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The purpose of this study is to address the question that economic standards, norms and regulations can possess weak spots that might be exploitable for the embezzlement of an organization’s assets with resultant material consequences in money laundering,tax evasion, fraud, corruption and other potential financial crimes.

The author’s methodological approach is to introduce and discuss a new logical-deductive test that the author names “embezzler test”. The author’s test investigates regulatory architectures from the perspective of someone attempting to divert assets from or to an organization. It appraises whether a potential embezzler could divert resources without being detected and sanctioned.

The embezzler test can be applied to a broad range of standards, norms and regulations.

This new test can be improved and further calibrated in future research.

Researchers, regulators and law makers can use the new test to identify and eventually fix weak spots for embezzlement in norms, standards and regulations.

To the best of the author’s knowledge, such a test has never been formulated or applied before to identify weak spots for potential embezzlement in regulatory architectures.

In the euro’s initial years, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain observed capital flow bonanzas and credit-booms, two cycles known to precede banking crises. Domestic banks fuelled those cycles via funding obtained from foreign financial institutions. Yet, these countries’ banking and financial crises have unfolded in different modes. In Ireland and Spain, credit-booms propelled real-estate bubbles, which dragged banks into crises, with governments’ accounts later being affected when rescuing banks (Spanish regional banks, and all Irish major banks). In Greece and Italy, extra monetary means perpetuated government imbalances (e.g. debt levels above 100% of GDP, large yearly deficits). More severely in Greece, banks were brought into crises by sovereign crises. In Portugal, a mixture of private and public sector–led crises have occurred. Our comparative study finds that these crises: (1) are connected to shocks and imbalances caused by dangerous banking sector cycles during the monetary integration process; (2) were not mere expansions of the US subprime crisis; (3) were not only caused by country-specific features and institutions; and (4) followed distinct paths, therefore, a uniform model encompassing all post-euro crises cannot exist.