primary, is to provide reports on investigations of various industries to the public and public officials. This role was more recently called research or “policy R&D”. A third role is to advocate for competition and markets both domestically and internationally. As a practical matter, the provision of economic advice to the FTC and to the legal staff has required that the economists wear “two hats,” helping the legal staff investigate cases and provide evidence to support law enforcement cases while also providing advice to the legal bureaus and to the Commission on which cases to pursue (thus providing “a second set of eyes” to evaluate cases). There is sometimes a tension in those functions because building a case is not the same as evaluating a case. Economists and the Bureau of Economics have provided such services to the FTC for over 100 years proving that a sub-organization can survive while playing roles that sometimes conflict. Such a life is not, however, always easy or fun.

Despite objections, “one of the more durable empirical relationships uncovered in statistical investigations of firm and industry profitability, is the tendency for profitability to be relatively high in high‐advertising consumer goods industries.”

Under the impetus of federal law, each state is required to develop Guidelines by which to determine presumptive child support awards following divorce. The key federal requirement is that during the specified quadrennial reviews of each state’s Guidelines, “a state must consider economic data on the cost of raising children.” Our purpose here is to compare presumptive child support awards provided in typical state Guidelines with the actual monetary costs of raising children.

To this end, we estimate these monetary costs from government data on consumer outlays in households with children as compared with substantially similar childless households. We review and reject current methods for determining child costs: both from income equivalence methods and those offered in annual government surveys; and provide quite different results despite using the same data employed by others.

Our econometric results indicate much lower monetary costs than reported for either of the two alternatives. Since presumptive child support awards in most states rely on current methods, these findings suggest that existing award structures should be re-evaluated.

Current award structures create a financial asset resulting from the gap between presumptive awards and monetary costs for custodial parents. This factor engenders resentment by support payers since it is his or her payments that fund this asset. And this resentment harms relationships between the parents. Increased willingness of non-custodial parents to make their assessed payments is an outcome promoted when payment amounts reflect the actual monetary costs of raising children.

In recent years, antitrust officials have recognized that vertical arrangements can cause competitive harm through two routes: first, they can facilitate collusion among rivals, and second, they can raise rivals’ costs and thereby create barriers to entry or expansion. In this paper, we identify a third and separate pathway: vertical integration allows upstream monopolists to exploit more fully the market power that has already been attained. We explore the implications of this third pathway for antitrust policy.

The purpose of this study is to determine if an earnings forecasting model based on factors hypothesised to result in differential profits across firms (industries) reduces model error relative to the model developed by Ou (1990). Initial research attempting to forecast earnings found that the random walk model, where current year's earnings are the prediction for next year, provides the best forecast of annual earnings (Ball and Watts 1972; Foster 1973; Beaver, Kettler, and Scholes 1970; Albrecht, Lookabill, and McKeown 1977; Brealey 1969). Ou (1990) developed an earnings forecasting model using financial statement information beyond prior years' earnings as the explanatory variables that outperformed the random walk model in predicting annual earnings.

Industrial organization economists have generally treated the firms operating within industries as fairly homogeneous. The firms are assumed to be similar in terms of the main decision variables so that there are few differences in the price: output, and product strategies preferred by each firm. Furthermore, the firms are believed to enjoy similar market power so that market power is essentially a shared asset. Some of the recent literature rejects the shared asset view of market power. Among the more significant contributions to this literature is the concept of strategic groups. This paper focuses on the relevance of the strategic group concept for entry theory.

There are two basic theoretical views of how advertising affects competition. One school of thought suggests that advertising decreases competition. Kaldor (1950) argued that through economies of scale in advertising, advertising increases market concentration. Also, Bain (1956) suggested that advertising causes strong product differentiation and brand loyalty, which are barriers to entry and will lead to higher concentration.