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The evolution of military profession in Latin American countries has not been the subject of research as compared to civil–military relationships because of the political intervention of the latter. Since the 1980s, with the restoration of democracy in countries of the Southern Cone, the design and management of defense is no more a monopoly of the armed forces, and they are now exposed to a wide range of influences. On the basis of the framework proposed by Moskos, Williams, and Segal in their book: The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War, where they argue the case of the United States of America as a paradigm of the military profession changes because of the postmodernism in industrialized countries, we pretend to make a comparative analysis of the changes or modernizations experienced by the military profession in Southern Cone's countries, mainly Argentina, Brazil, and Chile.

The relations between the Latin American states and their armed forces have been a special one at all times. In this region the military played and still plays a major political role. But the political role of the military has changed several times during the last century. These changes were forced by social movements, new patterns of thought, the USA or the Cuban Revolution. During the years, the military had different self-perceptions, which caused in a lot of interventions and military dictatorships. Today, it seems that democracy is well accepted throughout Latin America, but the military still has possibilities of influence.

After September 11th the defence community of the United States of America has been trying to adapt to the threats of the 21st century. Since 2001, many specialists have devoted themselves to explaining the concept of security, while the Federal government in Washington has organised a Transformation Office attached to the Defence Department. There has been much progress in the intervening years, and two wars plus a cunning terrorist attack have helped to definitively shape the concept.

Civil–military clashes that result from tensions or even a ‘gap’ between the military organisation and civil society are rather seldom. However, from time to time the headlines of the newspapers report of ‘scandals’, ‘abuses’ or ‘wrongs’ that result from civil–military tensions. Sometimes those wrongs came out in the open after some delay. This happened in respect to a coup-attempt by General Kruls shortly after World War II (Hoogenboezem, 2004). Evaluation of and reappraisal of the war against Indonesian freedom fighters in 1946–1947, euphemistically called ‘police actions’, led to large-scale public discussions 20 years later. In the 1970s, the Dutch citizens acknowledged that these police actions actually were deeds of war and the legitimacy of this war was intensely discussed as were the war crimes committed during the anti-guerrilla operations (Doorn & Hendrix, 1970). In the 1980s, the soldiers’ union published a black book on hazing practises in the armed forces that made it into the headlines. It led to research (Stoppelenburg, 1990) and attempts to stop these practices that often stemmed from the conscripts themselves. Union work and societal forces in favour of democratisation considerably contributed to civilianisation of the armed forces. The one-liner ‘as military as necessary, as civilian as possible’ became factual accepted policy. In the early 1990s, the suspension of conscription, the most important decision of defence restructuring, barely raised societal discussion (Joana et al., 2005; Moelker, Olsthoorn, Bos-Bakx, & Soeters, 2005), but the mishap in Srebrenica in 1995 certainly did! Peacekeeping gradually was seen and socially accepted as core business and when it became evident that keeping the peace in Bosnia was not without risks and when genocidal events befell the refugees in Srebrenica, the civil–military gap was clearly revealed and became the main issue of public debate. It led to discussion on the right of freedom of speech for civil servants when armed forces functionaries overtly expressed themselves in the newspapers (Kreemers, 2002). But the humanitarian debacle also led to a parliamentary inquiry (Parlementaire Enquête commissie, 2003) that, in 2003, caused government to fall. Parliamentary decision-making procedures regarding peacekeeping missions have been improved since. Article 100 of the Constitution states that parliament must be informed on peacekeeping operations unless there are very serious considerations not to do so. Government informs parliament by use of the ‘toetsingskader’ (Moelker, 2004). This is a list of criteria that is used to provide a checklist for informing parliament and to improve the quality of the decision-making. The ‘toetsingskader’ acknowledges that decision-making is an intertwined and convergent process that improves quality by inputs from civilian stakeholders and civilian and military experts. It enables a priori parliamentary control. A list for use by parliamentarians in other countries is given by Born (2003, p. 125).

Purpose – The purpose of the study was to get a deeper understanding of officers’ views of the factors that contribute to army ranger conscripts’ willingness to apply for international military service as well as to look at the officers’ own role in the recruitment process.

Methodology/approach – A grounded theory approach was used. Nine officers from the Swedish Army Ranger Battalion were interviewed.

Findings – Factors that seem to promote the possibility to recruit conscripts to international military service could be understood from five main categories: international military service, education, officers, the Swedish Army Ranger Battalion, and recruitment.

Originality/value of paper – Interviewing key figures in the recruitment process of the Swedish Armed Forces.

The United States military, like most militaries, has traditionally been a male-dominated organisation. Contemporary military historians argue that wars and the militaries that fight them are “an entirely masculine activity” (Keegan, 1993, p. 76) and “[b]efore it was anything else, war was an assertion of masculinity. When everything else is said and done, an assertion of masculinity is what it remains” (Van Creveld, 2001, p. 161). Because the military's “core activity” is combat (…), a task viewed primarily in masculine terms because it has generally been defined as “men's work”, a “deeply entrenched cult of masculinity pervades US military culture” (Dunivin, 1997, p. 2). Language has codified the long history of the masculine warrior paradigm. Van Creveld notes that the Old Testament utilises the same term for “adult man” and “warrior” while medieval Germans used “becoming a man” and “carrying a sword” interchangeably (Van Creveld, 2001, p. 164). James Webb, former Secretary of the Navy in the late 1980s, called combat the “quintessentially male obligation in any society” (Webb, 1997, p. 4). If societies have obligated men to combat, they have rewarded them by connecting combat to the achievement of manhood. Men bestow manhood on one another: men are made, not born (Goldstein, 2001). According to Kimmel (2000a, p. 214), “What men need is men's approval (…) we test ourselves, perform heroic feats, take enormous risks, all because we want other men to grant us our manhood.”

In recent years, and especially with the war in Iraq, the U.S. military's reliance on private contractors as forces in the theater of war has grown and become increasingly clear. We critically evaluate some of the best literature on the emergence of this phenomenon – especially Ken Silverstein's Private Warriors and P. W. Singer's Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry – and find a neglect of the historical path-dependent character of the rise of the new corporate armed forces. In particular, we concentrate on American experience and two silences that are integral to understanding the path-dependent character of this process: (1) earlier historical reliance on private armed force to suppress the labor movement in America, the template for this new form of irregular armed force and (2) the ghost of Vietnam as a continuing political liability in the mobilization of sufficient troop levels under neo-imperialist aspirations and “the global war on terror,” as the main condition for the rise of the new private military form. Both elements suggest the theoretical importance of state strength/weakness in any explanation of private armed force. We discuss several important political implications of our findings.

Purpose – The present study addresses: First, which traditions are currently lived in the Swiss Armed Forces? Second, which traditions are viewed in positive or negative terms and why is this so? And finally, which traditions have disappeared and which are wished for?

Methodology/approach – Two separate surveys were conducted by the authors of this study in an attempt to answer these questions. For the first survey, qualitative interviews were conducted with 50 professional and militia military commanders in order to get the internal perspective. For the second survey, a representative sample of 1,200 Swiss voters was interviewed in an attempt to get the external perspective.

Findings – The main findings show that there are few formal traditions in the Swiss Armed Forces. The republican self-concept and the decentralized political system in Switzerland have significantly influenced the meaning of traditions and their practice. Moreover, traditions mainly serve to integrate cadres and soldiers into the military. The majority of traditions is informal or a combination of formal (top-down) and informal (bottom-up) traditions. Lost traditions not only fell victim to structural changes, but their purpose was also questioned by commanders. Two major military reforms as well as societal change are the main reasons for the disappearance of traditions in the Swiss Armed Forces. The results show a high degree of congruence with the qualitative survey. In short, the Swiss population generally views military traditions in favorable terms. In particular, it endorses traditions that serve to foster a sense of community and impart knowledge. However, traditions that stress manhood and bravery are strongly rejected.

Research limitations/implications – The approach could be applied to other cases. Case studies may be generalized in a conceptual sense.

Originality/value of paper – Case study with broader practical and research implications, invites international comparative research.

Two concurrent changes are raising questions about the interplay between armed forces and local governments in contemporary urban settings. The first one is the spatial reorganisation of armed forces that has been taking place in most European countries since the end of the Cold War. The second one is the redistribution of political authority between levels of governments that has increased the relevance of cities and transformed urban governance. The chapter conceptualises the military administration as an urban actor, whose material and symbolic resources in cities transform over time. It investigates both the effects of a (changing) military presence on urban policies, and how those changes are framed and managed by local governments. The case under consideration is the city of Taranto (Southern Italy), one among the biggest military ports on the Mediterranean Sea. Here, transformations of defence policies opened a window of opportunity for a new urban policy agenda, whose goal is a partial differentiation from military activities. During the last ten years, local political elites have been undertaking several strategies for military spaces redevelopment. However, uneven power relations prevent civilian-military bargain: redevelopment strategies are the result of either local military initiative or central State decisions.