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To raise the quality of regulatory capital, Basel III capital rules recognize unrealized gains and losses on all available-for-sale (AFS) securities in Common Equity Tier 1 Capital (CET1). However, by examining the correlations between U.S. GDP growth rate, interest rates and regulatory capital ratios computed using Basel III regulatory capital definition for six U.S. global systemically important banks (G-SIBs) since 2007, this chapter finds that Basel III regulatory capital will enhance the pro-cyclicality of Basel III leverage ratio and Tier 1 capital ratio and their sensitivity to long-term interest rates. Therefore, Basel III capital standards may have significant implications for bank supervision and bank capital risk management in the near future. As banks will hold more high-quality liquid assets (HQLAs) as required by Basel III Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR), the weight of unrealized gains and losses arising from fair value accounting will increase in Basel III Tier 1 capital base, the consequent increase of pro-cyclicality in a bank’s regulatory capital ratios may distort the true picture of bank capital adequacy. If an expected loss approach (EL) is used as the provisioning model, such capital risk may be increased further. Moreover, as U.S. monetary policy has started tapering quantitative easing, long-term interest rates will increase inevitably. This may increase the negative impact of unrealized gains and losses on AFS securities on bank capital. As a result, it may be difficult for banks to maintain appropriate capital ratios to meet regulatory requirements and support business activities.

This chapter examines the impact of economic policy uncertainty (EPU) on bank profitability, using a sample of US banks from 2001 to 2016. We find a robust negative relationship between the aggregate level of policy uncertainty and bank profitability. The channel analysis shows that policy uncertainty can significantly reduce loan growth and increase the nonperforming loan ratio. More importantly, we find critical evidence that bank capital can improve the impact of policy uncertainty on the bank's economic performance and operation. Overall, this chapter has an important policy implication: policymakers can reduce the adverse effect of policy uncertainty on the banking industry through measures to stabilize bank capital adequacy.

In the economic literature, a crisis has been thematically defined around bank runs, failure of large financial corporations, and financial distress. Section 1 summarizes our learnings about international banking crisis, in terms of the origin and impact of such crises. This provides us an international benchmark before we delve deeper into India's banking distress, its size and trends. Section 2 focuses on the twin-balance-sheet crisis in India. On one side, corporate firms recklessly overleveraged, resulting in excess capacities and business diversification. On the other side, banks, both private and public, fell prey to excessive and procyclical credit lending and improper monitoring. Overall, too many projects were left too weakly monitored. Separately, we have focused on two subsections, first, how the financial institutions in India have overstretched their credit-disposal limit during market upturns. Second, we found absence of any theoretically grounded approaches to determine the capital-adequacy ratios (CARs) for the banks. In Section 3, we have identified the steps taken so far by the Banking regulator and the Government to resolve the crisis. Further, we critically examine the role of Korea Asset Management Corporation (KAMCO) towards a successful non-performing assets (NPAs) resolution in South Korea. Few key takeaways include, (1) establishing a public asset-management company (AMC) focused on maximization of recoveries and resolution of stressed assets, (2) well-defined governance structure for the AMC ensuring it works on market principles, shielded from political interferences, and (3) realistic asset valuation and transfer price that ensures limited downside risks for the public AMC.

The London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) is considered to be the most important interest rate in finance upon which trillions in financial contracts are decided. In 2008, it was revealed that the LIBOR traders were rigging the interest rates. Yet, there is an unresolved question that regulators and banking officials did not address in their quest to seek answers to the fraud: Were the banks under financial strain when they underreported their LIBOR rates? To answer this question, the article posits that the pressure to meet market expectations led the banks to experience financial strain. Data were gathered from 2004 to 2008 on the banks that were involved in the fraud (fraud banks) and matched with a control group of non-fraud banks. The results from a logistic regression model found sufficient statistical evidence to support the claim that fraud will be greater in banks characterized by a higher level of organizational complexity. Variables such as percent of outside directors, board members on the audit committee, and number of employees were all found to be statistically significant. These variables may offer key insights into detecting and preventing frauds in banks.

We describe some recent contingent capital securities (CoCos) and explore the issues that confront their development. We take the view that bank CoCos should be designed to maintain confidence in a bank before a crisis begins because once a crisis commences it is difficult to see how a bank can assure the capital market without the support of state aid. With this overriding objective in mind we find that, in at least some respects, existing examples of bank CoCos have got the ‘right’ design. Existing bank CoCos are unfunded as they should be as there is no need to structure these securities to provide additional liquidity. If funding turns out to be necessary then a liquidity crisis is already underway and the CoCo has already failed in its attempt to maintain confidence in the bank. Moreover, existing CoCos use the simpler single trigger that we favour rather than dual trigger structure recommended by some.

Purpose: This chapter discusses some policy options that central banks may find useful in dealing with climate change risk in the financial sector.

Methodology: This chapter uses discursive analysis to suggest policy options which central banks can use to deal with the risk of climate change in the financial sector.

Findings: Five policy options are proposed in the chapter, which includes: imposing a climate change capital surcharge; impose a fixed-rate risk capital – based on Tier 2 capital; a reduction in lending to industries whose activities destroy the environment and climate; creating a climate bank; and requiring financial institutions to relocate their important assets to areas less prone to climate change events.

Implication: Several policy experiments are needed to identify the best policy option that works best for each country while taking into account the unique financial sector, financial system, and climate change history of each country.

Originality: Central banks play an important role in regulating the financial sector and in managing its inherent risks, yet there are no studies that suggest policy solutions to help central banks and other financial sector regulators deal with the risk that climate change poses to the financial sector. This chapter suggests policy options that central banks can use to deal with the risk that climate change poses to the financial sector.