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Toyota's management system, more formally known as the Toyota production system (TPS) is one of the most benchmarked business improvement strategies in modern industry. While many companies try to emulate Toyota's success using a variety of different approaches, most practitioners are not aware how Toyota replicates TPS at suppliers. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the in‐house capabilities that are transferred from Toyota to suppliers as a way to more deeply understand how TPS can evolve.

This work studies Toyota's supplier development practices by evaluating organizational documents using latent semantic analysis (LSA). LSA is a theory and method for extracting and representing the contextual‐usage and meaning of words and phrases by statistical computation applied to text. LSA is based on singular value decomposition (SVD), which is a mathematical matrix decomposition technique using factor analysis.

This work shows that Toyota targets processes, rather than whole systems, in assisting suppliers to be more effective at abnormality management. Findings also show that Toyota's approval process doesn't necessarily support major kaizen at suppliers yet does encourage minor day‐to‐day kaizen. Finally, this work reports that the Toyota Way for suppliers does not have to be adopted by suppliers, but does represent “A Way” to interact with suppliers to drive both culture and productivity simultaneously.

The paper uses a new method for analyzing Toyota's supplier development practices by mathematically representing and analyzing Toyota's organizational documents. This new method allows various components and features of Toyota's supplier development process to be represented and described in a way that offers many unique insights.

The purpose of this paper is to compare principles from the original Toyota Production System (TPS), the Toyota Way 2001 and Kaizen philosophy with principles derived from Japanese Zen Buddhism. The paper would also like to enlarge the debate concerning some lessons learnt from Japanese culture in order to avoid Lean implementation failures.

The original English version of Taiichi Ohno’s book dedicated to the TPS, the Toyota Way 2001 and other relevant papers regarding Kaizen were reviewed and analyzed. The principles that emerged from the review of this literature were then compared with similar philosophical principles from Japanese Soto Zen Buddhism. The literature concerning Zen philosophy was methodically analyzed and categorized using the content analysis.

The results of this research show many theoretical parallelisms as well as lessons for practitioners, in particular referring to principles such as Jidoka, just-in-time, waste identification and elimination, challenge, Kaizen, Genchi Genbutsu, respect for people and teamwork.

Analysis and results are mainly based on the literature that was found, reviewed and categorized, along with the knowledge of authors on Zen philosophy. Results could differ depending on the literature reviewed and categorized.

The results of this research bring food for thought to practitioners in terms of lessons learnt from Japanese culture, Toyota principles and management style in order to avoid Lean implementation failures.

This is one of the first papers which compares Lean-TPS and Kaizen principles with the Zen philosophy to try to learn lessons for succeeding in Lean implementation.

The purpose of this article is to better understand Japanese manufacturing in mainland China and clarify how traditional Japanese subcontracting has changed and is changing to fit the economic environment there.

This article looks at the subcontracting practices of the Toyota Group along with the evolution of Shanghai Koito's operations in mainland China. The research for this study was conducted from 1995‐2003 and is based on visits to Toyota's China headquarters in Beijing and its technical center in Tianjin, Shanghai Koito Company, Sichuan Toyota, and Tianjin Toyota.

When Japanese style subcontracting in mainland China is compared with that of traditional Japanese subcontracting, a stark contrast is revealed. First of all, it is clear that Japanese‐affiliated enterprises in China are moving away from an insular, vertical subcontracting structure dominated by a single assembler. In the new subcontracting system, characteristic features – such as a broad customer base and localization – contrast with earlier features that included a substantial delegation of authority, regulated interfirm competition, and long‐term relations.

This paper is based on two case studies and so, while its findings may be accurate for the companies in question, helpful for understanding Japan's auto industry in mainland China, and may be more widely applicable, the findings are unlikely to be universally applicable.

With short‐term guidance corresponding to the needs of localization and the effective use of cheap labor coming to the fore, the examples of Toyota and Shanghai Koito may provide helpful illustrations of the kind of adaptation needed to succeed in mainland China. In particular, by moving away from a reliance on its traditional Japanese customers for sales, Shanghai Koito seems to have positioned itself well to avoid the hardship of dwindling sales that other more traditionally oriented Japanese suppliers have begun to face. Moreover, its growing independence may be an important indicator of what the future may look like for Japanese manufacturing.

Looking at the history of industrial development in East Asia, the adaptation of Japanese business practices to different economies in the region has been an important theme. This study provides an up‐to‐date review of a number of current issues facing Japanese automakers as they develop their operations in mainland China.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze Toyota's management directed kaizen activities named Jishuken. Currently, there are many variations in understanding how Toyota develops its managers to support daily kaizen, especially when Toyota managers have different levels of understanding of Toyota production system (TPS) and skills essential in applying TPS.

This paper will study Toyota's Jishuken process in the context of strengthening TPS and analyze both the technical and management aspects of Toyota's Jishuken process.

When integrated into plant‐wide long‐term continuous improvement, Jishukens can be extremely effective at developing management's ability to conduct and to teach others to conduct daily kaizen and problem solving. This paper shows how Jishukens function within the TPS system to continuously improve managers' understanding of TPS both for their own concrete problem solving and to support manager's roles in communicating, coaching and teaching problem solving to production workers.

Most attempts to imitate Toyota fail because techniques are adopted piecemeal with little understanding of why they exist or what kind of organizational culture is needed to keep them alive. Jishuken serves as an example of a technique which is successful only when embedded within the right organizational culture.

We have analysed the human resources management system in Japanese automobile companies, Toyota and Nissan, in their overseas production plants in the UK and have tried to analyse differences if any between their original human resources management system in Japan and in their foreign operations. We found out that these companies, as far as their internal operations are concerned, have tried to implement their original practices in spite of cultural differences. However, in the case of production management system they are not completely successful because of organisational differences in their foreign locations. We have analysed the effects of these novel practices on the industrial scene in the UK in general.

Examines how Toyota′s worldwide HRM practice has been developed to sustain the Toyota Production System. Explains how, in setting up the European assembly plant in the UK, Toyota has been faced with both strong forces for international consistency in HRM practices and strong local cultural forces calling for differentiation. Analyses this dialectic of forces by critically examining Toyota′s emergent HRM practices at its UK plant. These HRM practices are intended by the company to promote the four goals of employee integration with the organization; employee commitment; workforce flexibility and adaptability; and, finally, an emphasis on quality. Evaluates the evidence.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the manifold linkages connecting the Toyota Production System (TPS) back to the Gilbreths and others, and to determine how these have contributed to enterprise‐wide best practice. Industrial engineering (IE) theory rapidly subsumed method study and thereby made considerable contributions to output in World War II (WWII). The outcome is the positing of “contemporary” IE.

Consideration is given to the Japanese Management Association (JMA) personal handshake route originated by Frank Gilbreth in which experiences were handed down in lecture note format by successive generations of industrial engineers. His interaction with the FW Taylor Scientific Management movement is a second theme. The internationally recognised “softer” approach to teaching and coaching due to Lillian Gilbreth is then discussed. Finally the Gilbreth MOI2 Process Chart is examined.

TPS has evolved over an extended period of time to achieve continuous material flow. There has been no single procedure or technical breakthrough. Much of the detail would have been familiar to the Gilbreths. These became evident in the USA and the UK auto industries soon after the First World War. Elements of JIT are recognisable even earlier in the building of the UK Crystal Palace in 1851. However the scenario of the current TPS enterprise would be new to the Gilbreths. Similarly the various ways in which the systems approach has been successfully implemented throughout the organisation would appear strange. This becomes self‐evident via a three‐axis model representation of contemporary industrial engineering.

Newly appointed Toyota executives pursuing the shopfloor based Acclimatisation Course would immediately recognise the method study based waste elimination techniques at work. As Ohno remarked, such removal merely levels the playing field. Knowledge (and above all practice) in their use should be a pre‐requisite skill for employees at all levels. This is a sometimes “hidden” secret of TPS, but dates back to Lillian Gilbreth in 1914.

The paper supports the view that effective product delivery is best driven via sound industrial engineering expertise operating within an active learning organisation. The four level prism model applied to TPS highlights its system attributes.

The paper confirms there is a continuing role for well established method study techniques to be adapted to face new challenges, and output as “contemporary” industrial engineering.

The purpose of this paper is to provide a historical account of the significant role that Connecticut businesses and business leaders had in the spread of Lean management throughout the USA. The paper aims to describe what happens when managers do not understand and apply an important principle of Lean management.

Survey of published and unpublished records, as well as personal communications with key figures.

Establishes the role and importance of Connecticut businesses and business leaders in the discovery and dissemination of Lean management in America since 1979, external to Toyota and its affiliated suppliers.

The accuracy of some past events necessarily relies on the recollection of key figures that were obtained by personal communications.

Describes how an important principle, “respect for people,” was not understood by most management practitioners, thus hindering efforts to correctly practice Lean management and improve business performance.

The paper provides a historical account of Lean management in America, focusing on activities that occurred in the State of Connecticut post‐1979. Description and relevance of a key area of misunderstanding among practitioners of the Lean management system.

The purpose of this paper is to introduce management historians to the long‐forgotten work of Frank George Woollard (1883‐1957), who in the mid‐1920s established flow production in the British motor industry, and its remarkable similarity to current‐day production principles and practices used by Toyota Motor Corporation, also known as lean production.

Overview of Frank Woollard's life and work obtained from newly discovered journal papers, his 1954 book, Principles of Mass and Flow Production, newly discovered archives, and new first‐hand testimony from a close friend and from a long‐time family friend.

Frank Woollard was a pioneer in the establishment of flow production in the British motor industry in the mid‐1920s and the principal developer of automatic transfer machinery. His accomplishments are comparable to Taiichi Ohno, regarded as the architect of Toyota's production system.

Woollard's accomplishments in flow production are a fruitful area for future research given the speed and completeness with which flow production was established at Morris Motors Ltd, Engines Branch. Newly discovered papers describing his flow production system have yet to be studied in detail by academics.

Woollard's application of flow production beginning in 1923 means that timelines for discoveries and attributions of key accomplishments in lean management must be reexamined and revised.

Woollard's work fills important gaps in the literature on the history of flow production generally and in the British motor industry in particular. His work constitutes an early application of current‐day lean principles and practices, and is therefore noteworthy and relevant to management historians and the operations and production management community. It is hoped that this paper will inspire management historians to study Woollard's work and place him in the context of other early twentieth‐century pioneers in industrial management and flow production.

The Japanese prefabrication industry not only has automated its processes to a high extent, but it also innovates due to the fact that it delivers buildings of outstanding quality accompanied by a multitude of services. In order to explore and specify the concepts and parameters that have driven this industry, Japan's prefabrication industry, its cultural, economic and technological surrounding, as well as the applied processes, technologies and economic strategies, have to be illustrated and analysed. The purpose of this paper is to identify, describe and analyse these concepts and their related parameters, as well as to recognise the most influential drivers for the future that provide an indication into which direction the industry could evolve.

Being aware that literature does not provide relevant information and data, which would allow the authors to explore concepts and parameters explaining the success of the Japanese prefabrication industry, the authors performed field surveys, visited factories, R&D centres and sales points of all major Japanese prefabrication companies. In some cases the authors also interviewed general managers, researchers and developers, and academicians at Japanese universities. Based on an extensive literature review in the area of product development, production technology, modularisation, mass customisation, and innovation, the authors qualitatively and quantitatively analysed all major prefabrication companies according to a fixed scheme.

The concepts and parameters identified and analysed in this paper demonstrate that the Japanese prefabrication industry, which is leading in large‐scale industrialization, nowadays focuses towards services that are related to the building's utilisation phase, rather than delivering products. By involving customers it enhances the companies' customer relations, thus creating competitive advantages.

Overall the paper identifies that Japanese prefabrication industry acts rather like a “production industry” than a “construction industry”. Similar to many other high‐tech industries, Japan's prefabrication industry incorporates the latest product and process technologies and combines automation, products and services into complex value‐capturing systems.