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The study draws upon three accounts to examine post-truth politics and its link to accounting. In studying Petrobras, a Brazilian petrochemical company embroiled in a corruption scandal, the authors draw upon a politics of falsity to understand how different depictions of similar events can emerge. The authors depict Petrobras' corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosures during the period of corruption juxtaposed against the Brazilian Federal Police investigation (the Lava Jato/Car Wash Operation) and Petrobras' response to the allegations of institutional corruption.

The data set consisted of 56 Petrobras reports including Annual Reports, Financial Statements, Sustainability Reports and Form 20-Fs from 2004 to 2017, information disclosed by the Brazilian Federal Police concerning the Lava Jato Operation and media reports concerning Petrobras and the corruption scandal. The paper employs a discourse analysis approach to depict and interpret the accounts.

Through examining the connection between ontic accounts and ontological presuppositions, the authors illustrate a post-truth logic underpinning accounting, due to the interpretive, contestable and contingent nature of accounting information. Consequently, the authors turn to the “ethics of the real” as a response, as citizen subjects must be cautious in how they approach accounting and CSR disclosures.

Rather than relying on simplistic true/false dualities, the authors argue that the “ethics of the real” provides a courageous position for citizen subjects to interrogate the organisation by recognising the role of discourse and disclosure expectations on organisations in a post-truth environment. The study also illustrates how competing, contingent accounts of the same timeframe and events can emerge.

To examine the general political structure and background to decision making in aviation policy.

Largely conceptual and theoretical, applied to political and historical examples.

That ‘politics as usual’ signifies a structure characterised by adherence to underlying presuppositions which guide political and economic action and that moves towards different ways of thinking and acting and that environmental policy faces an uphill battle in the light of these often unacknowledged and typically unquestioned presuppositions.

Political action requires an accurate understanding of the circumstances in which it is to be undertaken. This chapter provides a clue to that proper understanding and hence is valuable for the appropriate orientation of political action.

The chapter employs an everyday term, ‘politics as usual’, and analyses its structure, claiming that it identifies a real underlying set of default positions in politics.

Although Niklas Luhmann refrains from an explicit treatment of power as a force of social constraint, I propose that, if partially reconstructed, his Systems Theory can illuminate the subject considerably. I show this by distinguishing between five elements in Luhmann's treatment of each of the following six social subsystems: the economy, politics, law, science, religion and education. The five subsystem elements are: (1) a binary code, (2) a basis of authority, (3) a language of social communication, (4) a generalized medium of communication, and (5) a social function. Whereas Luhmann assumes that each subsystem approximates autopoiesis, or self‐contained internal operation and autonomy, I assume the pervasiveness of interpenetration, whereby operations is one subsystem nonetheless affect operations in others. Subsequently, I juxtapose the reconstructed systems‐theoretic framework developed in the first half of the paper with Michel Foucault's power/knowledge framework. I conclude that the use of a reconstructed systems‐theoretic approach, based loosely on Luhmann's original theory, could greatly illuminate the specifics of power/knowledge in modern societies, to an even greater extent than Foucault does himself.

Recently there has been much discussion of the relevance to sociology of Wittgenstein's philosophy. In this discussion, reference has been made to Wittgenstein's remarks on classification. For instance, Dutton writes “After Wittgenstein, we might say that the category of acts which may be labelled criminal (or deviant) is the category: “any” acts”. (Ditton, 1979, p. 20). According to Hughes, “Wittgenstein uses the term “family resemblances” to make the point that states of affairs falling under a common term, such as ‘games’ show overlapping similarities and resemblances rather than universal, finitely specifiable common properties”. (1977, p. 72). However, the philosophical importance of Wittgenstein's remarks and their relevance to the concerns of the sociologist have not been fully explored. What precisely is Wittgenstein thought to be asserting and denying with his observations about games? After all, on the face of it, it hardly seems controversial or interesting to say that games resemble each other. It has been argued, most notably by Bambrough, that Wittgenstein's remarks are directed towards “the problem of universals”.

There is no argument among serious researchers that a mongoloid stock first colonized the New World from Asia. Nor is there controversy about the fact that these continental pioneers used the Bering Land Bridge that then connected the Asian Far East with Alaska.– Gerald F. Shields, et al.American Journal of Genetics (1992)

This essay investigates the meaning of rationality in Michel Foucault's notion of “governmental rationality,” both in what he takes rationalities to be and in how they relate to practices of governing. I try to resolve these questions in a sympathetic manner by detailing some of the social dynamics implicit in practices of governing. Pierre Bourdieu provides means to connect such practices with a detailed understanding of social struggle and resistance to power. These insights reveal strong lines of continuity between governmental rationality and collective political resistance to it. On this basis, I suggest a new path of investigation into forms of popular sovereignty as relatively neglected examples of governmental rationality.

“In so far as stray thoughts, giants, and brownies, lies and errors are really existing, though only in the imaginations of men, to that extent they are true. All errors and lies are true errors and true lies, hence are not so far removed from truth that one should belong to heaven and the other to eternal damnation.” (Dietzgen: The Positive Outcome of Philosophy).

Max Horkheimer and Theodore Adorno were affiliated with the Institute for Social Research throughout their careers.¹ Even today, no single work encompasses systematically and completely Critical Theory's major principles, methodology, and findings.² Traditional social science embodies a Cartesian world view taken directly from the empirical sciences. Explanation depends on logical and empirically verified propositions. Living and nonliving phenomena, for empiricists, exist in a net of causal relationships that emerge by analytically deconstructing reality into unilinear deductive sets and stressing data accumulation. Horkheimer, on the other hand, felt that scientific theorizing is historically conditioned.³ Empirical science presupposes an a priorism that is derived from, and reflects, dominant social values. Science can never be independent and a priori. It is always linked to hidden socioeconomic forces. For Horkheimer, traditional theory is a reified ideological category. It is constrained by empirical evidence and it annihilates the social totality, fueling capitalism with an expanding technology and obscuring the linkages between economic exploitation and bourgeois democracy.