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Interorganizational partner selection decisions are plagued with uncertainty. When making partnering decisions, firms strive to answer two questions: does the prospective partner have resources which can be used to generate value in the relationship; and will the partner be willing to actively share these resources and cooperate in good faith? Answers to these questions help reduce three types of uncertainty – partner capability uncertainty, partner competitiveness uncertainty and partner reliability uncertainty. For a relationship to benefit both partners, they have to possess complimentary resources of comparable quality, avoid explicit competition as well as be willing to engage in the cooperative behaviors within the confines of their relationship. In this paper, we examine the importance of prospective partners’ characteristics (differences in size, status and specialization) as well as their network characteristics (existence of a common partner and membership in the same clique) to the formation and longevity of their social relationships, as these characteristics reduce firms’ value generation and partner reliability uncertainty.

We introduce a multi-level model of the dependence of interfirm network topologies on the distribution and commonality of information in a network and the information strategies pursued by its member firms. Network topology, information properties of the network, and firm-level action within the network form dynamic, recursive, cross-level relationships – information properties in the network determine firm-level action, which in turn impacts the network topology and information properties. We derive predictions about the kinds of information strategies that firms are likely to adopt and succeed with in different information regimes, and about the kinds and short- and long-run dynamics of network topologies expected under different information regimes. Our model sheds new light on network topologies as a dependent variable that can be explained by network-level information regimes and firm-level information strategies.

In this reply, we respond to a series of substantive comments on our work by both Madhavan and Walker. In our response to Madhavan’s comments, we consider three accounts – “weak,” “semi-strong” and “strong” – that clarify how our model “explains” and offers insights that can emerge from our modeling strategy. We also explore ways in which our explanatory strategy might be extended in light of his critique. In our response to Walker’s comments, we adopt the “semi-strong” thesis, which admits variation in network-generating mechanisms, while also recognizing that information needs to be distributed and shared in order for many types of networks to function.