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This paper aims to present an analysis of the role of financial incentives, moral hazard and conflicts of interests leading up to the 2008 financial crisis.

The study’s analysis has identified common structural flaws throughout the securitization food chain. These structural flaws include inappropriate incentives, the absence of punishment, moral hazard and conflicts of interest. This research sees the full impact of these structural flaws when considering their co-occurrence throughout the financial system. The authors address systemic defects in the securitization food chain and examine the inter-relationships among homeowners, mortgage originators, investment banks and investors. The authors also address the role of exogenous factors, including the SEC, AIG, the credit rating agencies, Congress, business academia and the business media.

The study argues that the lack of criminal prosecutions of key financial executives has been a key factor in creating moral hazard. Eight years after the Great Recession ended in the USA, the financial services industry continues to suffer from a crisis of trust with society.

An overwhelming majority of Americans, 89 per cent, believe that the federal government does a poor job of regulating the financial services industry (Puzzanghera, 2014). A study argues that the current corporate lobbying framework undermines societal expectations of political equality and consent (Alzola, 2013). The authors believe the Singapore model may be a useful starting point to restructure regulatory agencies so that they are more responsive to societal concerns and less responsive to special interests. Finally, the widespread perception is that the financial services sector, in particular, is ethically challenged (Ferguson, 2012); perhaps there would be some benefit from the implementation of ethical climate monitoring in firms that have been subject to deferred prosecution agreements for serious ethical violations (Arnaud, 2010).

The authors believe the paper makes a truly original contribution. They provide new insights via their analysis of the role of financial incentives, moral hazard and conflicts of interests leading up to the 2008 financial crisis.

The purpose of this paper is to study the evolution of financial contagion between Eurozone banks, observing the credit default swaps (CDSs) market during the period 2009–2017.

The authors use a dynamic spatial Durbin model that enables to explore the direct and indirect effects over the short and long run and the transmission channels of the contagion.

The results show how contagion emerges through physical and financial market links between banks. This finding implies that a bank can fail because people expect other related financial institutions to fail as well (self-fulfilling crisis). The study provides statistically significant evidence of the presence of credit risk spillovers in CDS markets. The findings show that equity market dynamics of “neighbouring” banks are important factors in risk transmission.

The research provides a new contribution to the analysis of EZ banking risk contagion, studying CDS spread determinants both under a temporal and spatial dimension. Considering the cross-dependence of credit spreads, the study allowed to verify the non-linearity between the probability of default of a debtor and the observed credit spreads (credit spread puzzle). The authors provide information on the transmission mechanism of contagion and, on the effects among the largest banks. In fact, through the study of short- and long-term impacts, direct and indirect, the paper classify banks of systemic importance according to their effect on the financial system.

The impact of diversification on bank stability and risk remains an ongoing topic of discussion with inconclusive results. Hence, this study investigated the implications of income diversification on bank stability within African markets.

The study utilised longitudinal financial data on 45 countries from 2000 to 2017 and employed static and dynamic panel model estimation.

The results of the study suggest income diversification technique could improve financial stability throughout typical and crisis periods which validate portfolio management theory. The study also confirms the “too big to fail” hypothesis, extensive diversifying over an optimal range negatively impacts stability. Banks with a high level of liquidity, a higher operating efficiency and a larger deposit ratio become more resilient. Banking capital regulations found to be the appropriate monitoring instrument for lowering risks and maintaining stability. However, profitability was found to have a positive effect on bank risk-taking. The finding also suggests that political institutions have substantial, direct implications that are positively related to bank fragility. Macroeconomic factors such as gross domestic product (GDP) growth and inflation also influenced bank stability.

This study has important implications for bankers, regulators and academicians concerned about the effect of diversification on a bank’s risk-taking or stability in developing economies.

To the best of the author’s knowledge, this is the first study on Africa to analyse the quadratic influence of income diversification and the effects of political institutions on the level of bank stability.

Because systemically important banks' takeovers in the US were expected to contain the 2008 global financial crisis (GFC) but were found to have imposed large cost on shareholders, this paper examines the effectiveness of these acquisitions during the GFC and investigates what went wrong with the market for corporate control of large banks.

This paper presents a model of the disciplinary takeover based on the efficient market hypothesis which provides appropriate measures for it to examine the financial performance of acquiring banks after takeover.

The results indicate that the takeover market for large banks was ineffective in two aspects: the market did not distinguish strong banks from weak banks before the crisis and acquirers performed worse after takeover. Such ineffectiveness reflects the fundamental deficiencies of large bank takeovers arising from some key distinguishing characteristics of large banks.

The sample size of systemically important banks' takeovers is small so large-sample standard statistical inferences cannot be used.

The deficiencies of large bank takeovers need to be rectified in order to aid in resolving future crises.

This paper provides rare and detailed insight based on case studies of large US bank takeovers during the GFC.

The purpose of this study is to examine how five different multi-level governance (MLG) models affect place branding (PB) performance in Saudi Arabia.

In hierarchical administrative systems, central governments exert control on PB, influencing its effectiveness. While PB as such is widely studied, the effect of MLG on PB performance in centralized administrative systems remains understudied. The study is approached as a multiple case study of nine cities.

The study reveals that different MLG models indeed affect PB performance differently. Direct access to central leadership and resources boosts branding performance, while privatization promotes flexibility with similarly positive effects. Study findings, furthermore, show that some cities are considered too big to fail. Cities such as Riyadh and Neom are of prime importance and receive plenty of resources and leadership attention, while others are considered peripheral, are under-resourced and branding performance suffers accordingly. Emerging differences in PB performance associated with different MLG models are thus likely to deepen the gap between urban economic winners and losers.

This paper introduces five MLG models based on the actors involved in PB, their interactions and their access to resources. For each model, this paper assesses other factors which may influence the effectiveness of PB as well, such as access to the national leadership and staff capacity. This research thereby adds to the literature by identifying specific factors within MLG models influencing PB performance in hierarchical administrative systems.