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Existing research concerning the impact of unions on relative wages provides evidence for the existence of significant union/non‐union wage differentials. However, union practices are deemed to have a more pervasive effect on the overall distribution of wages, reducing wage differentials across and within establishments. Attempts to explore union effects on wage dispersion in the context of the Italian labour market. Several indicators of wage dispersion are computed, using both industry and establishment level data, in the attempt to ascertain the different routes through which union presence affects the structure of wages. The empirical evidence shows that Italian trade unions have pursued “egalitarian” objectives and have succeeded in shaping pay policies which, through central and local negotiations, raise low wages and reduce wage differentials both among skill categories and across establishments.

The purpose of this paper is to assess the role of the Protocol '93 bargaining model in favouring the slow‐down of the Italian economy and to design a correction.

The impact of the Protocol on factor income distribution is assessed through a deterministic dynamic model, and tested for the 1993‐2008 period. The paper explores theoretically and empirically the weakening of the incentives for both workers and employers to engage in fostering productivity.

In a macroeconomic setting with structural imbalance between the product and the labour markets reforms, the bargaining model has automatically increased up to 2002 the capital share in income, reducing the incentives for both social partners to accelerate productivity, as the labour share in income and the propensity to invest are co‐integrated (Johansen test). An analytical solution for correcting the bargaining distributive bias is proposed.

Further research should provide a picture of the different distributive behaviours of industrial sectors, particularly for industries exposed to/protected from international competition. The actual functioning of the new bargaining model (the Accordo Quadro of 2009) should also be assessed.

The bargaining model should be reformed so as to restore the right incentives for social partners. National industry‐wide wage bargaining should both incentivise and complement insufficient local bargaining.

The benefit of increased productivity and resumed growth has vast social implications, especially with reference to the sustainability of the welfare system.

The scientific literature has lacked any formal description of the dynamic operation of the Italian bargaining model, which is particularly valuable to both social partners and policy makers.

This paper analyses the relationship between wage dispersion and firm size within a “two-tier” system of collective bargaining (firm bargaining and multi-employer bargaining levels). Collective bargaining has a decisive role in setting wages in Spain, and its regulation highly limits the possibility for smaller firms to negotiate their own collective agreement.

Based on the Spanish Structure of Earnings Survey 2006, 2010 and 2014, the authors use variance decomposition in order to deeply analyse the effect of bargaining level on wage dispersion and compare the value of each decile of the distribution of wages for the purposes of identifying the quantitative differences in wage compression.

In general, the outcomes positively linked firm size and firm bargaining to wage dispersion. However, if firm size is taken into account, the effect of firm bargaining is limited among small firm workers because this type of firm is not usually covered by firm bargaining. On the other hand, the time analysis allows observing a wage compression that follows different patterns depending on firm size, compressing the higher part of the distribution in case of small firms and the lower part in case of large firms. This should be explained by the fact that wage negotiation is dependent on firm size.

Firm size has determined firm adjustment strategies to face the recent economic crisis and allows to evaluate the impact that changes in collective bargaining can have on wage distribution

There is no research that has tried to analyse the relationship between wage dispersion and firm size in a context where collective bargaining is essential to understand the wage structure. Normally, firm size plays a decisive role in wage policy given that the capacity of a company to negotiate an agreement is closely linked to its size.

The purpose of this paper is twofold: first, to reassert the persistent association of the decline in collective bargaining with the increase in income inequality, the fall in the share of wages in national income and deterioration in macroeconomic performance in the UK; and second, to present case studies affirming concrete outcomes of organisational collective bargaining for workers, in terms of pay, job quality, working hours and work-life balance.

The paper is based upon two methodological approaches. First, econometric analyses using industry-level and firm-level data for advanced and emerging economies testing the relationship between declining union density, collective bargaining coverage and the fall in the share of wages in national income. Second, it reports on ten in-depth case studies of collective bargaining each based upon analysis of collective bargaining agreements plus in-depth interviews with the actors party to them: in total, 16 trade union officers, 16 members and 11 employer representatives.

There is robust evidence of the effects of different measures of bargaining power on the labour share including union density, welfare state retrenchment, minimum wages and female employment. The case studies appear to address a legacy of deregulated industrial relations. A number demonstrate the reinvigoration of collective bargaining at the organisational and sectoral level, addressing the two-tier workforce and contractual differentiation, alongside the consequences of government pay policies for equality.

The case studies represent a purposive sample and therefore findings are not generalisable; researchers are encouraged to test the suggested propositions further.

The paper proposes that tackling income inequality requires a restructuring of the institutional framework in which bargaining takes place and a level playing field where the bargaining power of labour is more in balance with that of capital. Collective bargaining addresses a number of the issues raised by the Taylor Review of Modern Working Practices as essential for “good work”, yet is at odds with the review’s assumptions and remedies. The case studies reiterate the importance of the development of strong workplace representation and bargaining at workplace level, which advocates for non-members and provides a basis for union recruitment, organisation and wider employee engagement.

The paper indicates that there may be limits to employer commitment to deregulated employment relations. The emergence of new or reinvigorated collective agreements may represent a concession by employers that a “free”, individualised, deinstitutionalised, precarious approach to industrial relations, based on wage suppression and work intensification, is not in their interests in the long run.

The author develops a bilateral Nash bargaining model under value uncertainty and private/asymmetric information, combining ideas from axiomatic and strategic bargaining theory. The solution to the model leads organically to a two-tier stochastic frontier (2TSF) setup with intra-error dependence. The author presents two different statistical specifications to estimate the model, one that accounts for regressor endogeneity using copulas, the other able to identify separately the bargaining power from the private information effects at the individual level. An empirical application using a matched employer–employee data set (MEEDS) from Zambia and a second using another one from Ghana showcase the applied potential of the approach.

The chapter presents a historical and economic analysis of Nordic wage formation, with a special focus on how collective agreements really work. A stereotypical interpretation of the evolution of Nordic wage bargaining systems is that a centralised setting of wages has gradually been substituted with more decentralised pay bargaining. This overlooks the fact that central organisations could never really control wage levels, even in the golden age of centralised bargaining. Instead, central pay bargains defined minimum wage changes that ensured that local conflicts would be ruled out. Moreover, the central stipulations could often be overruled or adjusted at the local level. Following insights of Teulings and Hartog, we argue that the main function of Nordic collective agreements has always been to rule out local conflicts that would otherwise be initiated to seek local rents. Thus, collective agreements combine macroeconomic flexibility with adequate investment incentives at the local level. In this crucial sense, Nordic collective agreements are a completely stable institution. The most important transformation that has taken place is that formal peak bargaining on mean pay increases has been substituted with pattern bargaining where the manufacturing industry acts as a wage leader. Economic theory suggests that this almost amounts to centralised pay setting.

This monograph considers a further set of state and statutory functions which are connected with collective bargaining and to examine whether or not there effectively existed, or exists, directly and indirectly, encouragement for the promotion of collective bargaining.

The purpose of this paper is to illustrate that some enterprise unions in South China, as strategic labor actors, made local progress in collective bargaining, but further elaborates on why gainful bargaining would require a more systematic understanding of the prevailing industrial structure.

This paper is mainly drawn from intensive site visits and 51 in-depth interviews in 2013 and 2014, and several follow-ups up to 2018. Three cases of collective bargaining, featuring different union strategies of assertive negotiation, informal cooperation and direct confrontation, are discussed in detail.

The study illustrates that viable collective bargaining with worker-supported unions is possible in China. However, the effectiveness of bargaining does not count on this alone; the supply chain structure also imposes significant constraints, mainly by narrowing the bargaining scope of each supplier and differentiating the structural power of their unions. In these cases, institutionalized union coordination beyond individual suppliers is proposed.

These cases began as post-strike bargaining in Japanese auto supply chains and became the frontier of industrial relations in China. The impact of the supply chain in different sectors or regions requires further study.

This paper draws attention to the effect of an “invisible” but increasingly significant factor, industrial structure, on enterprise-level collective bargaining in China, unlike many previous criticisms of unwillingness or incompetence among labor actors.

I. INTRODUCTION In this monograph we point out and analyse various dimensions of bargaining structure, which we define broadly as the institutional configuration within which bargaining takes place, and attempt to provide some guidelines for management action. We look at the development, theory, and present framework of bargaining structure in Britain and then examine it in terms of choices: multi‐employer versus single employer, company versus plant level bargaining, and the various public policy issues involved.