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The design of a macro-prudential framework and its interaction with monetary policy has been at the forefront of the policy agenda since the global financial crisis. However, most advanced economies (AEs) have little experience using macroprudential policies. As a result, relatively little is known empirically about macroprudential instruments’ effectiveness in mitigating systemic risks in these countries, about their channels of transmission, and about how these instruments would interact with monetary policy. This paper aims to fill in the gap.

The authors develop a new approach using the euro area bank lending survey to assess the effectiveness of macro-prudential policies in containing credit growth and house price appreciation in mortgage markets. Estimation is performed under the panel regressions (OLS, GLS) and panel VAR setup. Endogeneity issues arising from measures of macro-prudential policies are addressed by introducing GMM estimation and various instruments.

The authors find instruments targeting the cost of bank capital most effective in slowing down mortgage credit growth, and that the impact is transmitted mainly through price margins, the same banking channel as monetary policy. Limits on loan-to-value ratios are also effective, especially when monetary policy is excessively loose.

With limited data on macroprudential policy measures in the AEs, this paper proposed a new methodology of using answers from bank lending survey as proxies to assess the effectiveness of specific macroprudential measures and their transmission channels.

The paper refers to the development process of corporate governance and shareholder activism in transition economies. It identifies the existing corporate governance structure as well as main problems analysing conflicts in Polish corporations portraying the shareholders' fight for control over the corporations. The analysis of several selected shareholder conflicts, referring particularly to the fights of dominant and minority shareholders allows to point out main shortcomings of corporate governance in transition economies. The lack of standards for corporate behaviour, the poor legal system characterized by weak enforcement of investor protection rights (law in action), the practically non‐existent shareholder litigation as well as the development stage of the shareholder activism. Finally, the paper attempts to trace the development of shareholder protection and ethical behaviour presenting the process of setting high standards for the corporate activity with the reference to transparency, the treatment of minority shareholders and the managerial accountability as well as the monitoring role of authorities carried out by Polish Securities and Exchange Commission and non‐governmental associations or business initiatives (Polish Institutes of Directors, Polish Institute for Investor Relations).